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Abstract 
 By using a modified version of the misinformation paradigm, this thesis 
examined a new and ecologically realistic domain for the investigation of false 
memories: Brands retroactively replaced in photographs. The main research questions 
addressed in this work was whether retroactively replaced brands in doctored 
photographs could influence memories for previously experienced brands. Following 
from this, the question of whether false brand memories would have any attitudinal or 
behavioural consequences for falsely remembered brands was addressed. Five 
experiments were carried out that included four misinformation studies (Experiments 
1, 3, 4, and 5) as well as one brand norming study (Experiment 2). Whereas all four 
misinformation studies examined the effects of a ‘brand misinformation effect’, 
Experiment 5 went one step further and examined the behavioural and attitudinal 
repercussions of false brand memories. In line with previous research, the results of 
all misinformation studies revealed reliable misinformation effects. These effects 
were found in more manufactured settings in which brands were experienced as brand 
placements in photographs (Experiments 1 and 3) but also in settings in which 
participants were misled on actual past autobiographical brand experiences 
(Experiments 4 and 5). Furthermore, the results of this thesis suggest that false brand 
memories could be accompanied by preference changes. That is, the data of 
Experiment 5 showed that false brand memories for ‘less liked’ competitor brands led 
to a positive shift in attitudes and behaviour towards these falsely remembered 
brands. These findings extend the applicability of the classical misinformation 
paradigm by showing reliable misinformation effects in a new and ecologically 
relevant context – retroactively changed brands in photographs. Second, these 
findings show the additional consequences of false memories for a new kind of 
stimuli that are real and competitive in nature and are associated with participants’ 
personal preferences. The practical and theoretical implications of misinformation-
induced false memories elicited by suggestive photographs are discussed. 
  
  
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
  
  
11 
Introduction 
 Increased advertising clutter in traditional mass media and technological 
advancement has led to the emergence of more innovative methods of advertising in 
recent years. One method that has become an indispensable part of the marketing mix 
for many companies is social media marketing. Aza Raskin, the former creative lead 
of Firefox, recently predicted that marketers might start to apply a new form of brand 
communication: Social network platforms could be used to replace existing brands in 
personal photos uploaded by their users. This retroactive product placement might 
create false memories for brands that were only suggested to the viewer (Raskin, 
2010). Because, in marketing, consumers’ individual experiences are considered to be 
key for future purchasing behaviour, in one form or another such a technique might 
indeed find its way into the marketer’s toolbox. But could advertisers really use this 
method to direct how past experiences with a brand are remembered and even go so 
far as to change a brand preference? 
 Support for the effectiveness of retroactive product placement comes from 
more than four decades of extensive false memory research. Here, hundreds of 
studies have provided evidence that individuals create false recollections of events 
that never actually occurred (Gallo, 2010) or that they confuse incidents that 
happened prior to or after an actual event with the original event itself (Loftus, 2003; 
Roediger & Gallo, 2004). By using a variety of false memory paradigms, researchers 
have repeatedly and reliably triggered spontaneously generated false memories for 
non-presented materials (e.g. the Deese/Roediger–McDermott paradigm [DRM; 
Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995]), implanted rich false memories for 
entire events (Bernstein, Scoboria, & Arnold, 2015), or implanted explicitly 
suggested false event details (e.g. the misinformation paradigm; Loftus, 2005). Over 
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the years, false memory effects have found applications in a number of areas, 
including the accuracy of eyewitness reports in legal settings (see, Loftus & Cahill, 
2007, for a review). More recently, these effects have been extended to areas such as 
marketing and advertising (e.g. Braun-LaTour, LaTour, Pickrell, & Loftus, 2004; 
Braun, Ellis, & Loftus, 2002; Sherman, Follows, Mushore, Hampson-Jones, & 
Wright-Bevans, 2015). For example, by using a suggestive advertisement, Braun and 
Loftus (1998) misled participants on the colour of a previously seen chocolate bar 
wrapper, a finding the researchers called the ‘advertising misinformation effect’. 
Braun et al. (2002) showed that it is even possible to implant rich false memories for 
an impossible event (e.g. shaking hands with a Warner character such as Bugs Bunny 
in Disneyland as a child) by exposing participants to a misleading advertisement. 
Although relatively little research has been done in this area, the studies that have 
been conducted provide reason to believe that false memory effects could be 
triggered by everyday life situations such as exposure to advertising. However, the 
exposure to retroactive product replacement would directly mislead a person on a 
previously experienced brand and hence, trigger a ‘brand misinformation effect’. 
 In the psychological literature, the most widely used technique to induce 
misleading postevent information is the misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 2003; 
Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). In this standard three-step paradigm, participants are 
typically exposed to events (e.g. a crime scene depicted in slide shows, videos, or 
staged by live actors), they then receive misleading information about the event in the 
form of a narrative or misleading questions (e.g. that a knife, not a gun, was used in 
the crime), and finally complete a memory test for what happened in the original 
event. The typical finding is that the misleading information is falsely reported as 
being part of the original event. This effect has been found in strictly controlled lab 
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environments in which both the original event and the misinformation phase were 
manufactured (e.g. Loftus et al., 1978), but also in more ecologically natural settings 
in which participants were misled on actual past autobiographical events (e.g. Loftus, 
Levidow, & Duensing, 1992; Wylie et al., 2014). The nature of this phenomenon has 
been explained by various theories. One frequently used theory, source-monitoring, 
proposes that participants confuse the sources of information. More specifically, that 
they confuse the source of the misleading information with the source of the original 
event. Indeed, it is well known that information about an event can be better 
remembered than the information about its source (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993).   
 Although the misinformation effect is well established in psychological 
literature, only a few studies exist that have used this paradigm to directly suggest 
contradicting brand information. In a more traditional misinformation study, Belli 
(1993; see also Frost, 2000, for a similar study) used brand items (e.g. versions of a 
soft drink, type of coffee, magazines) as critical objects in a slide show depicting a 
crime scene. When reading a narrative about the presence of these objects, some were 
replaced with misleading alternative brands (e.g. if they saw a Maxwell coffee jar in 
the slide show, this was replaced with Nescafe in the narrative). A second control 
narrative was used in which the object type (e.g. a coffee jar) was referred to but not 
the specific brand. In a final recognition test, participants recalled more misleading 
items in the misled narrative condition compared to the control narrative condition. 
However, consumer memory was not the focus of this study and other items types as 
brands (e.g. tools) were used as critical items as well. In a more recent study Holmes 
and Weaver (2010) used a modified version of the misinformation paradigm and 
asked participants to select various product brands for a fictitious ‘care package’. A 
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postevent narrative included reference to the correct brand or a contradictory brand 
(i.e. a different competitor brand). The researchers found that participants falsely 
recognized misleading brand items from the postevent narrative as belonging to their 
original ‘care package’. Hence, studies have shown that participants can be misled on 
previously experienced brands by suggesting contradicting brand information in a 
postevent narrative. However, how do these effects develop when misleading brand 
information is induced using doctored photographs?  
 In some studies, manipulated images have been used to implant misleading 
information (e.g. Nash & Wade, 2008; Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). For 
instance, Nash, Wade, and Brewer (2009) demonstrated that the use of doctored 
videos could lead to the creation of memory illusions for recently self-performed 
actions (e.g. copying a simple action by a researcher). These effects were stronger 
when the participants saw doctored footage of themselves compared to when the 
erroneous actions in the video were carried out by the researcher or a complete 
stranger. In a perhaps more ecologically valid setting, Sacchhi, Agnoli, and Loftus 
(2007) investigated how doctored photographs of past public events changed 
memories for those events. Participants viewed original or misleading digitally 
doctored images depicting protests in Beijing and Rome as being more violent than 
they actually were. Viewing the doctored images influenced the way participants 
remembered the events (they remembered them to be more violent and negative, and 
they recalled more damage). Nash et al. (2009) proposed that it is underlying 
mechanisms, such as the illusion of familiarity as well as perceived credibility of such 
images, that are involved when participants falsely attribute details from doctored 
images to an original event. Hence, research has shown that doctored photographs 
can be a powerful tool to introduce misleading information. However, manipulated 
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images have not been commonly used in the area of advertising to implant misleading 
information.  
 So, exactly what are the consequences of false memories? Although much has 
been learned about the false memory phenomenon over its history, researchers 
typically do not study its ‘after effects’ (Laney, Morris, Bernstein, Wakefield, & 
Loftus, 2008). Yet, it is of particular interest for applied areas such as advertising to 
know about potential downstream effects of false memories. A few studies have 
shown that false memories for attributes of experienced brands can be linked to 
consumer judgments and choice. For instance, the study by Braun and Loftus (1998) 
showed that when the misleading colour information was linked to a positive message 
(e.g. greater safety), misled participants expressed more favourable feelings towards 
the brand and more willingness to buy the product relative to non-misled participants 
(see also Braun-LaTour, LaTour, & Loftus, 2006; Braun, 1999, for similar findings in 
different advertising contexts). More recently, several researchers found that 
implanted autobiographical memories could have attitudinal and behavioural effects 
downstream (e.g. Berkowitz, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2008; Bernstein et al., 2015; 
Laney et al., 2008). Rajagopal and Montgomery (2011) demonstrated this effect using 
high imagery advertisements for a fictitious brand that made some participants falsely 
believe that this product had been experienced in the past. Akin to brands that were 
actually experienced in the study, this ‘false experience effect’ led to more favourable 
feelings for the fictitious product. Hence, studies to date provide reason to assume 
that false memories, once created, may indeed lead to attitudinal and behavioural 
repercussions. So how would these effects develop in a retroactive product placement 
context? Research has yet to examine the consequences of false memories for 
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misleading and competitive brands that directly challenge a consumer’s original 
brand choice.  
 On a practical note, examining the potential effects of a futuristic advertising 
method such as retroactive brand placement is important because several 
developments suggest that the ability to implement this strategy might be closer than 
first thought. In times of TiVo (a recording system allowing consumers to skip TV 
commercials), Netflix, and ad blocker (an application that can remove or alter 
advertising content from websites or mobile applications), consumers can easily skip 
or entirely avoid advertisements, increasing the marketers need for more integrated 
advertising methods (Wright, Khanfar, Harrington, & Kizer, 2010). Already, 
marketers place their brands into myriad media channels (e.g. movies, TV soaps, 
reality shows, games, books, radio streams; Gould & Gupta, 2006; Gupta & Lord, 
1998; Lee & Faber, 2007) and research suggests that brands placed in movies and 
games can have an influence on consumers’ explicit and implicit memory (e.g. 
Brennan, Dubas, & Babin, 1999; d’Astous & Chartier, 2000; Gupta & Lord, 1998; 
Lee & Faber, 2007; Russell, 2002; Yang, Roskos-Ewoldsen, Dinu, & Arpan, 2006; 
Yang & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2007). In addition, it seems to be more and more popular 
to use social media accounts of ‘influencers’ such as stars to promote brands and 
products on social network platforms, verbally (e.g. ‘I just love this new bag from 
brand x’), or as product placements in personal photographs (e.g. an athlete drinking 
an energy drink of his sponsor; “5 Advantages of Influencers Product Placement on 
Instagram,” 2016). On top of that, it was recently made public that new technologies, 
allowing retroactive brand integrations in music videos and movies, are already in 
place. For example, China’s online video and TV distributor, Youku, recently 
announced that they would use digital product placement in its shows to allow 
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product placement to be tailored to the audience of the programme. Thus, if you lived 
in America, your favourite TV actor would be holding a Coke can where as in China 
they would be holding Lipton iced tea (“New technology can turn TV shows into 
sophisticated adverts,” 2015). As highlighted by Raskin (2010), social network 
platforms such as Facebook provide a unique venue to retroactively insert brands in 
personal photographs, potentially changing one’s own brand memories and 
potentially one’s future purchasing behaviour. Therefore, it is of considerable 
importance not only to advance our understanding of false memory production, but in 
a consumer context, to understand if and how we can ‘override’ consumers’ brand 
memories and take a first step toward examining the effectiveness of retroactive 
brand placement.  
 By using a modified version of the misinformation paradigm, the experiments 
in this thesis took a first step and examined the effects of retroactively replaced 
brands in photographs on memory. Although there is some research about the 
advertising misinformation effect, there are still a number of questions that have to be 
addressed. One of these questions is whether (and how) retroactively replaced brands 
in personal photographs affect memories for previously experienced brands. 
Although previous studies might suggest that the answer to this question is yes, 
exploring the effects of retroactive brand replacement differs somewhat from past 
research. It is well established that manipulated photographs can be used to implant 
false information and that deceptive advertising can mislead on previously 
experienced products. However, research has yet to examine the effects of direct 
brand suggestions in doctored photographic materials. Hence, the current research 
serves as a conjunction between two areas of research. Whereas the examination of 
potential ‘brand misinformation effects’ in different settings forms the main 
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contribution of this study, a second important question is addressed later on in this 
project. That is, if we form false memories about brand experiences, do these memory 
errors have any attitudinal (affecting brand preference) or behavioural (affecting 
brand purchasing) effects downstream? In regard to the consequences of false 
memories, previous studies either (1) focused on false memories for misleading brand 
attributes and the consequences for the original brand experience or (2) looked at 
implanted false memories for the experience of a fictitious brand. In contrast, this 
study explored the consequences of false memories for misleading and competitive 
brands that directly challenge a consumer’s original brand choice. A positive finding 
would extend previous research to a personalised ‘brand misinformation effect’ that 
might reflect the competitive environment in supermarket shelves as well as 
participant’s real brand choice behaviour.  
 On a subsidiary level, this thesis addressed several other research questions 
that were raised as part of the individual experiments reported and these will be 
specified in detail in the corresponding chapters. One question focused on the effect 
of delay between the different stages of the misinformation paradigm, a question that 
is important concerning the ecological validity of our paradigm. Here, researchers 
have shown that participants can be more vulnerable to misleading information the 
longer the delay between the original event and the misinformation phase (e.g. Loftus 
et al., 1978; Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008) as well as between the misinformation 
phase and the final memory test (e.g. Frost, 2000; Roediger, Jacoby, & McDermott, 
1996). However, these effects have been explored by using misleading narratives and 
have yet to be explored in a doctored photograph context (but see Schacter, 
Koutstaal, Johnson, Gross, & Angell, 1997).  
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Another research question addressed in this thesis involves examining age 
differences in the vulnerability to suggestive brand information. More specifically, 
differences in false memory creation between younger and older adults were 
examined. From a marketing perspective, this question is important because as 
population ageing increases, there is a need to explore consumer behaviour of this 
important target group. Here, several studies provide reason to suggest that older 
adults are more vulnerable to misleading information than are younger adults (e.g. 
Cohen & Faulkner, 1989). One explanation for this suggests that older adults have 
more problems in monitoring the sources of their memories due to an age-related 
decline in cognitive abilities (e.g. Schacter et al., 1997). However, age-related 
differences have not been examined in an advertising misinformation context yet, a 
gap that will be addressed in this thesis.  
Last, two subsidiary research questions were raised that aimed to better 
understand the processes involved in the misinformation paradigm. The first question 
was somewhat exploratory in nature and aimed to examine the involvement of 
encoding specific processes in the misinformation paradigm by using eye-tracking 
technology. The second question centred on the debate concerning whether false 
memories created in the misinformation paradigm are related in any way to false 
memories created in the DRM paradigm (e.g. Ost, Blank, Davies, & Jones, 2013; 
Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, & Dong, 2013). However, because these questions were 
raised based on results obtained in previous studies in this thesis, they will be 
discussed in the respective chapters.  
 In the following chapters, I begin by laying the theoretical foundation for the 
experiments in this thesis. First, misinformation-based false memories are defined 
with reference to other false memory phenomena that are touched on in this work. 
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Next, I review theoretical accounts of the misinformation effect. Following this, 
findings of studies using photographs to implant misinformation are presented and 
the underlying mechanisms are discussed. Subsequently, the experiments carried out 
as part of this thesis are introduced, including methodological commonalities and 
differences between the experiments. Then each individual experiment is presented in 
detail. Finally, there is an overall discussion that reviews and integrates the findings 
of this project. 
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Literature review 
The misinformation effect in light of other false memory phenomena 
 Although this work mainly focuses on memory distortions created in the 
misinformation paradigm, it is important to define the false memory term in the light 
of other ‘types’ of false memories that are touched on in this project. In general, false 
memories (sometimes also referred to as memory illusions or pseudo-memory; Zhu, 
Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Li, Xue, et al., 2010), refer to recollections of events or details 
of events that were actually never experienced. They are also defined as being a 
memory distortion, in which individuals confuse incidents that happened prior to or 
after an actual event with the original event itself (Loftus, 2003; Roediger & Gallo, 
2004). In comparison to true memories, which can be reconstructively remembered 
more or less as they actually occurred, memory illusions go beyond direct experience 
and include interpretations, interference, or actually contradict the experienced event 
(Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). But unlike lying, these non-experienced events are really 
believed to have happened (Zhu, et al., 2010). However, false memory phenomena 
are diverse and relate to a broad range of episodic memory distortions that have been 
observed in experimental settings, in psychotherapeutic environments, and in other 
real life settings (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997; Wade et al., 2007). According to Brainerd 
and Reyna (2005, p. 25)  false memories ‘…are  what we measure’ and to fully 
understand what is known about the phenomenon requires an understanding of the 
basic research paradigms that have been used to induce false memories. 
The misinformation paradigm and the misinformation effect 
 The misinformation paradigm is used to implant false memories for what is 
often seen as ‘contradictory’ event details. As noted in the last chapter, in the 
standard three-step paradigm of a classical misinformation experiment, participants 
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are first exposed to a forensically relevant event in form of a slide show, a video, or 
an event staged by actors (e.g. a crime scene). Subsequently participants receive 
misinformation about this event by being exposed to a narrative or suggestive 
questions including ‘hidden’ misleading details (e.g. suggesting that a knife not a gun 
was used in the crime). Finally participants complete a memory test for the original 
event to record the influence of misinformation on participant’s memory. A typical 
finding is that misled participants are more likely to report the misleading postevent 
information than control participants who were not exposed to the misleading 
information. For example, in one of the first studies using this paradigm, Loftus et al. 
(1978) exposed participants to a traffic accident scenario via picture slides. One slide 
depicted a critical event scene showing a car stopping at a ‘stop’ sign. After, some 
participants were asked a neutral question about the event including a ‘hidden’ 
contradicting detail such as ‘Did another car pass the red Datsun while it was stopped 
at the yield sign?’, when in fact a stop sign had appeared in the slides. Other 
participants (the control condition) received consistent (stop sign) or neutral (traffic 
sign) information. Last, in a final memory test, all participants were asked to 
discriminate between old/accurate slides and new slides containing the 
misinformation detail. Findings revealed that misled participants recognized the 
original event detail (the stop sign) less often and the misleading detail (the yield 
sign) more often relative to the control conditions.  
 By using the misinformation paradigm in one form or the other, hundreds of 
studies have found evidence for the existence of one or both manifestations of 
misinformation’s influence: (1) poorer memory performance for originally presented 
items (e.g. stop sign) in the misled condition compared to the control condition. 
Alternatively, or sometimes in addition (2) stronger endorsement rates of 
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misinformation items (e.g. yield sign) in the misled relative to a baseline condition 
(e.g. false retrieval of novel but related items at test; Blank & Launay, 2014). 
Although the influence of misinformation on memory is undisputed, the magnitude of 
the misinformation effect has shown to depend on many factors centring on study 
design and type of memory test (Roediger et al., 1996).  
Other ‘types’ of memory distortions and differentiation from the 
misinformation effect 
 Various other paradigms have been used that have elicited false memory 
phenomena (see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005 for an extensive review of these methods). 
Next to the misinformation paradigm, the DRM paradigm and the implanted false 
memory approach are two of the most established false memory paradigms in the 
cognitive literature (Pezdek & Lam, 2007). A crucial difference between the methods 
is how false memories are elicited in these paradigms. Whereas the DRM paradigm 
aims to elicit internally generated false memories for non-presented materials, the 
misinformation paradigm as well as the implanted false memory approach aim to 
induce false memories by means of explicit suggestion (Zhu et al., 2013). For 
instance, in a typical DRM study, participants are presented with lists of related 
words (e.g. table, sit, legs, couch) that are semantically associated with a non-
presented critical lure word (e.g. chair). In a subsequent memory test, many 
participants falsely recall or recognize the critical lure word as part of the word list 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In contrast, in the misinformation paradigm, 
participants are misled on existing memories and participants create false memories 
for misleading event details (Otgaar, Verschuere, Meijer, & van Oorsouw, 2012). The 
implanted false memory paradigm goes one step further and aims to induce false 
memories for entire events that did not happen. In a typical study, participants first 
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receive narratives or photographs about supposedly experienced events (Loftus & 
Pickrell, 1995; Wade et al., 2002). After several suggestive interviews, participants 
typically report partial or full false memories for rich and complex events (e.g. that 
participants went on a hot air balloon ride in their childhood; Wade et al., 2002).  
 Myriad theories have been proposed to explain false memory phenomena 
created in these different paradigms. Examples are the source-monitoring framework, 
the activation-monitoring account, the fuzzy trace theory, the fluency-misattribution 
perspective, and the constructive memory framework (see the following chapters for 
a description of some of these theories and Gallo, 2010, and Steffens & 
Mecklenbräuker, 2007, for a full description of these and more concepts). Whereas 
some of these theories have been established to explain memory errors created in 
specific paradigms, others are used to explain false memory phenomena in a variety 
of tasks (Gallo, 2010). In this context researchers have questioned whether or not 
memory errors elicited by different paradigms are mediated by the same cognitive 
mechanisms and whether they are even related (Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Wade et al., 
2007). For example, spontaneously generated false memories in the DRM paradigm 
are thought to be mainly caused by endogenous processes (i.e. that they are mainly 
driven by spreading activation in networks of memory traces (see Howe, Wimmer, 
Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Otgaar, Howe, Brackmann, & Smeets, 2016). In 
contrast, paradigms using external influence to implant misleading information are 
believed to be driven by exogenous processes as well (Otgaar et al., 2016). That is, 
not only memory traces, but also social demands may play a role when participants 
misattribute misleading information to an original event or report entirely implanted 
events (Otgaar et al., 2016, 2012). Still, a common mechanism of internally and more 
externally generated false memories may lie in the formation of distorted memory 
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traces, potentially being caused by source-monitoring difficulties in the paradigms 
(Ost et al., 2013; see Experiment 3 for more discussion on this matter).  
Theoretical accounts of the misinformation effect 
 It is well established that human memory is a reconstruction of past events 
rather than a veridical representation of events as they actually happened. It is also 
known that the extent to which a person is misled by suggestive postevent details can 
influence the reports of originally experienced events (Hyman & Loftus, 1998). In 
order to specifically account for the suggestibility to misinformation phenomena, 
various theories have been proposed over the years. Whereas early-developed 
theories proposed the misinformation phenomenon to occur because misinformation 
alters the originally stored memory trace (memory impairment hypothesis; Loftus et 
al., 1978) or renders it difficult to retrieve (memory interference accounts; Bekerian 
& Bowers, 1983), later theories hold that the misinformation effect is a bias effect 
caused by misinformation acceptance (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). Researchers 
have also proposed more integrative frameworks that are not constructive in nature to 
explain the suggestibility to misinformation. One theory that has been used to explain 
memory phenomena in a variety of tasks and that has been used most widely to 
explain the misinformation effect, is the source-monitoring framework (Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989). Because of their importance for this research, the following sections 
will first provide an overview of the early hypotheses and their development before 
presenting the source-monitoring framework. Last, some alternative theories that can 
account for the misinformation effect will be briefly addressed. 
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Memory impairment and interference accounts 
 Early explanations of the misinformation effect were based on the consistent 
finding that misled participants performed less accurately than control participants on 
the final memory test. For instance, when a ‘stop sign’ was originally shown to 
participants that was later contradicted by a ‘yield sign’ in the misinformation phase, 
misled participants were less accurate about the stop sign relative to non-misinformed 
control participants. The original interpretation of this phenomenon was that 
misinformation, at encoding, might change the original event memory trace in some 
way (e.g. by partially overwriting the original memory trace). It was believed that in 
some extreme cases the original event information could even be entirely erased from 
memory (e.g. Loftus et al., 1978). When participants were later asked about the 
original event, they accessed an updated memory trace version containing the false 
information (yield sign) instead of the original detail. Other researchers soon 
challenged this notion by introducing a memory interference account. It was 
suggested that original event information as well as misinformation details might co-
exist in memory. However, retrieval of the original event memory was believed to be 
blocked by the retrieval of the potentially stronger and more recently received 
misinformation trace. Hence, misinformation was thought to merely lead to impaired 
accessibility of intact memory traces for an original event (Bekerian & Bowers, 1983). 
 Most of these previous conclusions were questioned by McCloskey and 
Zaragoza (1985) who claimed that misinformation has no effect on the original event 
memory at all. They criticized the traditional memory testing procedure in which 
misled and control participants were required to distinguish between original items 
and misinformation items in two alternative forced choice-tests. They argued that 
misinformation effects recorded by these means might merely present a bias effect 
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caused by misinformation acceptance in the misled condition. In order to provide 
evidence for this ‘non-impairment’ view, the researchers established equal conditions 
for the experimental as well as control condition and excluded misinformation items 
at test. Instead, all participants (misinformed and non-misinformed) were asked to 
discriminate between originally seen and completely novel test items (e.g. excluding 
the yield sign and discriminating between the stop sign and an intersection sign). The 
researchers argued that if misinformed participants would still perform worse than the 
control groups on originally seen items, a guessing bias in the misled condition could 
be dismissed as the driving force of the misinformation effect. However, in a series of 
six experiments the researchers did not reveal a misled-control difference for original 
event accuracy by using this procedure. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) concluded 
that neither memory impairment nor impairment of access could be implied from 
studies to date and proposed that guessing or social demands might account for 
previous findings instead.  
 However, despite these null-effects, researchers did not entirely rule out 
memory impairment as partly causing the misinformation effect. Several researchers 
showed that under certain conditions, memory impairment might play a role in the 
misinformation effect. For example, Belli (1989) proposed McCloskey and Zaragozas’ 
(1985) modified testing procedure as not being sensitive enough to tap into memory 
impairment processes. In one study Belli (1989) used a yes/no recognition task (e.g. 
did you see a hammer in the slides – yes or no?) instead of a forced choice test 
(discriminating between slides depicting the original and a novel detail). Results 
showed that misled groups reduced the yes-responses about the original event items 
even when the modified testing procedure was applied (see also Tversky & Tuchin, 
1989, for similar findings). Belli, Windschitl, McCarthy, and Winfrey (1992) 
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revealed the effect with longer retention intervals between original event and final 
test phase but not when shorter intervals were used. Hence, several studies were able 
to reveal a memory impairment effect, which provided support for the validity of 
previous research and memory impairment hypotheses (Belli et al., 1992).  
The suggestibility account 
 The memory impairment debate brought forward alternative interpretations 
for the misinformation effect. One of these accounts focused on the incorporation of 
misleading information into a memory report (Ceci, Crotteau Huffman, Smith, & 
Loftus, 1994). For instance, consider the scenario in which misinformation (e.g. yield 
sign) is selected in the absence of other memories because the original event 
information (e.g. the stop sign) was never encoded in the first place or was simply 
forgotten. If participants choose the misleading detail with great conviction it might 
be that participants created a new memory for the postevent detail that was integrated 
into the original event memory trace. Hence, even if no memory impairment could 
have occurred, it might be that participants truly misremember that a misleading 
detail appeared in the original event (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989) - a process that some 
researchers consider to be equally important (e.g. Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989).  
 However, researchers stressed the importance of distinguishing such memory-
based misinformation acceptances from test errors caused by deliberation, recency 
bias, or pure guessing mechanisms (e.g. Blank, 1998). For example, from a 
deliberation perspective, participants may indeed know or suspect that the misleading 
information is inconsistent with their original memories. However, participants still 
falsely accept the misleading information because of task compliance or because they 
trust the misinformation source more (Belli, 1989; Lindsay, 1990). Recency biases 
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may occur when both the original as well as the misleading information are 
principally available in memory, but the misleading item is selected nonetheless 
because of its recency advantage over the original information. Here, participants 
may simply rely on decision criteria such as familiarity or retrieval fluency instead of 
applying more systematic decision processes about the source of the information. 
Importantly, compared to deliberation processes, participants do not realise at test 
that they report information remembered from the misinformation phase only (Blank, 
1998). Last, guessing might occur when participants remember neither the event 
detail (e.g. stop sign) nor the misinformation detail (e.g. yield sign) and randomly 
select the misleading item (yield sign) at test (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989).  
 In regard to these concerns, several studies provide reason to believe that 
misinformation acceptances are more than caused just by deliberation and biases. For 
instance, researchers demonstrated misinformation false alarms associated with high 
degrees of confidence, something that would not be expected from mere guessing 
mechanisms (Donders, Sehooler, & Loftus, 1987 in Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; 
Tversky & Tuchin, 1989). Furthermore, researchers demonstrated misinformation 
false alarms at test that were associated with fast response times, speaking against the 
influence of deliberation processes (Donders, Sehooler, & Loftus, 1987 in Loftus & 
Hoffman, 1989). Additional support comes from studies that encourage more 
elaborate source judgments at test by using source-monitoring tasks (see below) and 
post-warnings about the about the misinformation. Findings show that awareness 
about the misinformation does not necessarily make participants immune to the 
misinformation effect (e.g. Eakin, Schreiber, & Sergent-Marshall, 2003; Wyler & 
Oswald, 2016). Hence, although guessing, social demands, and recency effects may 
play a role in producing the misinformation effect, in some cases participants may 
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genuinely believe that a misleading item was indeed encountered during the original 
event (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989). 
The source-monitoring framework 
 In order to explain the misinformation acceptance phenomenon, researchers 
developed more integrative theories. One of these theories is the source-monitoring 
framework (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989) an extension of the reality-monitoring model 
developed by Johnson and Raye (1981). Source-monitoring refers to processes 
involved when mental experiences, such as thoughts, images, and feelings are 
attributed to reality or imagination (Lindsay, 1990). According to the framework, 
memory errors are the result of misattributing the source of imagined, inferred, or 
suggested information to the original event experience (Frenda et al., 2013). The 
central idea is that these source confusions arise because retrieving the content of a 
memory trace and its source is underpinned by two separate cognitive processes. 
When information is retrieved from memory, it is believed that source information is 
not a fixed label attached to the memory trace. Instead, source attributions underlie 
separate, often non-deliberate decision-making processes in which the source is 
inferred from the integral qualitative characteristics of the memory trace (heuristic 
processing). In this rapid and non-reflective process, sources may sometimes be 
confused when individuals fail to access the characteristics of a memory effectively. 
Source decisions can be based on more extended reasoning as well (systematic 
processing), which may involve the search for the plausibility of an event and 
congruence with other beliefs (Johnson et al., 1993). However, although both 
heuristic and systematic processes can be integrated to produce a more accurate 
source judgment (Henkel & Carbuto, 2008), even conscious source deliberations may 
not always guarantee remembering the aspects relevant for identifying a source. 
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Generally, it is believed that source relevant information from an event memory fades 
more rapidly than memory for the content of the event. In misinformation terms the 
source-monitoring theory holds that at test, the misleading postevent detail is 
erroneously attributed to the original event because individuals confuse the sources of 
information either rapidly and automatically or after conscious deliberation (Johnson 
et al., 1993).  
 Researchers have suggested that the decision-making process about the source 
of a memory is influenced by two key variables that are in turn influenced by several 
other factors. One of these key variables is the extent to which a more systematic 
decision-making process and source deliberation are encouraged at the time of 
memory retrieval (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). Although asking for participant’s original 
event memory by means of classical recognition testing (e.g. ‘what have you seen 
during the original event?’) is in essence testing participants’ source-monitoring 
abilities, researchers started to use more direct tests to examine the occurrence of 
source errors. For instance, instead of solely referring to the original event at test, 
researchers started to provide different source options as response alternatives (e.g. 
‘seen in original slide show only, misleading narrative only, or both event phases’?). 
Findings across these studies showed that such measures usually reduce and 
sometimes even eliminate the occurrence of source errors (e.g. Lindsay & Johnson, 
1989; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). The model explains these test differences by 
highlighting different judgment criteria applied in classical recognition and source-
monitoring tasks. Thus, recognition tasks are thought to trigger more rapid and 
familiarity-based judgments in which source decisions are made in a rather non-
deliberate process. As a result, participants behave more liberally in stating that a 
familiar item was seen in the slides. Source-monitoring tests, on the other hand, may 
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trigger a more effortful and systematic based decision-making process for familiar 
items (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989).  
 The other important variable that is likely to influence the decision-making 
process about the source of a memory is whether the information accessed can be 
used to reliably discriminate between the original event and misinformation episode. 
The decision-making process involves evaluating the characteristics of memories 
such as vividness, perceptual detail, and familiarity. For instance, compared to 
imagined events, memories for veridical events are believed to contain richer sensory 
detail and more cues about the context in which these memories were acquired. 
However, when mental images have similar phenomenological qualities to memories 
for actual experiences, distinguishing between imagined and real experiences may be 
a demanding task (Johnson, Suengas, Foley, & Raye, 1988). Consequently, the 
likelihood of source confusions is expected to vary depending on the similarity 
between original event and misinformation episode (Zaragoza, Lane, Ackil, & 
Chambers, 1997). Given that in the misinformation paradigm the original event and 
misinformation episode refer to the same event (the originally experienced event), in 
most cases there should be a substantial overlap between the two sources of 
information, making them objectively similar (Mitchell, Johnson, & Mather, 2003).  
 The source-monitoring model posits that the source deliberation and 
discrimination ability processes are affected by various other factors. Examples are 
delay, source credibility, judgment biases, and current goals (Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). 
Although not all of these factors can be reviewed as part of this work, some factors 
such as the ‘When question’ (i.e. the time of exposure to misinformation and final 
test), will be pursued in succeeding chapters. Last, it should be noted that the decision 
processes about the source of a memory might also interact with previously described 
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memory impairment and misinformation acceptance mechanisms. For example, 
participants may be more prone to source confusions when only the misleading detail 
instead of both the original detail and the misleading detail are remembered (due to 
memory impairment or non-encoding/forgetting of the original item). On the other 
hand, if both details are remembered, more effortful source deliberations may reduce 
the occurrence of misinformation false alarms (Lindsay, 1990). Hence, in contrast to 
theories mentioned above, the source-monitoring framework posits that both original 
event and misinformation experiences may indeed remain separate and intact; 
however, their sources might not be accessible (Johnson et al., 1993). 
Summary and alternative accounts 
 In sum, researchers have proposed various theories as to why misinformation 
is sometimes falsely attributed to the original event. These include memory 
impairment hypotheses, memory blocking accounts, misinformation acceptance 
theories caused by biases, as well as the more integrative theories such as the source-
monitoring account. Although these theories have been debated heavily in the past, 
nowadays there is a consensus that several factors can be involved when 
misinformation is falsely accepted (Ayers & Reder, 1998). Researchers agree that 
although processes such as guessing and social demands may contribute to the 
misinformation effect, genuine memory impairment as well as source confusions may 
play a role when misleading details are falsely attributed to the original event. 
However, the occurrence of the misinformation effect seems to depend on key 
variables such as the encouragement of source deliberation at test, as well as on the 
similarity between original event details and misleading information. These variables 
can in turn be influenced by other factors such as time delays, and source credibility.  
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 It should be noted that other theories exist that can account for the 
suggestibility to misinformation that, compared to the source-monitoring framework, 
incorporate more detailed assumptions about the processes underlying the effect 
(Ayers & Reder, 1998; Steffens & Mecklenbräuker, 2007). For example, Fuzzy Trace 
Theory (FTT; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) draws upon the concept of dual-opponent 
processes. It assumes (in misinformation terms) that individuals encode and store in 
parallel verbatim and gist representations for both the original detail and the 
misinformation detail and that these traces are held independently of one another. 
Whereas verbatim representations refer to surface-level aspects of event details and 
are believed to drive accurate memories, gist representations which are of schematic 
nature (fuzzy traces) present the meaning or theme of the event details and are said to 
drive false memory production (Steffens & Mecklenbräuker, 2007). According to the 
theory, verbatim representations are believed to be highly susceptible to interference 
and to decline rapidly over time. On the other hand, gist traces are more durable 
(Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). Hence, in a misinformation task, participants might falsely 
‘recognize’ the misleading detail (the yield sign) because it triggers memory for the 
gist of the originally seen information (traffic sign; Reyna & Titcomb 1997).  
 Other theories derive from spreading activation models that propose false 
memories to arise because of spreading activation across meaning-connected 
information in memory (Howe et al., 2009; Henry Otgaar et al., 2016). For example, 
one of these theories, the Activation Monitoring Theory (AMT; Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001), suggests the operation of two opponent processes on 
accurate and inaccurate memories: activation of the presented stimuli and source 
monitoring during testing (Steffens & Mecklenbräuker, 2007). It is assumed that at 
encoding, processing of a concept results in a spreading activation to corresponding 
  
36 
but non-presented concept nodes. Thus, in misinformation terms, encoding of the 
original event information may already activate the related misleading item prior to 
its presentation in the misinformation phase. At retrieval/test, participants must then 
distinguish between activation resulting from originally presented items (the stop 
sign) and misleading items (the yield sign). In this process, source monitoring-errors 
may occur (Steffens & Mecklenbräuker, 2007).  
 Ayers and Reder (1998) developed a spreading actication model (Source of 
Activation Confusion model; SAC) in order to specifically explain the various 
findings revealed by using the misinformation paradigm (Pickrell, McDonald, 
Bernstein, & Loftus, 2016). Based on similar grounds as AMT, the researchers 
argued that a concept's strength decays over time. Thus, weaker activation of the 
originally experienced concept and stronger activation for more recently experienced 
misinformation concept may lead to misattributing the source of an activated concept 
and hence to source-monitoring errors (Steffens & Mecklenbräuker, 2007). In this 
process participants may be aware of the high activation of the misleading concept 
‘yield sign’ but may be unaware of the reason that it was activated (Pickrell et al., 
2016).  Another theory, the Associative-Activation Theory (AAT; Howe et al., 2009), 
is partly based on AMT (Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012). However, although the 
model shares the underlying spreading activation assumptions of AMT, contrary to 
AMT (and also FTT), the model can be considered as a single process theory that 
focuses on false memory production through immediate and automatic spreading 
activation processes at encoding rather than at retrieval (Howe et al., 2009; Otgaar, 
Howe, Peters, Sauerland, & Raymaekers, 2013). Hence the theory predicts 
misinformation false memories to occur because the concept of the misleading detail 
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was activated during the original event and reinstated at the time of misinformation 
presentation. 
 Generally, spreading activation theories and also FTT are more established in 
the area of spontaneously generated false memories (e.g. elicited in the DRM 
paradigm) and are less commonly used to describe false memories elicited in the 
misinformation paradigm (Ayers & Reder, 1998; but see Otgaar et al., 2016; Reyna, 
2000). However, under certain conditions the theories may provide explanation for 
the misinformation false memories. For example, when false information is not 
actively suggested but merely retroactively presented and if this false information 
preserves the meaning of originally presented stimuli (Otgaar et al., 2016). Similar to 
the source-monitoring framework, FFT, AMT, SAC, and AAT are not constructive in 
nature and do not posit the impairment of original event information. For example, 
the same individual who accepted the misleading detail (the yield sign), based on gist 
reliance or spreading activation could also accept the original detail (the stop sign), 
based on accessing the verbatim memory trace or activation of the original concept 
(Ayers & Reder, 1998; Reyna, 2000).  
 Researchers have debated which of the above mentioned theories can better 
explain false memories in general (e.g. Steffens & Mecklenbräuker, 2007) and 
whether the source-monitoring account, AAT/AMT, or FFT, is more suitable to 
explain the empirical findings in the misinformation paradigm (e.g. Lindsay & 
Johnson, 2000; Reyna, 2000; Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). Generally, this research does 
not posit that one theory is better than the other in explaining the misinformation 
effect and where possible, empirical findings will be interpreted from a variety of 
angles. However, due to its prevalence in the misinformation literature most findings 
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will be explained in the light of the source-monitoring framework as well as the 
earlier proposed theories (memory impairment and suggestibility accounts).  
Doctored photographs as suggestive postevent misinformation  
 Although researchers have traditionally used false narratives to implant 
information, several studies exist that have used suggestive images. For example, 
Schacter et al. (1997) examined the effects of interpolated photographs on 
participant’s memory for a previously seen videotape. They found that older 
participants were particularly prone to falsely attributing the new photo scenes (i.e. 
the additive misinformation) to the earlier watched videotape even when they were 
explicitly warned that some of the photo scenes were new. Although the researchers 
found this effect only for older but not younger adults, their findings provided the 
first evidence that suggestive postevent photos could lead to memory distortions (see 
Experiment 4 for a more detailed discussion about the age related differences in 
source-monitoring abilities). Later studies specifically examined the effects of 
doctored images on participants’ memories. For example Wade et al. (2002) exposed 
participants to a manipulated childhood photo depicting participants on a hot air 
balloon ride when in fact participants had never experienced such an event. After 
several interviews about the false event including imagination-based tasks, a 
substantial number of participants (50%) falsely recalled autobiographical 
experiences of the suggested event. Hence, the researchers showed that doctored 
images could lead to implanting entirely fictitious autobiographical childhood events 
(see also Garry & Wade, 2005). As demonstrated earlier, manipulated images have 
also been found to effectively induce false memories when participants were misled 
on more recent experiences (Nash & Wade, 2008; Nash, et al., 2009). 
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 Although false memory rates elicited by photographs have not always been 
higher compared to false memory rates elicited in false narrative studies (see Garry & 
Wade, 2005), judging from previous research it seems reasonable to conclude that 
photographs are perceived as compelling evidence that a depicted event really 
occurred. But what are the mechanisms responsible for these effects? From a source-
monitoring perspective researchers proposed that heuristic as well as more systematic 
judgments contribute to this phenomenon. For instance, regarding the latter factor, it 
is generally believed that relatively plausible events are more likely to be falsely 
remembered and than relatively implausible events. This assumption is based on false 
narrative studies that were not always successful in implanting less plausible events 
(Hyman & Loftus, 1998; but see Otgaar, Candel, Merckelbach, & Wade, 2009). For 
example Pezdek et al. (1997) were not able to implant the false memory that 
participants had received an enema as a child. However, research has also shown that 
information from a presumably credible source can influence the perceived 
plausibility of misleading information (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001). In this 
regard, photographs might be perceived as authoritative evidence that an event really 
occurred and as a result doctored images may skew participants’ plausibility 
judgments (Otgaar, Candel, Merckelbach, & Wade, 2009; Wade et al., 2002). 
 Regarding more heuristic judgements, researchers argued that photographs 
can provide a ‘cognitive springboard’ to generate thoughts, feelings, and images in 
association with the suggested event. As a result, the pictorially suggested event and 
actually experienced events may contain enough similar features in order for 
participants to claim that the suggested event is remembered (Wade et al., 2002). It 
follows that viewing doctored photographs can lead to source misattributions when 
the source of the mnemonic experience is misremembered. For instance, the vivid 
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representation produced by being exposed to an image may not be remembered as 
having been a photograph but falsely remembered as having been one’s actual and 
original experience of an event (Henkel & Carbuto, 2008).  
 The more recent study by Nash et al. (2009) specifically examined the 
question of why doctored images lead to source misattributions for suggested events. 
In their study, the researchers filmed participants while they were observing and 
copying simple actions performed by a researcher. After two days, participants saw a 
doctored video about the events in which some additional actions were included that 
were neither observed nor performed originally. In a between-participant design, 
participants saw the misleading video in such as way that it either depicted the 
participant and the researcher, the researcher only, or a stranger performing the 
actions. In a final memory and belief questionnaire participants were tested for old, 
misleading, as well as entirely new control actions. In line with the researchers’ 
predictions, the first important finding was that participants in all three video 
conditions rated the misleading actions higher on the memory and belief scales than 
the control actions. Hence, data provided evidence that the doctored videos led to 
memory and belief distortions, an effect the researchers named the ‘doctored-
evidence effect’. Because the effect occurred independently of how misinformation 
was presented (i.e. who appeared in the photos), the researchers concluded that 
familiarity processes might be one driving force for these distortions. The explanation 
proposed suggests that the rush of familiarity typically associated with veridical 
memories, might have cause source-misattributions when the same feelings of 
familiarity were experienced for the suggested events. More specifically, when the 
suggested image came to mind and was accompanied by a rush of familiarity, it is 
possible that the image was misattributed to genuine recollection. The second 
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important finding of that study was that memory distortions were stronger when 
participants were misled by a video depicting the researcher and themselves, 
compared to when the researcher only, or a stranger had presented the new actions. 
Hence, seeing oneself in the videos when the new actions were performed seemed to 
be perceived as more evidential that these actions were indeed originally performed. 
The researchers concluded that credibility might be a second factor contributing to 
memory distortions caused by images and that this credibility might led participants 
to lower their source-monitoring criteria when judgements were made (Nash, et al., 
2009; see also Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). 
 In sum, several studies provide evidence that photographs are a powerful tool 
to implant misleading information. These effects have been shown in a variety of 
settings such as by using interpolated photographs that misled on more manufactured 
original experience, but also by using doctored images that implanted entire 
childhood memories, or that misled on self-experienced events. These phenomena 
can be explained by applying the source-monitoring framework that suggests several 
cognitive mechanisms potentially responsible for the ‘doctored-evidence’ effect 
(Nash et al., 2009). For example, Nash et al. (2009) provided evidence that doctored 
images may create an illusion of familiarity and also increase the perceived 
credibility of misleading information that may subsequently lead to an increase in 
source-confusions.  
Experiments in this thesis 
 So far, I have presented the motivation for this research, defined the false 
memory term, and discussed the original misinformation paradigm including the 
nature of the misinformation effect. In addition, the possible underlying mechanisms 
of the ‘doctored evidence effect’ were discussed. Returning to retroactive product 
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replacement, recall the main research questions of this thesis. The first was whether 
retroactively replaced brands in personal photographs affect memories for previously 
experienced brands. Following from this, the second question addressed later in this 
project centred on the consequences of false brand memories. More specifically, if we 
form false memories about brand experiences, do these memory errors have any 
attitudinal (affecting brand preference) or behavioural (affecting brand purchasing) 
effects downstream? In order to provide answers to these questions, five experiments 
were carried out. These five experiments included four misinformation studies 
(Experiment 1, 3, 4 and 5) as well as one brand norming study (Experiment 2). 
Whereas all four misinformation studies examined the effects of retroactively 
replaced brands in photographs on participants’ original brand memories, Experiment 
5, went one step further and looked at the attitudinal and behavioural consequences of 
false brand memories. Data collected in Experiment 2, the brand norming study, 
served to provide a pool of normed brands that could be used for stimuli selection in 
Experiments 3-5 and to gather information about the role of brand awareness factors 
in the misinformation effect. 
Commonalities and differences between misinformation experiments 
 Methods. All misinformation experiments reported in this thesis had in 
common that they used a modified version of the misinformation paradigm in which 
participants were misled via doctored photographs on an original brand experience. 
More specifically, in all experiments, participants were exposed to brand stimuli 
during an original event, received contradicting brand misinformation embedded in a 
doctored photo at a later stage, and subsequently completed a final surprise memory 
test for the original event. However, the original event (i.e. how brands were 
originally experienced), the degree of personalization of study stimuli (in both 
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original event as well as misinformation phase), as well as participant’s awareness 
about the brand nature of the tasks differed across experiments.  
 Similar to the traditional misinformation paradigm procedure, Experiments 1 
and 3 examined the effect of retroactive brand replacements in a manufactured and 
rather impersonalized setting. More specifically, the original event and 
misinformation phase were experienced as photographs that included brand 
placements and that were embedded into a fictitious Facebook account. It was not 
mentioned to participants that the brands appearing in the photos were of interest for 
the experiment. These methods were chosen because first, Experiments 1 and 3 
served as proof of concept studies in which impersonalized study materials reduced 
the complexity of these studies. Second, the studies specifically aimed to examine a 
brand misinformation effect in a typical ‘product placement setting’ that would be 
comparable to integrated brand placements in movies and game shows. The results of 
these studies would not only provide information about how brands in photographs 
would be generally remembered but also whether a reliable misinformation effect 
could be replicated in an incidental learning task focusing on brand placement. 
Hence, the ‘product placement nature’ of study materials was the focus in these 
studies.  
 In contrast, Experiments 4 and 5 examined the effects of retroactive brand 
replacements in settings in which in which participants were misled on actual pasts 
with brands (brands were rated in Experiment 4 and even personally selected in 
Experiment 5). In addition, the photographs that were used to mislead participants 
during the misinformation phase were photos taken during the study and even 
depicted participants themselves in Experiment 5. Hence participants were tested in 
more personalized settings in these studies. Another important difference between 
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Experiments 1 and 3 and Experiments 4 and 5 is that participant’s attention was 
directed to the brands in the latter studies. More precisely, although the tasks were 
incidental in these Experiments as well (i.e. participants were not aware that their 
memory for the brands would be tested at a later stage) brands were consciously 
experienced during the experimental stages of the task. Hence, in these studies it was 
not the product placement question that was in focus but rather how a brand 
misinformation effect would develop under more personalized circumstances.  
 Some of the misinformation studies examined the effects of additional study 
manipulations on memory performance in the misinformation paradigm that will be 
specified in the respective chapters. For instance, Experiment 1 examined the effects 
of a delay between misinformation phase and final memory test and included a font at 
test manipulation (i.e. at test, stimuli were either shown as the brand’s correct logo or 
in normal text font). Experiment 3 examined a time delay between original event 
phase and misinformation phase. Furthermore, the experiment measured an additional 
variable, which was visual fixation duration on the brands using eye-tracking 
technology. Last, Experiment 4 examined the effects of age in the misinformation 
effects and tested younger as well as older participants. 
 Designs and final memory tests. Besides experiment-specific wordings, the 
format of the final memory tests was identical for all misinformation studies. 
Participants were first administered a recognition test for the original event in which 
they were tested for original items (originally experienced brands), misleading items 
(contradicting brands in the photos that only appeared during the misinformation 
phase), as well as on non-presented but related foil items. Rather than including a 
non-misled control condition in a between-participants design, our studies applied a 
within design in which participants were misled on some original items (misled item 
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condition) but not on others (control item condition). The latter items served as 
baselines (this will be specified in later chapters). Whereas some researchers use 
forced-choice recognition tests to analyse the uptake of misinformation (e.g. Okado 
& Stark, 2005), we
1
 used yes/no recognition tests similar to Underwood and Pezdek 
(1998), in which each of the three item types (the original, the misleading, and the 
foil item) were tested separately (see also Frost, Ingraham, & Wilson, 2002; Tversky 
& Tuchin, 1989). Researchers acknowledge that both procedures are valuable, but 
that they each pose different demands on participants (Wright & Loftus, 1998). The 
forced-choice procedure suggests that only one response alternative is true. In 
contrast, the yes/no method suggests that all alternatives, neither, or either could be 
correct, a method that has shown to be more sensitive to tap memory processes 
elicited in the misinformation paradigm (e.g. Belli, 1989; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989). 
 In order to record more information about the characteristics of participants’ 
yes-responses from the recognition test, yes-responses were accompanied by 
Remember, Know, and Guess judgments. This measure (originally Remember/Know 
paradigm; Tulving, 1985) was included in order to capture the distinct psychological 
experiences that accompanied participants’ memory performance. In this context, 
remembering is defined as the true state of conscious recollection in which details are 
perceived as more vivid and with more sensory detail, possibly because these 
memories are re-experienced at retrieval. Knowing, on the other hand, is defined as a 
feeling of familiarity that arises in the absence of recollection. It occurs when 
participants believe that an item appeared during the original event but they do not 
explicitly remember its presence (Tulving, 1985). We added a ‘Guess’ option to 
                                                        
1 Using the plural form ‘we’ in this thesis is merely stylistic and refers to the 
candidate solely in most cases. One exception can be found in Chapter 7 (Experiment 
5), a publication based chapter, in which other researchers contributed to 
approximately 20 per cent of the published manuscript.  
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separate responses based on familiarity processes from simple guess responses (e.g. 
Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999). Generally, only a few studies have used the 
Remember/Know paradigm in the standard misinformation paradigm (but see Frost, 
2000; Holmes & Weaver, 2010; Roediger et al., 1996) and most studies have used 
false narratives to implant misleading information. Findings across these false 
narrative studies suggest a trend that misinformation false memories for contradicting 
misinformation (as supposed to additive misinformation) are associated with higher 
scores of know compared to remember responses. Because veridical memories have 
shown the reversed pattern (in short delay conditions between the experimental 
stages), findings suggest that misinformation false memories are perceived as having 
different subjective qualities compared to veridical memories (Frost, 2000). However, 
how will these effects develop in a paradigm that uses photographs to mislead on 
original information?  
 Similar to previous research (Okado & Stark, 2005; Zhu et al., 2012; Zhu, 
Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Li, Moyzis, et al., 2010; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Li, Xue, 
et al., 2010) participants’ yes-responses from the recognition test were then followed 
up in a source-monitoring task. In this test participants were asked to reconsider the 
sources of their recognition test answers by offering participants several source 
options. This approach was chosen to complement potentially more rapid and 
familiarity-based judgments in the recognition test (heuristic source judgments) with 
a measure of participant’s more effortful and systematic based decision-making 
process for familiar items. Hence, the recognition task was used as a more liberal 
measure and the source-monitoring task as a more conservative measure to analyse 
the uptake of misinformation. The source options provided at test were chosen in line 
with Okado and Stark (2005). In comparison to earlier studies, which typically 
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provided the following four options for an answer: original event only, postevent 
information only, both, and neither (e.g. Lindsay & Johnson, 1989), Okado and Stark 
(2005) replaced the ‘neither’ option with a ‘guessed’ option and added an additional 
‘items conflicted across phases’ choice. A guess option is important as participants 
may simply guess even when provided with concrete source options at test. For 
instance, participants may be unsure about the actual source of remembered 
information and feel obliged to commit to an option if ‘guessing’ is not allowed 
(Blank, 1998). Similarly, the ‘conflicted’ optioned provides an escape in cases in 
which a conflict across phases is noticed, but in which exact source-attributions are 
not possible.  
Main predictions 
 In line with previous research we expected that participants in all 
misinformation studies would be misled by the retroactively replaced brands in the 
photographs. We predicted that participants would create source confusions and 
falsely attribute the misleading brands from the photos to the original brand 
experience. In addition, we believed that the participant’s original brand placement 
memory would be impaired as a result of the manipulation and hence, lower hit rates 
for originally experienced brands would be obtained in the misled relative to the 
control item condition. We expected to see these trends for participants’ overall 
memory performance in the recognition test as well as potentially in their more 
refined memory performance measured as remember responses and source-
monitoring judgements. In Experiment 5, we expected that participants’ false 
memories for the misleading brands would be associated with attitudinal and 
behavioural consequences for the falsely remembered brands.  
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Experiment 1 - A proof of concept study - the effects of retroactive product 
replacement on placement memory 
 As demonstrated in previous chapters, numerous studies exist that support the 
likely effectiveness of retroactive product replacement. Hundreds of studies provide 
evidence to suggest that presenting contradictory misinformation can affect memory 
reports of a previously experienced event (Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994; 
Loftus, 1977). Indeed, we have seen this effect in the world of consumer behaviour 
and advertising. However, studies directly challenging an original brand experience 
by suggesting a direct competitor brand (i.e. that specifically examine the occurrence 
of a ‘brand misinformation effect’) are rare (but see Belli, 1989; Holmes & Weaver, 
2010). We have also reviewed studies that show the effectiveness of manipulated 
images to implant misleading information (Nash & Wade, 2008; Wade et al., 2002). 
However, to our knowledge, in advertising, doctored photographs have not yet been 
used to suggest false brand information.  
 Experiment 1 was carried out to address these gaps and to examine for the 
first time whether retroactively changed brands embedded in photographs have the 
potential to create a reliable ‘brand misinformation effect’. To address this question 
we used a modified version of the misinformation paradigm in which we misled 
participants via manipulated photographs on brand placements that had been 
experienced during a previous encounter with these photographs. More specifically, 
participants were unknowingly exposed to misleading brand information by watching 
what they believed were the same photographs depicting the same events. However, 
some of the original brand placements within each photograph were replaced by a 
competitor brand the second time. Because the experimental design aimed to reflect a 
situation in which a social network user browses a person’s Facebook photos twice 
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and is incidentally exposed to original and misleading brand placements in this 
process, we did not use the classical misinformation paradigm procedure. That is 
instead of having the original event phase presented in pictorial form and the 
misinformation phase as a written narrative, both phases were presented pictorially.  
 Although not used as often, similar techniques have been employed before 
and do elicit reliable misinformation effects (Manning & Loftus, 1996; Okado & 
Stark, 2005). For example, in the study by Okado and Stark (2005), participants were 
exposed to eight vignettes that depicted a crime scene (original event phase). In these 
slides, 12 critical event details were manipulated when participants viewed the 
vignettes a second time (misinformation phase). Two days later, participants took a 
three-alternative forced-choice recognition test for the original event exposure, in 
which participants had to discriminate between original event items, misleading 
items, as well as foil items. Following the recognition test, a source-monitoring test 
was completed that required participants to indicate which source the recognition test 
answers were remembered: (1) saw in the first set of presentations, (2) saw in the 
second set of presentations, (3) saw in both sets of presentations, (4) items conflicted 
between original event and misinformation stage, and (5) guessed. Results showed 
that in the recognition test about 30% of the misleading items were falsely attributed 
to the original exposure to the vignettes. Of these, about 50% of the items were 
robustly endorsed in the subsequent source-monitoring task (i.e. options (1) or (3) 
were chosen).  
 Although we did not expect any extreme deviations from previous findings, 
several study-specific factors might influence our results. The first factor was the 
exclusive use of brand items as study stimuli. As demonstrated in previous chapters, 
previous misinformation studies have found reliable misinformation effects by 
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partially (e.g. Belli, 1989) or entirely (Holmes & Weaver, 2010) using brand stimuli 
in the conventional misinformation procedure (i.e. in a procedure using the standard 
three step paradigm in which misinformation is presented in narrative form). 
However, studies exist that provide reasons to assume that the use of brand specific 
stimuli can lead to unusual results in established false memory paradigms. For 
example, Sherman and Moran (2011) examined false memories for non-presented 
brand names in the DRM paradigm. Here, participants were presented with lists of 
associated brand names and were subsequently confronted with a memory test for 
presented as well as non-presented brands. Consistent with previous research, the 
study produced a high and reliable false alarm rate for the obvious missing critical 
lure brand (e.g. for the non-presented brand TESCO, when the brands Morrisons, 
Sainsbury’s, Asda, Waitrose, Somerfield, Aldi, Safeway, Co-op, Iceland and Lidl had 
appeared in a list). However, unlike previous studies, data also revealed an unusually 
high false alarm rate for weakly related, non-presented control brands (see also 
Sherman, 2013). This finding suggests that false memories for brands were not only 
‘reserved’ for the obvious lure brand but that they also occurred for more loosely 
associated brands, although at a lower rates. The explanation proposed suggests that 
there might be strong semantic connections between brands of a category considering 
that brands often occur in their competitive environment (e.g. in the same 
supermarket shelves; Sherman & Moran, 2011).  
 The second factor is the peripheral product placement nature of our stimuli 
(i.e. the typically subtle nature in which brand placements are integrated into scenes). 
In this regard, it is well established that the encoding conditions of target items can 
influence the occurrence or strength of misinformation specific memory processes 
(Belli et al., 1992). For example, studies that have used one version or the other of 
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McCloskey and Zaragozas’ (1985) ‘crime scene slides’, in which target items were 
presented in a rather peripheral manner (e.g. a mug on a cluttered desk), have 
typically achieved hit rates for original slide items of about 36% to 46% (for original 
items on which participants were misled on). In contrast, Belli et al., (1992) achieved 
hit rates of 67% for details that were centrally placed into the slides. Another study 
specifically investigated the effects of centrally versus peripherally presented target 
items in the misinformation paradigm (Wright & Stroud, 1998). The researchers did 
not only obtain lower hit rates for more subtly depicted items but they also showed 
that the peripheral stimuli were associated with higher false alarm rates for the 
misleading information compared to more centrally placed items.  
 Another area of research that is informative in this context can be found in the 
area of marketing. Here, studies on product placement effectiveness exist that have 
focused on the question of how a product, once embedded in a scene, has an 
influence on brand memory. Results have been somewhat inconclusive, most likely 
because of a number of factors that influence memory for brands placed in movies or 
game scenes (La Ferle & Edwards, 2006; Law & Braun, 2000). These factors include 
exposure time (Brennan et al., 1999), placement prominence (Gupta & Lord, 1998; 
Lee & Faber, 2007), placement modality (visual or verbal reference) (Russell, 2002), 
the degree of brand integration in a scene (Yang et al., 2006), as well as whether a 
placement is referred to by a leading character or not (d’Astous & Chartier, 2000). 
Nevertheless, findings across these studies point to the fact that brands placed in 
movies, TV shows, and computer games can have an influence on consumers’ 
explicit and implicit memory (e.g. Brennan et al., 1999; d’Astous & Chartier, 2000; 
Gupta & Lord, 1998; Lee & Faber, 2007; Russell, 2002; Yang et al., 2006; Yang & 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2007). However, research that examines false memories in the 
  
53 
context of brand placements is rare. In one study dealing with implicit and explicit 
memory for brand names in computer games, Yang et al. (2006) measured false 
alarm rates for non-presented product placements as part of an incidental learning 
task. In the study, participants were asked to play a computer game that included 
product placements. In a subsequent recognition test that was administered after a 
short delay, participants correctly recognized about 47% of the presented product 
placements. However, about 29% of the non-presented competitor brands were 
falsely recognized.  
 Returning to retroactive product placements in photographs, it is important to 
know if consumers encode brand stimuli in snapshot photographs depicting everyday 
life scenes in the first place - a factor important for further false memory production. 
Watching photos may differ from watching movies, playing video games or slide 
shows depicting a crime scene. For example, rather than focusing on a storyline or a 
concrete task at hand, photographs often enable individuals to indulge in 
reminiscence or to build impressions. Here, the snapshot nature of photos might 
potentially let individuals pay more attention to details in order to extract information 
from the photo. However, in other ways watching photos may be similar to these 
other media. When watching photographs, analogous to movies, games, or slide 
shows, the characters, the storyline/occasion of the picture, as well as locations are in 
focus rather than the surrounding details. As a result, the likelihood of encoding and 
remembering brand information from these media may be comparable. Research has 
yet to examine if and how the encoding of retroactive brand placements in every day 
live photographs will influence the outcome of participants’ true and false memories 
created in the misinformation paradigm. 
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 It is well established that the strength of the misinformation effect depends on 
the retention intervals between the experimental stages of the misinformation 
paradigm. For instance, the results of several studies suggest that the effect of 
misleading information is stronger with longer retention intervals between the 
misinformation phase and the final memory test (Frost et al., 2002; Underwood & 
Pezdek, 1998). An important role in this context may be the perceived similarity 
between the memory details for misinformation items and the original items. Whereas 
over a short passage of time it may be more obvious that memory for (often verbally 
provided) misinformation does not have the perceptual features of the (often 
pictorially experienced) original detail, with longer retention intervals, this 
association may fade. Consequently the original detail may be perceived as more 
comparable to the misinformation detail (Frost et al., 2002).  
 Such time manipulations have been shown to influence phenomenological 
experience (Remember/Know judgements) of false memory retrieval in the 
misinformation paradigm as well. For example, Roediger et al. (1996) exposed 
participants to a slide show depicting a crime scene. Subsequently, participants read a 
narrative containing contradicting misinformation. In a recall test that was carried out 
two days later, misleading information was more likely to be judged as known than 
remembered. By using the same paradigm but administering the final recall test either 
immediately or one week after, Frost (2000) revealed similar findings. Here, 
contradictory misinformation was associated with higher scores of know responses 
compared to remember responses in both the immediate as well as the delay 
condition. For original items, on which participants were misled, remember 
judgments exceeded know judgments in the immediate condition. However, this was 
not true for the one-week delay condition. Here, the proportion of remember 
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judgments decreased with longer retention intervals and both remember and know 
judgments were made equally often (see also Roediger et al., 1996). The explanation 
proposed suggested that the verbally presented misleading information does contain 
fewer episodic and perceptual details than does memory for the pictorially presented 
original event. Hence, know judgments exceed the remember judgments for the 
misleading details. Original items on the other hand, may lose some of their episodic 
and perceptual details over time. As a result, the amount of remember judgments 
decreases. 
 Although previous research examined the effects of longer time delays such 
as 48 hours or 1-week between the misinformation phase and the final test, we opted 
for an immediate and a 1-day delay condition. The delay condition would not only 
offer an ecologically valid interval between exposure to misleading information and 
subsequent memory retrieval, but it would also allow us to investigate whether 
proportions of Remember, Know, and Guess judgements would be affected after a 
shorter time delay. However, we did not include any predictions regarding the effect 
of time delay on memory performance. The reasoning here is that many theoretical 
explanations are based on the different modalities of the pictorial original event detail 
and the verbally presented misinformation detail (i.e. differences in perceived 
similarity between the critical details). The pictorial modality of both stages of our 
paradigm might reveal a different outcome because the amount of perceptual details 
might be very similar from the outset.  
 Previous research has examined the effects of font manipulations on true and 
false memories by using list-learning paradigms. Here, the so called ‘picture-
superiority effect’ is well established with better memory for items that were 
presented in pictorial form compared to items that were presented in simple font 
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(Israel & Schacter, 1997). Researchers have also found that participants’ false 
memory production can be affected in this context. For example, Israel and Schacter 
(1997) manipulated the study font at encoding as well as the type of font at test in the 
DRM paradigm. Participants were first exposed to lists of semantic associates in 
auditory form. Whereas these auditory words were accompanied by matching 
pictures in one condition, in another condition they were accompanied by a written 
version of that word. In the final memory task, test items were either presented in 
both auditory and pictorial formats or solely in auditory form. Results revealed that 
reinstating the visual information at test not only led to an increase in hits for the list 
items but it also led to a reduction of false alarms for the missing critical lure item. 
Hence, the study suggests that visually reinstating the study stimuli at test is relevant 
when making true as well as false recognition judgments (see also Schacter, Israel, & 
Racine, 1999). Schacter et al. (1999) argued that these effects are likely to reflect 
distinctiveness heuristic processes. More specifically, because participants in the 
pictorial testing condition were provided with more distinctive cues, they may have 
demanded more detailed recollections to support a yes-response on the recognition 
test.  
 One study exists that has examined the effect of a brand font manipulation on 
memory in the DRM paradigm. Sherman and Moran (2011) exposed participants to 
lists of associated brands in either brand-specific logo form or simple Times New 
Roman font. The font type of items in a subsequent Remember, Know, Guess 
recognition test were then either reinstated or not. Results showed that only 
participant’s remember responses were affected in this design. Here, seeing the brand 
logos at encoding led to an overall increase in remember responses for all items 
types. However, and more importantly for our study, the font manipulation at test 
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only led to an increase in remember responses for original list items and the 
manipulation had little effect on participants’ false recognition of non-presented 
items. The explanation proposed suggests that it might have been participants’ 
familiarity with seeing pairings of fonts and brand names (due to everyday exposure) 
that might have produced this null effect.  
 So how would these effects develop for misleading brands in the 
misinformation paradigm? The nature of our study required brand insertions in their 
brand-specific font because text placements in photographs would have been 
problematic and somewhat against the purpose of this study. Hence, we only 
manipulated font type at test. Because we used an incidental brand learning task, we 
were specifically interested to see whether brand-specific font at test, and hence the 
visual reinstatement of brand icons, would aid participants’ true brand placement 
memories. In addition, we wanted to examine how these effects would develop for 
externally generated false memories created in the misinformation paradigm 
compared to non-presented, related items.  
 With these ideas in mind this proof of concept study examined for the first 
time whether retroactively replaced brands in photographs could change memories 
for originally seen brand placements. We invited participants to the lab under the 
auspices of examining how individuals process information when they are looking 
over a Facebook account of another Facebook user. Facebook was chosen for this 
research because of the large number of active users and the high familiarity with the 
platform among younger adults. We first exposed participants to photographs 
embedded into a fictitious Facebook account. Each photograph contained theme 
specific brand placements. Half of these brands were replaced by a competitor brand 
when participants saw the pictures a second time. Either immediately or after a delay 
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of one day, participants completed a recognition test followed by a source-monitoring 
task in which test items were either seen in pictorial form or simple font.  
It was predicted that participants would create source confusions and falsely 
attribute the misleading brands to the original photo exposure. In addition, we 
believed that that participant’s original brand placement memory would be impaired 
as a result of the manipulation and hence, there should be lower hit rates for 
originally seen brands in the misled relative to the control item condition. We 
expected to see these trends in participants’ overall recognition scores, as well as in 
their remember responses and more refined ‘robust’ memory performance in the 
source-monitoring task. We did not make any concrete predictions concerning how 
the time delay and font at test manipulations would influence these effects. 
Method and Measurement 
Participants  
 Sixty students and staff members aged 18 – 38 (M = 25.12 years, SD = 5.2; 
30% male) of City, University of London participated in the experiment for course 
credit or remuneration.  
Stimuli  
 Brand selection. To select the brand stimuli for this study we first identified a 
range of brand categories that would be relevant for our target sample ‘University 
students and staff in early adulthood’ (e.g. product categories typically found in 
University supermarkets or categories in the consumer electronic sector relevant for 
this age group). To reduce the occurrence of semantic intrusions in the study (e.g. that 
the exposure to one brand would trigger memories for a related brand where not 
wanted) we did our best to choose brand categories that were differentiated 
thematically. Next, we listed relevant brands belonging to these categories by using 
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UK relevant online resources. For example, we entered the term ‘fizzy drink’ into the 
ASDA UK grocery online shop website and added all relevant brands of that 
category. Crosschecks with other Internet sites (e.g. Tesco.co.uk) were used to assure 
that all relevant brands of a category were identified. We then searched for the three 
most popular brands for each category that were likely to present the brand leaders of 
their category. To do this, we used the search engine Google and the amount of 
‘Google results’ that were counted by the tool when a brand name was entered. By 
restricting search results to UK registered websites, the three brands with the highest 
amount of hits/results per category were selected. We considered the number of times 
a brand appeared on the web to be a good proxy for its position in the market and 
hence, consumer awareness of these brands. In the end, we included the three most 
popular brands of 24 product categories as actual study stimuli (the specific brand 
categories and brands used in this study can be found in Appendix A). We confirmed 
that all brands were either internationally known or advertised in the UK. 
 Study stimuli. To present the brand stimuli to participants we created a 
fictitious Facebook account in the form of a screenshot-presentation in offline-mode. 
The account was a typical Facebook timeline showing the basic information about a 
male City, University of London student in his twenties. Twelve pictures were 
embedded into the Facebook account showing the account owner and/or groups of 
friends in different social situations (e.g. friends having a picnic).
2
 Photos were 
mainly selected based on their ability to thematically ‘host’ brand placements of the 
chosen brand categories. Two out of 24 brand categories were assigned to each of the 
12 photos (e.g. a chips brand and grocery shop brand in the picnic scene). It should be 
                                                        
2 The content for the fictitious Facebook account including all photos were obtained 
from different Facebook account owners (e.g. family members or friends of the 
researcher) who all provided full consent that the photos could be used for this study. 
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noted that some brands from our brand selection process described earlier had to be 
omitted in this process. For example, some brands were not suitable as product 
placement because their brand font was too small to be recognizable in a picture. In 
these cases, the next brand in line was chosen. Next, three versions of each photo 
were created that embedded one of the three chosen brand examples of a brand 
category (e.g. one of the chips brands: Doritos, Kettle, or Walkers and one of the 
grocery shop brands: Asda, Tesco, or Morrisons; see Appendix B for examples of 
these photo versions). Because each photo depicted two brands of two different brand 
categories, two specific brands of these categories were paired for the study (e.g. 
photo version 1: Doritos and Asda). In this process, we did our best to balance brand 
strength between the paired brands of different categories to avoid effects driven by 
particularly strong or weak photographs. More specifically, we paired the strongest 
brand, i.e. the brand with the highest amount of Google hits (potentially the brand 
leader of a category) with a less strong brand of another category, i.e. the brand third 
in line regarding the amount of Google hits. During the original event, participants 
were exposed to one out of three versions of each of these 12 pictures and hence, to 
one out of three brands for each of the 24 brand categories.  
 To induce misinformation, participants were later misled on one category 
brand per photo. More specifically, misleading information was provided for 12 out 
of 24 brands by replacing these items with contradicting/misleading brands during a 
second exposure to the pictures (misled item condition). For the remaining 12 brands 
that were originally shown, consistent information was provided (i.e. participants 
were not misled on these items – control item condition). The remaining items of a 
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brand category that were not used in the photos served as foil items in the final 
memory test.
3
 
 Assignment of the brands to the three item types (original item, misleading 
item, and foil item) and to the condition (misled item condition and control item 
condition) was counterbalanced across participants. Further, each of the competitor 
brands of a category served equally often as misleading/contradicting brand during 
the misinformation phase. To do this this, twelve different conditions in which 
participants were exposed to different brand combinations (slide show combinations) 
were created for counterbalancing purposes. We also randomized the order in which 
participants were exposed to the single photos. 
Procedure   
 Original event. Figure 1 shows the design of this study. Participants were 
tested individually in this study in a laboratory of City, University of London. In 
order to reduce the risks of demand characteristics, participants were informed that 
the purpose of the study was to examine how information is processed when a 
Facebook user looks over the Facebook account of another user. They were not told 
that they would later complete a memory test for brand information.  
                                                        
3 To illustrate, consider the following scenario in the picnic scene, in which 
participants saw the chips brand and a grocery shop brand: Participants may have 
been misled on the chips brand (misled item condition). If the chips brand Doritos 
was seen during the first exposure to the photos (original item in the misled item 
condition), Kettle may have been used to mislead participants during the second 
exposure to the pictures (misleading item in the misled item condition). The 
remaining non-presented brand Walkers was used as foil item in the test (foil item in 
the misled item condition). Participants may have not been misled on the grocery 
shop brand (control item condition) and hence, the brand Asda may have appeared in 
a consistent manner during both exposures to the pictures (original item in the control 
item condition). Last, the remaining non-presented brands Tesco and Morrisons (foil 
items in the control item condition) were the foils in the memory test. Please note that 
the misleading item is not applicable in the control item condition since participants 
were not misled on the originally seen brand in that condition. 
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Figure 1. Study design 
 
First, participants were shown the Facebook profile and were instructed to 
imagine that a fictitious acquaintance just added them as a friend on Facebook and 
that they should now gain their first impression by looking over the Facebook 
timeline of that person. Next, participants were instructed to click on ‘Photos’ and 
look at the personal pictures uploaded by their fictitious acquaintance. To stop 
participants from simply looking passively at the pictures, participants were asked to 
imagine that they were familiar with some of the account owner’s friends seen in the 
pictures. In addition, they were asked to imagine that they were part of the events 
shown, even if they were of course not seen in the pictures. By letting participants 
imagine who could have been present in the scenes, what could have been talked 
about, as well as where the events might have taken place, we hoped participants 
engaged with the scenes. Importantly, at no point was reference made to any of the 
brand placements. To ensure that all participants engaged for the same time period 
with the pictures, photos changed automatically and participants were exposed to 
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each photo for 12 seconds.
4
 After exposure to the study stimuli, participants 
completed some unrelated filler activities consisting of simple math tasks and logic-
based number puzzles such as Sudoku for 30 minutes. 
 Misinformation phase. After 30 minutes, all participants were asked to look 
at the Facebook profile and the same photos again. The simple instruction was given 
that participants should indulge in reminiscence by viewing what they believed were 
the same photographs depicting the same events than seen earlier. This time however, 
participants saw the photos that were manipulated such that one brand per picture was 
replaced with a different brand of the same category, while the other brand did not 
change during the process. Each individual picture was again shown for 12 seconds. 
After, half of the participants were dismissed whereas the other half continued their 
unrelated filler activities (simple math tasks) for ten minutes.   
 Final memory test. The final memory tests were carried out either 
immediately (i.e. after a delay of ten minutes) by half of the participants (N = 30) or 
after 24 - 26 hours by the other half of the participants (N = 30). First, participants 
were given a recognition test that recorded their overall memories for the original 
event. Here, participants were explicitly told that the test strictly referred to the first 
exposure to the photographs. To further affirm this instruction, the word ‘first’ was 
underlined and typed in capital letters and red ink for each of the trials. Brand items 
appeared on the screen one at a time and participants were instructed to click ‘yes’ for 
brands that were seen during the first exposure to the photos and to click ‘no’ if they 
                                                        
4 The exposure time to study stimuli in classical misinformation studies ranges from 
three to seven seconds per slide for long series of colour slides (about 80 slides; e.g. 
Ackil & Zaragoza, 1995; Belli, 1989; Frost, 2000) but has also been one minute for 
one single colour slide depicting an original event (e.g. Blank, 1998). For this study 
an exposure time of 12 seconds per slide was considered appropriate in order to let 
participants engage with the scenes and to provide the chance to encode the rather 
peripherally placed brand details without using an unnatural photo viewing 
behaviour. 
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were not. Only if ‘yes’ was clicked were participants asked to make a Remember, 
Know, or Guess judgment. Participants were asked to press ‘remember’ when they 
were able to consciously recollect and mentally relive the appearance of that item in 
the first presentation of the picture. They were asked to consider whether they could 
visually re-experience the item as well as its position in the photo. Participants were 
asked to press ‘know’ when the judgment was based on a feeling of familiarity, 
described as a sensation that the item was seen in one of the photos but could not be 
visually re-experienced in the setting of the picture. Finally, they were to press 
‘guess’ when they could neither recollect nor recognize the item on the basis of 
familiarity, but if they could not definitely reject. 
 Following the recognition test, a final source-monitoring task was carried out 
to measure what is referred to as participants’ robust memory performance. In this 
test, we gave participants the chance to reconsider the presentation sources of all 
items endorsed during the recognition test. Five options were provided for each of the 
items: (1) seen during the first exposure to the pictures only, (2) seen during the 
second exposure to the pictures only, (3) seen during both exposures to the pictures, 
(4) brands conflicted across both photo exposure phases, (5) just guessed. We used 
this procedure in order to further affirm whether participants believed that they had 
seen the misleading detail during the original event (see Zhu et al., 2012). In order to 
reduce the risk of in-test priming effects, all brands of a category appeared in 
different testing blocks. The order in which brands of different categories appeared in 
these blocks as well as the order of block presentation was counterbalanced across 
participants. In all tests, half of the participants were exposed to brand stimuli in 
pictorial form (N = 30) whereas the other half was exposed to the brand names in a 
simple font (N = 30). 
  
65 
Measurement and analysis  
 The 72 items of the recognition test consisted of 24 of the original items (12 
on which participants were misled and 12 on which participants were not misled), 12 
misleading items that contradicted their original counterparts, and 36 non-presented 
foil items (including 12 foil items categorically related to the misled and 24 foil items 
related to the control item condition). Correct and incorrect yes-responses to these 
items were used to compute participant’s overall memory performance (i.e. hits and 
false alarms of correctly or incorrectly stating that an item had appeared during the 
original event). Robust memory performance in the source-monitoring task consisted 
of the recognition test answers under stricter source-monitoring criteria. Original 
items in the misled item condition were coded robust true memories when option (1) 
‘seen during the first exposure to the pictures only’ or (4) ‘brands conflicted across 
both photo exposure phases’ was correctly ticked (see options of the source-
monitoring task described earlier). Original items in the control item condition were 
coded as robust true memories when option (3) ‘seen during both exposures to the 
pictures’ was correctly chosen. Misleading items were coded as robust false alarms 
when option (1) or (3) was incorrectly selected. Finally, foils in misled and control 
item conditions were coded as robust false memories when option (1) or (3) was 
falsely chosen (see Okado & Stark, 2005).  
 Based on previous research (e.g. Frost et al., 2002; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989) 
we analysed the uptake of misinformation by applying statistical tests that would first 
compare participants’ memory performance (yes-responses to items) within the 
misled item condition and then across conditions (misled item vs. control item). 
These main analyses were carried out separately for participants’ raw recognition 
scores, their Remember, Know, and Guess responses, as well as for their robust 
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memory performance on the source-monitoring task. Despite multiple comparisons 
across conditions with different statistical tests, we decided to set an overall standard 
alpha level equal to .05 for our main analysis (see also Frost et al., 2002). Because 
our task used an implicit learning procedure with trends that were expected to be 
smaller than the effects usually achieved in classical misinformation studies, an alpha 
level of .05 seemed appropriate because a more conservative p-value might not have 
been sensitive enough to detect potential effects in our data. Several sub-analyses 
(such as an analysis by item) were also used to further investigate the misinformation 
data. 
Results 
Sample characteristics 
 Shapiro-Wilk’s tests (p > .05) and visual inspections of histograms, normal Q-
Q plots and box plots, were used to examine whether the dependent variables of this 
study were approximately normally distributed. Analysis showed that the dependent 
variable item endorsement was roughly normally distributed for Item type (original 
items and misleading items), Condition (misled item condition and control item 
condition), Stimuli test format (font and pictorial), and Time of test (immediately and 
1-day delay). However, participants’ foil false alarms in the misled item condition 
showed a skewness or kurtosis exceeding threshold values in some of the conditions 
(Shapiro-Wilk’s tests: ps < .05). An inspection of the variable revealed two outlier 
data points for foil false alarms that contradicted the pattern found for all other 
participants. Thus, we decided to remove these data from the analyses.
5
 The 
                                                        
5 We used the outlier-labelling rule to identify the outliers in the variable (Tukey, 
1977). The formula utilized the third and first quartile and a multiplier of 1.5 to 
determine upper and lower boundaries for potential outliers. This resulted in the 
elimination of two data points that exceeded the upper boundary of .68 (data points of 
two participants). This reduced the immediate test/font condition by two participants 
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elimination of these two participants transformed foil false alarm scores to be roughly 
normally distributed in most of the conditions. Further, neither participant’s age nor 
gender had any effect on the dependent variables of this study. Hence, these variables 
were not included in the following analyses. 
Recognition test data  
 Raw score analysis. Table 1 shows the proportion of yes-responses for the 
three item types (original details, misleading details, and foil details) correctly and 
incorrectly accepted as being part of the original event as a function of condition (i.e. 
whether participants were or were not misled on an item; a table showing the 
proportion yes-responses as a function of Time of Test and Stimuli test format can be 
found in Appendix C). 
First, we compared participants’ overall yes-responses to the three item types 
in the misled item condition. Here, we were interested in whether participants could 
differentiate between originally seen items and originally non-seen items (misleading 
details and the foils) and between the misleading details and the non-presented foil 
items. In addition, we were interested to see whether Time of test and Stimuli test 
format had any effect on participants’ yes-responses. We ran a 3(Item type: original 
item vs. misleading item vs. foil item) x2(Time of test: immediate vs. delay) 
x2(Stimuli test format: font vs. pictorial) mixed factor ANOVA. Analysis yielded a 
significant main effect of Item type, F(2, 108) = 20.13, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .27. 
Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that participants correctly accepted more 
                                                                                                                                                              
leaving N = 13 participants in this condition. The amount of participants in all other 
conditions remained N = 15. It should also be noted that none of the effects reported 
in this section were crucially affected by this intervention but due to the unusual 
behaviour of these participants and for reasons of ‘normality assumption’ data points 
were excluded from analysis.  
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original items (M = .44, SD = .19) than they falsely accepted misleading items (M = 
.33, SD = .21; p = .018) and the related foil items (M = .24, SD = .17, p < .001). In 
addition, misleading items were more often falsely accepted than the foil items (p = 
.004). There were no other significant main effects or interactions (all ps > .05; see 
Appendix D for all test statistics).
6
 
 
Table 1. Mean proportion (SE) of yes-responses with proportion of Remember, 
Know, and Guess responses for each item type as a function of condition. 
Condition
Response 
type
Total .44 (.03) .33 (.03) .24 (.02)
Remember .27 (.03) .16 (.02) .09 (.01)
Know .11 (.01) .11 (.02) .08 (.01)
Guess .07 (.01) .06 (.01) .06 (.01)
Total .55 (.02) .21 (.02)
Remember .36 (.03) .07 (.01)
Know .13 (.02) .08 (.01)
Guess .07 (.01) .06 (.01)
n.a.
n.a.
Control
item
Item type
n.a.
Misled
item
n.a.
Original items 
(hits)
Misleading items
(false alarms)
Foil items 
(false alarms)
 
 
Notes. In the misled item condition Original items were items seen in the first 
exposure to the photos that were contradicted by Misleading items in the second 
exposure to the photos. Foil items were the non-presented but categorically related 
items. In the control item condition, Original items were shown in a consistent 
manner during both event phases. Foil items were the non-presented but categorically 
related items. *Misleading items are not applicable to the control item condition 
because participants were not misinformed on the original items in this condition. 
Overall memory performance in bold font. Any anomalies in adding up are due to 
rounding errors. 
 
 
                                                        
6 In participants’ raw recognition scores as well as source-monitoring task 
performance, the factors Time of test as well as Stimuli test format produced null-
effects with high p-values and small effect sizes. To reduce the complexity of the 
results section, test statistics of non-significant main effects and interactions of our 
main analysis was not reported in the results section but can be found in Appendix D. 
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 For further comparison we examined participants’ yes-responses to the item 
types across condition and conducted 2(Condition: misled item vs. control item) 
x2(Time of test: immediate vs. delay) x2(Stimuli test format: font vs. pictorial) mixed 
factor ANOVAs separately for the original-, the misleading-, and the foil details. For 
original items, there was a significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 54) = 19.11, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .26, showing that participants correctly accepted more original details in 
the control item condition (M = .55, SD = .18) relative to the misled item condition. 
Misleading details (in the misled item condition) were compared to foil responses in 
the control item condition. This was done because foil items in the control item 
condition referred to a detail that was similar in nature to misleading items in the 
misled item condition and thus, retrieval of these items served as an additional 
baseline. Here, analyses revealed a significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 54) = 
25.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .32, with more false acceptances of misleading items (in the 
misled) relative to the foils in the control item condition (M = .21, SD = .13). Last, 
comparing foil items across condition revealed no significant main effect of 
Condition.
 7
 Further, no other significant main effects or interactions were found for 
all comparisons across conditions. 
To have a closer look at the relationship between participants’ hits and false 
alarms for the different item types, we computed Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients for participants’ recognition scores. In the misled item condition, results 
revealed a positive correlation between endorsed original items and endorsed foil 
items, r = .27, n = 58, p = .040, and also between misleading items and foil details, r 
                                                        
7 Note that the misleading item vs. foil and foil vs. foil comparison across condition 
will not be pursued in the following analyses. Because foil items in the control 
condition did not differ in any aspect from foils in the misled item condition (all ps > 
.05) these comparisons were not reported in R/K/G- as well as source-monitoring 
data analysis in order to reduce the complexity of the results section.  
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= .37, n = 58, p = .004. No significant correlation was found between original items 
and misleading items, r = .06, n = 58, p = .68. Hence, the more hits were produced for 
original items, the more related foils were also falsely accepted. This association was 
not found between original items and misleading items, suggesting that both false 
alarm types (for misleading items and the foils) reflected different processes. In the 
control item condition, no significant correlation was found between original items 
and the foil items, r = .16, n = 58, p = .23. 
Overall, analysis of the recognition data suggests that participants were misled 
by the retroactively changed brands in the photographs. More specifically, 
participants endorsed the misleading items more often than the related but non-
presented foil items, which shows that the misinformation effect was caused by more 
than just mere guessing. In addition, comparisons across conditions showed that 
participants produced more correct responses for the original details in the control 
item relative to the misled item condition, suggesting the presence of a memory 
impairment effect. The time of the memory test did not have any effect on 
participants’ raw recognition scores. Whereas statistically, the stimuli test format 
manipulation did not reveal any differences between the means either, numerically, 
means for the original items were in the expected direction with higher scores of yes-
responses in the pictorial relative to the font condition (.48 vs. .40 in the misled item 
and .58 vs. .52 in the control item condition; see table in Appendix C). 
 Remember, Know, and Guess analysis. Table 1 shows the proportion of 
Remember, Know, and Guess responses for each item type as a function of condition 
(a table showing the proportion Remember, Know, and Guess responses as a function 
of Time of Test and Stimuli test format can be found in Appendix E). First, we 
conducted the same ANOVAs as above for participants’ remember responses only to 
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see whether the same effects would be present when looking only at participants’ 
conscious recollections. In the misled item condition, analysis yielded a significant 
main effect of Item type, F(2, 108) = 21.12, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .28. Bonferroni pairwise 
comparisons showed that participants correctly remembered more original items (M = 
.27, SD = .20) than they falsely remembered misleading items (M = .16, SD = .16; p = 
.005) and the related foil items (M = .09, SD = .10, p < .001). In addition, misleading 
items were more often falsely remembered than the foil items (p = .008). The data 
revealed no significant interactions but there was a significant main effect of Time of 
test F(1, 54) = 6.28, p = .015, ηp
2
 = .10. Results showed that overall, there were more 
remember responses in the immediate (M = .20, SD = .16), relative to the delay (M = 
.14, SD = .14), condition (see Figure 2a). Analysis also yielded a significant main 
effect of Stimuli test format, F(1, 54) = 11.87, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .18, with more 
remember responses in the pictorial (M = .21, SD = .16), compared to the font (M = 
.13, SD = .12), condition (see Figure 2b). There was no significant interaction 
between Time of test and Stimuli test format. Looking at remember responses for 
original items across condition analysis revealed a main effect of Condition, F(1, 54) 
= 16.21, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .23. More original items were remembered in the control 
item (M = .36, SD = .21) relative to the misled item condition (M = .27, SD = .20). No 
other significant main effects or interactions were found. 
 For completion, we conducted the same analysis separately for participants 
know and guess responses. For participants know responses we only found a 
significant Item type X Time of test interaction in the misled item condition, F(2, 
108) = 4.0, p = .021, ηp
2
 = .07. Further analysis of the simple main effects only 
revealed one borderline significant effect of interest looking at the effect of Time of 
test at each level of Item type. Independent sample t-tests with Bonferroni adjusted 
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alpha levels of .016 (.05/3) showed that whereas original items were more often 
known in the delay (M = .14, SD = .09) relative to the immediate condition (M = .07, 
SD = .09), t(56) = 2.35, p = .021, d = .78, no differences in know responses were 
found for misleading items and the foil items (see Figure 2a). For guess responses, 
neither in the misled item nor across item conditions, any significant main effect 
effects or interactions were found. 
 Hence, the misinformation effect found in the overall recognition scores was 
clearly confirmed when participants’ remember responses only were compared 
between item types. Original items were more often remembered than the misleading 
items and both were more often remembered than the foils. In addition, original items 
were more often remembered in the control item relative to the misled item condition. 
No such response pattern was detected in participants’ know and guess responses. 
Data also suggest that Time of test and Stimuli test format had an effect on 
participants’ remember responses that were not revealed in the raw recognition 
scores. Overall, the delayed test condition seemed to reduce participants’ remember 
responses for all the item types whereas participants created overall more remember 
responses when brands were displayed in pictorial form at test. However, these 
factors did not interact. 
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Figure 2a. Proportions of Remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G) responses for 
original items, misleading items, and foil items in the misled item condition as a 
function of Time of test. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
 
Figure 2b. Proportions of Remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G) responses for 
original items, misleading items, and foil items in the misled item condition as a 
function of Stimuli test format. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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 We also investigated Remember, Know, and Guess response patterns within 
the different Item types to see whether these patterns would differ as a function of 
Time of test and Stimuli test format. We ran 3(Response type: remember vs. know. 
vs. guess) x 2(Time of test: immediate vs. delay) x2(Stimuli format: font vs. pictorial) 
mixed factor ANOVAs separately for original items, misleading items, and foil items. 
For original items in the misled item condition there was a main effect of Response 
type, F(2,108) = 32.19, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .37 as well as a significant Response type and 
Time of test interaction, F(2,108) = 4.93, p = .009,  ηp
2
 = .08. Analysis of the simple 
main effects was carried out by examining Response type at each level of Time of 
test. One-way repeated measures ANOVAs revealed a stronger main effect of 
Response type in the immediate, F(2,54) = 29.82, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .53, relative to the 
1-day delay condition, F(2,58) = 6.51, p = .003,  ηp
2
 = .18. Bonferroni pairwise 
comparison showed that whereas original items were more often remembered (M = 
.32, SD = .21) than known (M = .07, SD = .09) in the immediate testing condition (p 
< .001), this difference was not significant in the delayed testing condition (p > .05). 
Analysis also yielded a significant Response Type and Stimuli test format interaction, 
F(2,108) = 5.73, p = .004,  ηp
2
 = .10. Further analyses using one-way repeated 
measures ANOVAs revealed a weaker main effect of Response type in the font, 
F(2,54) = 6.83, p = .002,  ηp
2
 = .20; relative to the pictorial condition, F(2,58) = 
26.50, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .48). Bonferroni pairwise comparison showed that whereas 
original items were more often remembered (M = .33, SD = .22) than known (M = 
.08, SD = .10) in the pictorial test condition (p < .001), this difference was not 
revealed in the font test condition (p > .05). No other significant main effects or 
interactions were found (all ps > .05). 
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 The same analysis for misleading items revealed a significant main effect of 
Response type as well, F(2,108) = 8.42, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .14. Bonferroni pairwise 
comparisons showed that misleading items were more often remembered than 
guessed (p = .001). The difference between know and guess responses was only 
borderline significant (p = .051) with more know than guess responses. There was no 
difference between remember and know responses. Apart from this, there was only a 
significant Response Type and Stimuli test format interaction, F(2,108) = 3.10, p = 
.049,  ηp
2
 = .54. Further analysis only revealed a main effects of Response type in the 
pictorial condition, F(2,58) = 9.47, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .25, but not in the font condition. 
Whereas Bonferroni pairwise comparison showed that misleading items were more 
often remembered (M = .19, SD = .18) than known (M = .10, SD = .10), and also 
more often known than guessed (M = .05, SD = .07) in the pictorial condition, there 
was no such effect in the simple font condition. No other significant main effects or 
interactions were found (all ps > .05). 
 For original items in the control item condition analysis yielded a main effect 
of Response type as well, F(2,108) = 47.94, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .47. More original details 
were remembered than both known and guessed (both ps < .001) and more were 
known than guessed (p = .006). There were no further significant main effects or 
interactions. For foils in the misled and control item condition there were no 
significant main effects or interactions (all ps > .05). 
 To sum up, these data suggest that the response patterns within original items 
in the misled item condition differed depending on whether the memory test was 
carried out immediately or after a delay. Specifically, when original items were 
endorsed in the immediate condition, responses were more often associated with 
remember than know responses. However, the delay condition showed a different 
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trend. Here, the reduction of remember responses and the increase of know responses 
led to a tie between the two response types. The misleading items showed a similar 
response pattern. As can be seen in Figure 2a, differences between Remember, Know, 
and Guess responses seemed to be more pronounced in the immediate relative to the 
delay condition. However, these differences were not statistically significant. 
Concerning the effects of Stimuli test format, data showed that the font condition 
somehow reduced differences between response types for original items as well as the 
misleading details. Whereas both items types were more often remembered than 
known and more often remembered and known than guessed in the pictorial 
condition, most of these differences were not present in the font condition. No 
difference in phenomenological experience was found for the foil items. 
Source-monitoring test data  
 Table 2 shows the proportion of overall robust memory performance as well 
as individual responses in the source-monitoring task as a function of Condition. To 
recap, in the source-monitoring task participants were asked to reconsider the sources 
of their recognition test answers by choosing from different source options (see notes 
Table 2). We conducted the same main analysis as above on participants’ robust 
memory performance. Again, in the misled item condition analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of Item type, F(2, 108) = 10.73, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .17. 
Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that there was no difference between the 
original items and the misleading items (p = .28) but that original items were more 
often correctly attributed to the original event (M = .21, SD = .19) than the foil items 
were falsely attributed to the original event (M = .07, SD = .07, p < .001). In addition, 
more misleading items were falsely attributed to the original event (M = .15, SD = 
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.15) than foil items (p = .004). No other significant main effects or interactions were 
found. 
 Comparison of original items across condition (misled item vs. control item) 
revealed a main effect of Item Type as well, F(1, 54) = 19.77, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .27, 
with more correct source attributions in the control item (M = .33, SD = .20) relative 
to the misled item condition. There were no other significant main effects or 
interactions. 
  
Table 2. Mean proportion (SE) of robust memory performance (correct and incorrect 
source attributions to the original event) total and broken down by response for each 
item type as a function of condition. 
Control
 Robust .21 (.02) .33 (.03) .15 (.02) -- .07 (.01) .07 (.01)
(1) Saw 1 only .17 (.03) .05 (.01) .03 (.01) -- .03 (.01) .03 (.01)
(2) Saw 2 only .02 (.01) .05 (.01) .06 (.01) -- .02 (.01) .02 (.00)
(3) Both .10 (.01) .33 (.03) .12 (.02) -- .04 (.01) .04 (.01)
(4) Conflicted .04 (.01) .03 (.01) .03 (.01) -- .03 (.01) .02 (.01)
(5) Guessed .11 (.01) .09 (.02) .10 (.02) -- .11 (.02) .10 (.01)
Original item
(hits)
Foil Items
(false alarms)
Misleading item 
(false alarms)
Misled Control Misled Misled Control
 
Notes. Item types were coded robust when one of the following options were ticked 
by a participant: Original item: misled (1) or (4), control (3); Misleading item: (1) or 
(3), Foil item: misled and control (1) or (3). Robust memory performance in bold 
font.  
 
Thus, analysis of participants’ robust memories mirrored most trends found in 
participants overall memory performance and remember responses. One exception 
was found in the misled item condition. Here, correct source attributions for the 
original items and false source attributions for the misleading items did not 
statistically differ from another, indicating that participants accepted the misleading 
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alternative as often as the item actually seen during the original event. Unlike 
participants’ remember responses, the effect of Time of test and Stimuli test format 
were not found in participants’ robust memory performance. However, regarding the 
latter manipulation, there was a numerical trend for original items with higher scores 
of correct source-attributions in the pictorial relative to the font condition (.24 vs. .17 
in the misled and .36 vs. .30 in the control item condition; see table in Appendix F). 
 Last, we examined participants’ response patterns within item types in the 
source-monitoring task in order to examine participants’ source-monitoring 
performance closer. Here, we were only interested in the misled item condition and 
whether response patterns for original items and the misleading items would differ as 
a function of Time of test and Stimuli test format. Remember that hits for original 
items in the misled item condition were only coded robust true memories when ‘saw 
1 only’ and ‘conflicted’ was selected and that false alarms for the misleading items 
were coded robust false memories when ‘saw 1 only’ or ‘both’ was selected in the 
source task. We ran two 5(Response type: saw 1 only vs. saw 2 only. vs. both vs. 
conflicted vs. guessed) x 2(Time of test: immediate vs. delay) x2(Stimuli format: font 
vs. pictorial) mixed factor ANOVAs. For original items there was a significant main 
effect of Response type, F(4, 216) = 12.86, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .19. Bonferroni pairwise 
comparisons showed no significant difference between options ‘saw 1 only’, ‘both’, 
and ‘guessed’, but all three options were more often selected than ‘saw 2 only’ (all ps 
< .001) and ‘conflicted’ (all ps < .001; see mean scores in Table 2). There were no 
other significant main effects or interactions. For the misleading items there was a 
significant main effect of Response type as well, F(4, 216) = 9.66, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .15. 
Further comparisons revealed that whereas ‘both’ was equally often selected than 
‘guessed’, both options were more often chosen than ‘saw 1 only’ (ps < .001), ‘saw 2 
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only’ (p = .006, p = .045), and ‘conflicted’ (ps < .001). In addition, ‘saw 2 only’ was 
more often selected than ‘saw 1 only’ (p = .022). There were no other significant 
main effects or interactions. 
 To summarize these findings, data suggest that participants showed some 
ability to correctly identify the sources of their memories. For original items in the 
misled item condition participants chose the ‘Saw 1 only’ option numerically more 
often than any of the other response types. However, statistically there was no 
difference between correctly choosing ‘saw 1 only’ or falsely choosing the ‘both’ 
option. This was different for the misleading items. Although participants correctly 
chose ‘saw 2 only’ more often than ‘saw 1 only’, ‘both’ was falsely chosen more 
often than any of these options. However, it should be noted that the option ‘both’ 
was equally often chosen for the misleading details than for the original items. Hence, 
source confusions were not only reserved for the misleading items but also for the 
original items on which participants were misled on. Last, none of these options were 
affected by our between-participants factors Time of test and Stimuli test format. 
Item performance data  
 We examined differences in participants’ true and false endorsement rates 
depending on where items were positioned in the photographs. Because three related 
brands of a category always appeared in the same position of a picture, we plotted the 
average hit and false alarm rates across the three related brands for each of the 24 
categories. Figure 3a and 3b show the mean endorsement rates of some of these 
‘placement positions’ when they appeared as original items in the misled item 
condition and when they appeared as misleading items. Inspection of these data 
revealed strong differences in memory performance between brand categories/brand 
positions. For example, hits for original items in the misled item condition ranged 
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from .22 for service station brands to .72 for fast food and coffee shop brands. False 
alarms for the misleading items went from .19 for the sports brands to .55 for the 
bottled water brands.  
 To further analyse the effect of placement position on memory performance, 
we separated item positions into more prominent placements (N = 10; centrally 
placed items or items integrated into a scene) and less prominent placements (N = 14; 
peripherally placed items or items not integrated into a scene). Results of independent 
sample t-tests revealed no significant differences in true and false endorsement rates 
depending on the placement condition (all ps > .05). However descriptively, there 
was a trend of more hits for original items in the prominent placement condition 
compared to the less prominent condition (.49 vs. .40 in the misled and .62 vs. .54 in 
the control item condition).
8
 Hence, data provided some indication that memory 
performance depended on where and how an item was positioned in the photos.  
We also analysed memory performance for single brands across all categories 
and found that these often differed from the performance for other brands. For 
example, it was the mobile brand LG that had the lowest hit rate when it appeared as 
an original item in the misled item condition (.00) and it was the fast food brand 
McDonald’s and the chips brand Walkers that were remembered best (both .90). 
When it appeared as a misleading item the car rental brand Hertz caused the least 
false memories (.09) and the water brand Buxton the most (.82). Hence, overall the 
item analysis revealed strong differences in participants’ hit and false alarm rates for 
                                                        
8 Please note that the attribution of placement positions to the prominently and non-
prominently condition was decided based on a discussion by the researcher with an 
individual that was naïve concerning the study purpose. Although both parties agreed 
on all placement attributions in the end, it should be noted that above-mentioned 
trends were also found when ‘more complicated’ item positions (i.e. item positions on 
which agreement was not instantly obtained) were excluded from the analysis.  
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individual brands as well (a table showing the average hit and false alarm rates for all 
brands used in this study can be found in Appendix A).  
 
 
Figure 3a. Mean endorsement rates in the recognition test of original items in misled 
item condition per placement position (i.e. across the three items of a category). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. Mean endorsement rates in the recognition test of misleading items per 
placement position (i.e. across the three items of a category). 
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To see if there would be a relationship between items correctly an incorrectly 
endorsed, we computed Pearson’s r correlations scores between item types endorsed 
in the misled and control item condition. As can be seen in Table 3, data suggest that 
it was the brands with high hit rates that also produced the most false alarms when 
they appeared as misleading or as related foil items.  
 
 
Table 3. Pearson’s r correlations between yes-responses for each item type and 
Google hits as a function of condition 
Google
 hits
Original 
items
Misleading 
items
Foil 
items
Original 
items
Foil 
items
Original items .113
Misleading items -.044    .358**
Foil items -.031    .355**   .275*
Original items .164    .509** .157 .343**
Foil items -.082 .199   .284* .404** .231
ControlMisled
Condition
Misled
Control
 
Note. N = 72; * p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Last, we computed Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between 
participants’ memory performance for each item type and Google hits (i.e. the 
amount of Google hits when a brand was entered into the search engine; see earlier). 
This was done in order to examine whether brand awareness as measured by Google 
hits, and hence, the fact whether a brand was a leader of its category or not, was 
associated with true and false brand memories.
9
 As can be seen in Table 3, none of 
the item types endorsed in misled and control item condition were significantly 
                                                        
9 Please note that we considered running an analysis by item ANCOVA to analyse 
the effects of Time of test and Stimuli test format on memory performance by 
controlling for brand popularity as measure by Google hits. However, each of the 72 
brands did not appear frequently enough in each of the between factor conditions to 
justify splitting and analysing our data correspondingly. 
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correlated with Google hits. However, inspection of the r values suggested small 
positive correlations between participants’ true memories and Google hits. No such 
trend was seen for the misleading and non-presented items. 
Discussion 
 This study used a modified version of the misinformation paradigm to 
examine for the first time whether retroactively replaced brands in photographs could 
influence memories for originally experienced brands. Participants were exposed to 
the same photographs including brand placements on two occasions. When 
participants saw the pictures the second time, some product brands were replaced by 
a competitor brand. A recognition test for the original event including Remember, 
Know, and Guess judgements as well as a subsequent source-monitoring task were 
used to measure the uptake of misinformation. In addition we examined whether a 
delay of the final memory tests as well as the presentation format of test stimuli in 
these tests would have any effect upon participants memory performance. 
Effects of retroactive product replacement on memory performance 
 Results of this study revealed a reliable misinformation effect caused by 
retroactive brand replacements in photographs. Results of the recognition test showed 
that 33% of the misleading brands were falsely attributed to the original exposure to 
the photographs. In comparison, there were significantly fewer false alarms for the 
non-presented but related competitor brands. What this suggests is that the 
misinformation effect was not simply caused by mere guessing. Also, about 50% of 
the misinformation false alarms were associated with recollective (remember) 
experiences. That is, these memories seemed vivid and real, with many participants 
reporting remember judgments in the recognition test. Our data also suggest that 
participants’ original event memories were affected by the study manipulation. Items 
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that were originally seen in the photos but were later replaced by a competitor brand 
were correctly remembered in only 44% of the cases. In comparison, we found 55% 
correct recognition for control brands that were seen during both exposure phases to 
the photographs. As expected, these trends were not only confirmed in participants’ 
overall memory performance, but also in their more refined remember responses (i.e. 
when responses based on familiarity and guessing were excluded from the analysis). 
In addition, the same result pattern was revealed when we gave participants the 
chance to reconsider the sources of their memories in the source-monitoring task (saw 
1 only vs. saw 2 only vs. both vs. brands conflicted vs. guessed). However, when 
confronted with the source options, participants were able to correct some of their 
memory errors created in the recognition test. Importantly, 15% of all misleading 
items (50% of endorsed misleading items in the recognition test) were still robustly 
misattributed to the first or both exposures to the pictures. These results are consistent 
with the results of Okado and Stark (2005) who also used photographs to implant 
misleading information.  
 From a theoretical point of view, the misinformation effect found in this study 
is likely to be caused by source confusions, more specifically, by confusing the 
source of the misleading brand memory with the original brand exposure (Zaragoza 
& Lane, 1994). Our data suggest that some of these source misattributions might have 
been triggered by memory impairment processes, meaning that participant’s original 
event memory trace for a brand placement was partially or completely overwritten, or 
simply blocked by the new memory trace for the misleading competitor brand. In 
other cases, the memory for the misleading information might have been accepted in 
order to ‘fill in the gaps’, for example when the original brand placement was never 
encoded the first place. In this scenario, participants might have created new 
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memories that the misleading item had appeared during the first exposure to the 
photographs. 
 Another explanation for the misinformation-based false alarms is demand 
characteristics. More specifically, participants might have falsely attributed the 
misleading item to the original event in order to comply with the perceived desires of 
the experimenter. Although we do not exclude the possibility that strategic biases 
were behind some of the misinformation false alarms recorded here, we believe that 
our procedure and cover story should have kept such effects to a minimum. First, the 
critical items in the recognition test were embedded in a substantial amount of related 
foil items, which should have made it hard to apply any kind of strategy. Second, in 
cases in which demand characteristics might have influenced the recognition test 
results, such responses, including guessing biases, were likely to be filtered out in the 
final source-monitoring task. Here, we specifically encouraged participants to 
reconsider the sources of the recognition test answers. Hence it seems reasonable to 
assume that in most (if not all) cases, participants created real false memories that the 
retroactively inserted brands were experienced during the original exposure to the 
photographs. 
 In order to evaluate the overall outcome of our paradigm in more detail, 
several other findings need to be addressed. First, the overall hit rate for original 
items in the misled item condition was 44%. This hit rate was relatively low 
compared to other misinformation studies that have used more centrally presented 
target items (e.g. about 57% in Okado & Stark, 2005, who also used altered photos to 
implant misleading information). However, our finding seems to be in line with 
misinformation studies that have used rather peripherally presented target items (e.g. 
46% in McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). In addition, our hit rate matched the one from 
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Yang et al. (2006), who examined recognition for product placements in computer 
games (M = .40; please note that participants in that study were not misled on the 
brand placements and that their hit rate might have been even lower in that case). 
Hence, our study suggests that encoding of rather peripheral brand placements in 
snapshot photographs as tested under the described conditions does not seem to differ 
greatly from other media such as games or picture slides showing a crime scene.  
 In relation to this, there was also a slightly higher than usual endorsement rate 
for related foils items (.24 in this study vs. approximately .10 in Okado & Stark, 
2005, who used more centrally presented target items, or .06 in Frost, 2000, who used 
more pheripherally placed items). One explanation for these findings might be brand-
specific characteristics. As mentioned earlier, using brand-specific stimuli has led to 
high false alarm rates for non-presented items. For example, the study of Yang et al. 
(2006) revealed a false alarm rate for non-presented brands of about 29%. Or 
Sherman and Moran (2011) who found a false alarm rate of .19 for weakly related but 
non-presented brands in the DRM paradigm. Hence, our data support the notion that 
there might indeed be special characteristics that differentiate brands from critical 
items that are not normally used in misinformation studies. Reasons such as the 
clustered environments in which brands of one category often appear with one 
another (e.g. in supermarket shelves; Sherman & Moran, 2011), and brand exposure 
frequency could have an impact on how brands are remembered. Due to these 
characteristics it could be that even if only one, or in some cases two, highly related 
brands of one category were presented in this study, this was enough to activate 
strong brand category themes, which gave rise to internally created false alarms for 
related foil items. This notion is supported by Associative Activation Theory (AAT; 
Howe et al., 2009) and also Activation Monitoring Theory (AMT; Roediger et al., 
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2001) suggesting that it is the activation of highly interconnected concepts in one’s 
knowledge base that is the driving force for the creation of internally generated false 
memories (Howe & Derbish, 2010; Howe & Wilkinson, 2011). One approach to test 
this idea could be the use of sets of more unrelated foil brands, which might reduce 
false memories for non-presented brands in a future study.  
Effects of test delay on memory performance 
 The time delay between stimulus presentation and final test had no effect on 
participants’ overall memory performance in the recognition test or on their 
performance in the source-monitoring task. An explanation for these null effects 
might be the rather short time delay of 24 hours between stimuli presentation and 
final test. However, the manipulation seemed to influence participants’ conscious 
recollections in the recognition test. Here, relative to the immediate testing condition, 
the delayed condition led to an overall decrease in ‘remember’ responses for all item 
types. What this suggests is that participants’ true and false item memory was 
experienced as less vivid and potentially less real after a time delay. Further 
investigation showed that the time delay specifically affected participant’s response 
patterns for true recollections of original items in the misled item condition. Whereas 
overall, original items were more often remembered than known, and more often 
known than guessed, it turned out that this trend was more pronounced in the 
immediate compared to the delayed testing condition. In the delayed condition, 
remember responses decreased and know judgments increased to such an extent that 
both answer options were selected equally often (please note that these comparisons 
were only borderline significant). This trend is consistent with previous research and 
suggests that episodic and perceptual details of original event items decreased with 
time (e.g. Frost, 2000; Roediger et al., 1996). However, unlike previous research, the 
  
88 
know responses for misinformation false alarms did not exceed remember 
judgements in either of the testing conditions. Instead, even if in weaker form, their 
phenomenological characteristics mirrored the trend found for the original items. 
That is, descriptively, the misleading items were more often remembered than known 
and more often known than guessed in the immediate condition (in non-significant or 
borderline significant form). This deviation from previous findings might be 
explained by the pictorial presentation format of the misleading items. Whereas 
verbally presented misinformation might have triggered the superiority of know 
judgments in previous studies, the pictorially presented misinformation in this study 
seemed to have led to a reversed trend or at least to a tie between both response types. 
Future research should investigate how these effects develop under longer time delay 
conditions.  
Effects of stimuli format at test on memory performance 
 The test font manipulation had little effect on the data. That is, no significant 
differences were found on participants’ overall recognition scores. However, 
numerically, the means were in the expected direction with more yes-responses for 
participants’ true memories when brand placements were pictorially reinstated at test. 
This trend was significant when participants’ remember responses only were analysed 
and was not significant for participants’ more refined robust memory performance 
scores. This pattern is consistent with previous findings and shows that the perceptual 
information provided at test somewhat facilitated the retrieval of participants’ true 
brand placement memories.  
Looking at participants’ false memory retrieval of misleading and non-
presented foil items, our study did not show any signs of a false memory suppression 
effect for either of the item types. This finding is partially consistent with the study of  
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Sherman and Moran (2011) who found that font manipulation in the DRM paradigm 
had little effect on participants’ false recognition of non-presented items. Instead, we 
did find tendencies in our data that remember responses increased not only for the 
original items but also for the misleading as well as the foil items. Whereas this 
tendency can be explained for misleading items that shared the pictorial nature of the 
original items, it seems to be an anomaly for the spontaneously generated foil false 
alarms that had never been presented to begin with. Although more data collection 
would be necessary to see whether this effect is robust or not, an explanation for this 
finding could be again the characteristics that constitute different brands of the same 
category. Maybe the presentation of two categorically related brands in our study 
(one during the original event and the other during misinformation phase) activated 
vivid internally generated false memories for the brand logo of the third competitor. 
When the brand logos were seen at test, a rush of familiarity for these items might 
have led participants to falsely believe that the item was seen originally.  
Effects of brand items on memory performance 
 Last, our item analysis revealed strong differences in hit and false alarm rates 
across brands items. Here, data showed that there were strong differences in memory 
performance between brand categories and hence placement positions. Although 
brand placement positioning was not manipulated in this study, the separation of 
placement positions into more and less prominently inserted brands provided some 
indication that participants’ true memories were higher when brands were inserted 
more prominently. However, it should be noted that this sub-analysis was limited as it 
solely focused on the centrality and the integration of a placement in a scene. Other 
factors, such as the relative size of a brand placement, that were likely to influence 
the results of this study as well, were not considered. In addition, one photograph of 
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this study contained a brand placement that was depicted twice (see coffee shop 
brands in the shopping centre scene in Appendix B). In this specific case it is unclear 
whether the high hit rate (.72) measured for the coffee shop brands resulted from the 
exposure frequency to the brands or from other factors, such as the relatively 
dominant size of the placement. 
Further item analysis revealed strong differences in memory performance 
between single brand within and across brand categories as well. Hence, data 
indicated that the ability to remember a brand depended on multiple factors including 
brand positioning and brand specific characteristics. Regarding the latter, one factor 
that might have played a role in this context is the familiarity of a brand in a 
consumer’s mind. How familiar a brand was to a consumer might have been 
influenced by a variety of factors including brand awareness, brand associations and 
maybe brand attitudes. Because brands with high hit rates were often the ones that 
were also falsely remembered the most often, it might have been these brand 
characteristics that influenced how brands were remembered. Although brand items 
were fully counterbalanced across conditions, brand familiarity information was only 
recorded by means of Google hits. The amount of Google hits was not correlated with 
participants’ memory performance and perhaps the measure was too crude to use for 
brand norming purposes. Future research should consider using a more sensitive 
measure to select the brand stimuli (see Experiment 2). 
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Conclusion  
 To conclude, this study demonstrated that retroactive brand replacements in 
photographs could influence how participants remember an original brand 
experience. This effect was shown by using a rather atypical misinformation 
paradigm format with both original event and misinformation phase presented 
pictorially. Although the paradigm largely produced results consistent with previous 
misinformation research, there were also some unusual study outcomes that might 
have been caused by the pictorial presentation of misinformation materials. Another 
factor responsible might have been the characteristics that constitute brands of the 
same category. The latter factor might have driven the unusually high endorsement 
rate for the categorically related foil brands, a finding that was addressed again in 
Experiment 3. The time delay of our memory test as well as the font manipulation at 
test did have overall little effect on participants’ memory performance. However, 
they seemed to influence the amount of remember judgements for true as well as false 
recognition across all item types. Future research should examine how these effects 
develop with bigger sample sizes and longer time delays between misinformation 
presentation and the final memory test. In general, it would be interesting to see how 
a longer delay between original event and misinformation phase would influence the 
results in this paradigm. Consumers might be exposed to retroactive brand 
replacements in photographs after a delay of time that allowed the original brand 
memory to weaken (Loftus, 2005), an effect examined in Experiment 3. Ultimately, a 
next study should also try to base the brand selection process on a more elaborated 
brand norming study. Our study recorded strong variances not only concerning 
placement positions but also regarding single brands of a category.  
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A brand norming study 
 Experiment 1 revealed a reliable misinformation effect caused by 
retroactively changing brands in photographs. However, the paradigm created some 
unusual study outcomes as well. One was the high endorsement rate of non-presented 
foil brands (e.g. the false alarm rate of 24% in comparison to 8% in Zhu et al., 2013). 
Also, even if the hit rate was consistent with some previous misinformation studies 
that have used rather peripherally presented slide details, our hit rate was relatively 
low (M = .44). An item analysis in Experiment 1 showed that memory performance 
varied considerably across brands. One reason for this variation might have been 
certain brand characteristics, such as the strength of a brand in consumer’s mind. 
Whereas highly familiar brands might have attracted more attention, leading to better 
encoding, memory traces for brands lower in familiarity might have been forgotten 
more rapidly or never been created in the first place. Although we did use a norming 
procedure in Experiment 1, namely Google hits, when we examined correlations 
between participants’ memory performance and this variable, no associations were 
obtained. The question arises as to whether the measure ‘Google hits’ was sensitive 
enough to capture potential brand perception processes that might have influenced the 
results in Experiment 1.  
 In order to avoid these issues in future studies, Experiment 2 was carried out 
to measure some aspects that might influence the perception of brands in a 
consumer’s mind. The main aim was to use this information to make decisions about 
the single brands that would be used in later studies. However, in addition it was our 
aim to enrich the analysis of our research with variables that might be able to clarify 
results not only of future studies but also retroactively, for the results of Experiment 
1. 
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 We administered two tasks for our norming study, tasks that were chosen 
based on findings in marketing research. Here, research suggests that consumer 
perception of brands depends on their knowledge about these brands, which in turn 
involves not only brand awareness processes (such as recall and recognition) but also 
brand image factors. In this context, brand image is thought of as ‘brand associations 
held in consumer memory’, which involves brand perceptions such as quality and 
attitudes towards brands (Keller, 1993, p 3). 
 Based on these ideas, Task 1 was a brand recall task that aimed to obtain a 
pure measure of respondent’s top-of-mind awareness of brands belonging in different 
brand categories (Keller, 1993). Task 2 was a brand rating task that involved 
evaluating a wide range of categorically related brands for participants’ perceptions 
and attitudes towards these brands. By providing participants with brands to be rated, 
we would not only obtain additional information for brands belonging to different 
categories, but we would also record variables about potentially less familiar brands 
that were not recalled in Task 1. For Task 2 we chose semantic differentiation scale 
questions (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) – a measure frequently used to 
record consumer attitudes about objects (Low & Lamb, 2000). Here, participants are 
typically asked to indicate to what extent they agree with certain statements about 
objects by evaluating objects on a set of semantic scales. These scales present verbal 
opposites (e.g. good vs. bad) and a neutral middle. For this study, three word pairs 
were chosen based on Osgood et al.’s (1957) conclusions that there are three 
dominant and independent dimensions that are used to evaluate objects: Evaluation, 
potency and activity. Although studies typically use several bipolar scales falling 
under each of these categories to evaluate an object, we restricted the task to one 
verbal opposite per category in order to reduce the complexity of this task. As 
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participants would have to rate a large range of brands in this task, additional rating 
scales might have led to boredom or fatigue and, hence, to less valid results. Hence, 
in this study participants had to indicate for a list of brands on 7-point scales whether 
they thought a brand was either good or bad (evaluation), well known or not well 
known (potency), and frequently used or not frequently used (activity). We chose 
these particular factors because they seemed to best reflect Osgood et al.’s (1957) 
dimensions in an everyday life brand context. We hoped that by using this technique, 
different dimensions about a brand were recorded that contributed to participants’ 
overall brand image. To make sure that Task 2 created reliable results (i.e. to examine 
the stability of the three dimension scales over time), some participants were 
administered Task 2 twice.  
Method  
Participants   
 Fifty-one undergraduate and postgraduate students from City, University of 
London (mean age = 19.78 years, SD = 3.9; 31% male) participated in the experiment 
for course credit or remuneration. Ten of these participants were retested on Task 2.  
Materials   
 Participants completed two computer-based questionnaires. In Task 1, the free 
recall task, participants were cued with a brand category (e.g. soft drinks). In total 
they were exposed to 28 brand categories of which 24 were obtained from 
Experiment 1. Brand information for four additional categories was recorded for 
future research. The order in which the brand categories appeared on the screen was 
fully counterbalanced across participants.  
 In Task 2, the semantic differential task, participants indicated on 7-point 
scales whether the listed brands were perceived as good or bad, well known or not 
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well known, and whether these brands were frequently used or not. A ‘can’t say’ 
answer option was provided in case a brand was unknown to a participant. In total, 
231 brands belonging to 28 brand categories (same categories as used in Task 1) were 
listed in category blocks and were presented in their brand specific logo font (see 
Appendix G for an overview of brand categories used in both tasks and for the brands 
that were rated in Task 2). Each of these category blocks were separated by a page 
break. For most of the categories, eight to ten brands had to be rated. However, for 
some brand categories, fewer brands were added to the test because only a limited 
number of brands were identified for that category (e.g. search engine brands). As in 
Experiment 1, brands for the task were selected by doing online research (e.g. UK 
grocery online shopping websites) to identify all relevant brands per category. In this 
process we checked that the brands selected were either internationally known or 
advertised in the UK. Crosschecks with the results of the brand recall task ensured 
that all relevant brands of a category were included in Task 2. The order in which 
category lists were evaluated, the order in which the semantic differentiations 
appeared, the order in which a positive or negative adjective appeared first or second 
on the scale, as well as the order in which the brands appeared in the presentation list 
itself was counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure  
 Participants were tested individually in a laboratory of City, University of 
London. All participants started with the brand recall task and then completed the 
semantic differential task. This order was kept constant throughout the entire study in 
order to avoid the influence of brand exposure in Task 2 on brand recall in Task 1. In 
Task 1, participants were exposed to one brand category after the other and were 
instructed to enter as many brands belonging to this brand category that came to 
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mind. They were instructed to start with the first brand that came to mind when cued 
by the category, continue with the second, the third, and so on. We asked participants 
to try their best to enter at least five brands per category. After, participants continued 
seamlessly with Task 2. Participants were instructed to go through the brands listed 
for a category (e.g. chocolate brands) and to make their judgment on the first 7-point 
scale that was presented to them (e.g. the evaluation scale). Participants were asked to 
base their responses on their personal and current attitudes and perceptions towards 
the brands. Following this, the same brands were rated on the next dimension scale 
(e.g. the potency scale). After completion of the third dimension scale (e.g. the 
activity scale), the procedure was repeated for the next brand category (e.g. coffee 
shop brands). The 10 participants who were retested on the semantic differential task 
returned to the lab after seven days and completed the task again. 
Measurement and analysis  
 In Task 1 (recall task) the measure was the percentage of respondents who 
recalled a specific brand. For Task 2 (semantic differentiation scale task) we 
calculated for each of the brands an average evaluation (good – bad), potency (well 
known – not well known), and activity score (frequently used – not frequently used; 
scores for both tasks can be found in Appendix G). To test for test-retest reliability in 
Task 2, we correlated the average rating scores for all three dimensions at time 1 and 
time 2. We first analysed our norming data recorded here and subsequently examined 
these data in light of our misinformation measures recorded in Experiment 1. 
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Results 
Norming study data 
 Test-retest reliability analysis. In order to test whether Task 2 produced 
reliable results for each scale (evaluation, potency, and activity), we computed 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between semantic differential test 
scores recorded at time 1 and at time 2 for each variable. For the variables potency 
and activity, results revealed strong correlations between test scores recorded at time 
1 and time 2 (potency: r = .96, n = 231, p < .001 and activity: r = .94, n = 231, p < 
.001). However, for the brand evaluation variable, the correlation of test scores 
between time 1 and 2 turned out to be moderate (r = .51, n = 231, p < .001). 
Main analysis. For the main analysis we first inspected our data 
descriptively. In Task 1, participants recalled 340 brands in total (excluding outliers 
that were removed in a data cleaning process in which, for example, brands not 
belonging to a particular category were removed). The brand category in which most 
brands were recalled was the category ‘clothes shop brands’ with 26 brands recalled 
followed by mid-range car brands and chocolate brands (both 23 brands). The 
category with the lowest count of brands was the search engine category with four 
brands, preceded by car rental and game console brands (both five brands). The most 
often recalled brand presented the fast food brand McDonald’s that was recalled by 
100% of participants, followed by Google (98%), Coca Cola, Nike, Facebook and 
Nintendo (all 96%). 
 In Task 2 it was the search engine Google that was rated best on the 7-point 
evaluation-, potency-, as well as activity sales (Ms = 1.00, 1.08, 1.00). However, not 
surprisingly, further inspection showed that the ranking of a brand often differed 
depending on the particular scale that was examined. To analyse the strength of 
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association between the three scales (evaluation, potency, and activity), we computed 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for the test scores. Results revealed 
that potency scores were highly correlated with evaluation (r = .91, n = 231, p < .001) 
and activity (r = .91, n = 231, p < .001), as was evaluation with activity (r = .93, n = 
231, p < .001). Hence, the more well known a brand was perceived by a participant 
the better the brand was evaluated and the more frequently it was used. 
 Last, we examined potential associations between variables across Task 1 and 
2 and ran correlation analysis between brand recall scores as well as semantic 
differential test scores. Analysis was based on 183 brands that were both recalled in 
Task 1 as well as rated in Task 2. Results showed that recall frequency in Task 1 was 
significantly correlated with brand potency (r = -.71, n = 185, p < .001), brand 
evaluation (r = -.59, n = 185, p < .001), as well as brand activity (r = -.65, n = 185, p 
< .001). Hence the more often a brand was recalled in Task 1, the more well known, 
the better, and the more frequently used it was rated in Task 2. 
Correlations with Experiment 1 data 
 Last, we examined if our misinformation measures recorded in Experiment 1 
were associated with the brand awareness and brand image data recorded in this 
study. Hence, we computed Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients 
between our brand recall and brand rating data and the hit and false alarm rates for 
the item types recorded in Experiment 1 (correct and false acceptances of original, 
misleading, as well as foil items as being part of the original event). Looking at the 
brand recall data of Task 1, results only revealed significant correlations between 
brand recall and hits for original items in the misled item condition (original items on 
which participants were misled on; r = .34, n = 68, p = .007) and in the control item 
condition (items that had appeared in a consistent manner during both exposure 
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phases to the photos; r = .33, n = 68, p = .006). Hence, the data suggest that the more 
often a brand was recalled in the current study, the higher the amount of hits that 
were created for these brands in Experiment 1. 
 For the potency scores of Task 2, results yielded moderate correlations for 
original items hits in the misled (r = -.33, n = 69, p = .005; please note that the 
negative r values stem from the fact that on a scale from 1 – 7, 1 presented the 
positive opposite) and the control item condition (r = -.47, n = 69, p < .001). In 
addition, the scores were correlated with foil false alarms in the misled (r = -.30, n = 
69, p = .012) and control item condition (r = -.26, n = 69, p = .032). In a weaker but 
still significant form, the Evaluation score was correlated with the same variables; the 
original items in the misled (r = -.25, n = 72, p = .038) and control item condition (r = 
-.30, n = 69, p = .012) as well as with the foils in misled (r = -.28, n = 69, p = .019) 
and control item condition (r = -.24, n = 69, p = .011). Last, analysis revealed that the 
activity scale was correlated with original items hits in the control item condition (r = 
-.38, n = 69, p = .001) and with foil false alarms in the misled (r = -.27, n = 69, p = 
.027) and the control item condition (r = -.27, n = 69, p = .026). Hence, findings 
suggest that the better, the more well known, and the more frequently used a brand 
was rated in the current study, the more hits for these items were created when they 
appeared as an original item in Experiment 1. However, the same trend was found for 
participants’ false alarms when these brands appeared as related but non-presented 
foil items in the memory test of Experiment 1. False alarms for the misleading items 
were not correlated with any of the brand norming variables.
10
  
                                                        
10 Please note that we ran multiple regression analysis on these data as well to see if 
brand recall, brand evaluation, potency, and activity predicted hits and false alarms in 
Experiment 1. Using the enter method it was found that all factors explained a 
significant amount of the variance in true memories for original items in the control 
condition; F(4, 61) = 4.65, p = .002, R
2
 = .23, R
2
Adjusted = .18, as well as in foil false 
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 Last, we ran Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between our 
norming variables and the amount of Google hits that were recorded in Experiment 1 
(our norming variable in Experiment 1). Results showed that Google hits were 
correlated with brand recall (r = .50, n = 68, p < .001), Potency (r = -.37, n = 69, p = 
.002), as well as with activity (r = -.27, n = 69, p = .023). Hence, our norming 
variable in Experiment 1 was indeed associated with brand knowledge factors, 
particularly with brand recall. 
Discussion 
 Based on the findings obtained in Experiment 1, the main aim of Experiment 
2 was to obtain a pool of normed brands that could be used in future studies. In 
addition, it was the aim to create a set of brand variables that could be used to enrich 
the analysis of future and past experiments. In order to achieve this, participants of 
this study completed a brand recall task as well as a brand-rating task for a wide 
range of brands belonging to 28 product categories. We inspected potential 
associations between variables of both tasks and found that our brand awareness and 
brand image factors seemed to be associated. More specifically, we found high 
correlations between participants’ brand recall scores and how these brands were 
rated on the evaluation, potency, and activity scale. Not surprisingly, it was the 
potency data (well known vs. not well known) that seemed to have the strongest 
                                                                                                                                                              
alarms in the control condition, F(4, 61) = 3.16, p = .020, R
2
 = .17, R
2
Adjusted = .12. For 
the original items, the analysis showed that only potency did significantly predict 
correct yes-responses (Beta = -.52, t(65) = -2.29, p = .025). For the foil items, it was 
the variable brand recall (Beta = -.53, t(65) = -2.88, p = .005) and (in at a borderline 
significant level) potency (Beta = -.47, t(65) = -2.00, p = .051) that did predict the 
false yes-responses in this condition. However, it should be noted that our data 
violated assumption of non-multicollinearity (with threshold Tolerance and VIF 
values) and that results should be taken with a pinch of salt.   
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relationship with brand recall. This outcome might be explained by certain well 
known and heavily advertised brands just being on top of one’s mind regardless of 
more subjective criteria such as whether a brand was liked or frequently used or not. 
Looking at the fast food brand McDonald’s for example that was recalled by 100% of 
study participants, data showed that this controversial brand did not appear on top on 
the list concerning how much the brand was liked. Nevertheless, all three dimensions 
recorded in Task 2 were highly correlated, indicating that an object’s potency, 
evaluation and activity seem go hand in hand. 
 Regarding the consistency of Task, 2 (semantic differential task), data 
indicated that the measure created reliable results looking at brand potency and 
frequency of use. Here, very strong correlations were found between results recorded 
at time 1 and 2. Although significant, for brand evaluation (good - bad) this 
relationship did not turn out to be as strong as for the other two variables. Although it 
is possible that attitudes towards the brands somewhat changed during the 1-week 
retention interval (but please note that a paired sample t-test on these data revealed no 
difference in brand rating at Time 1 and Time 2), it might also have been biases 
caused by the test-retest procedure that were responsible for these results. Being a 
subjective criterion, participants might have been conscious about their good-bad 
judgements in order appear in a positive light and changed their answers 
correspondingly. Either way, it is questionable whether future brand decisions should 
be based on this variable. 
 When we analysed our norming data in light of the misinformation measures 
recorded in Experiment 1, results showed that both brand awareness and brand image 
variables of our norming study were associated with true brand placement memory 
recorded in Experiment 1. More specifically, data suggest that the stronger a brand 
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was generally perceived in a consumer’s mind (as measured in brand recall, 
evaluation, potency, and activity), the more often it was correctly remembered when 
it appeared as an original brand placement in Experiment 1. These results suggest that 
brand knowledge as recorded here, might indeed play a role in encoding and storing 
of peripherally placed brand information. In addition, correlations were found 
between our brand image variables and false alarms for related but non-presented 
competitor brands recorded in Experiment 1. Hence, variables that focused on the 
subjective perception about a brand might have contributed to the creation of these 
spontaneously created false memories.  
 This finding is somewhat in line with our argumentation why Experiment 1 
triggered an unusually high false alarm rate for the related but non-presented 
competitor brands. We argued that it might have been the special characteristics of 
brands, such as their characteristic of occurring in their competitive environment (e.g. 
supermarket shelves, advertising, car dealers) that caused these results. Hence, it is 
possible that individual brand concepts are highly related because we are faced with 
the task of choosing among our brand preferences every day (e.g. do I go to 
Starbucks or Costa Coffee?). In this context, Associative Activation Theory (and 
Activation Monitoring Theory; Roediger et al., 2001) suggests that it is the activation 
particularly of highly interconnected concepts in one’s knowledge base that is the 
driving force the creation of internally created false memories (Howe et al., 2009). 
Hence, the exposure to one or two categorically related brands in our study might 
have triggered false memories for the non-presented competitor brand. This effect 
might have been increased for the more familiar or preferred competitor brands 
because of a stronger connection to the corresponding brand concept.  
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 The same analysis did not reveal any indication that false alarms for the 
misleading items were influenced by brand knowledge factors as measured in this 
study. None of the variables were associated with misinformation false alarms 
recorded in Experiment 1. This finding provides further support that false memories 
for the misleading brands and the false memories for non-presented foil brands were 
at least partially driven by different mechanisms. If it was source confusions that 
were responsible for the ‘more’ externally generated misinformation false memories, 
these might have not been affected by participants’ perceptions toward the misleading 
brands. Instead, looking at the other side of the coin, maybe it was the perceptions 
and attitudes towards the original brand (on which participants were misled on) that 
were crucial regarding whether or not a misleading brand was falsely accepted or not. 
For example, an originally seen brand that was perceived as less strong and less 
preferred than other brands, might have been more prone to ‘lose the battle’ against 
the competing and misleading item, independent of how strong the misleading item 
itself was perceived. The fact that original items in Experiment 1 were associated 
with less hits the ‘weaker’ they were perceived in Experiment 2, speaks for this 
assumption. However, more research is necessary to see whether these findings are 
reliable (see the following Experiments for some more discussion on this topic).  
 A last finding to mention looking back at Experiment 1 is that the norming 
variable ‘Google hits’ seemed to be associated with brand awareness factors of this 
study. Hence, we were not wrong in believing that the variable captured some aspects 
of participant’s brand awareness. However, the measure might not have been 
sensitive enough to show its influence in memory performance of Experiment 1 and 
future research might be advised to rely on classical norming procedures. 
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Experiment 3 - A replication study - the effects of delayed retroactive product 
replacement on placement memory 
 Although we found a reliable misinformation effect in Experiment 1, our 
study revealed a higher than usual endorsement rate for related but non-presented 
competitor brands. Because foil false alarms were a baseline for misinformation 
acceptances in that study, the misinformation effect revealed was slightly weaker 
compared to other studies. Related to this, data revealed a relatively low hit rate for 
product placements in pictures, likely caused by weak encoding processes that acted 
at the time of studying the brand placements. To explore these effects further and to 
develop a set of normed brands that could be used for further studies a norming study 
(Experiment 2) was conducted that recorded factors potentially contributing to the 
overall consumer knowledge about a brand (including brand awareness and brand 
image factors). By correlating these brand knowledge data of the norming study with 
the hit and false alarm rates of Experiment 1, results revealed that brands higher in 
familiarity were not only more often correctly recognized but also more often falsely 
recognized when they appeared as non-presented foil item at test. Hence, these data 
indicated that brand awareness and brand image factors might have influenced the 
results in Experiment 1. In addition, item position analysis carried out as part of 
Experiment 1 indicated that the question of whether a brand was remembered or not 
might have depended on its position in a picture as well. Data indicated a numerical 
trend of more hits for originally seen items the more prominently items were 
positioned in the photographs.  
 The current study used the paradigm developed in Experiment 1 to further 
investigate the effects of brands as well as the effects of retroactively placed brands in 
photographs on consumers’ true and false memories. The main aim was not only to 
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replicate the ‘brand misinformation effect’ revealed in Experiment 1, but also to 
increase the effects found in Experiment 1 by increasing the hit rate (due to the use of 
‘stronger’ and more prominently placed brands) as well as to lower false alarm rates 
for non-presented foil items (due to the use of a set of more unrelated foil items in the 
memory test) – consequently creating results more in line with findings typically 
achieved in misinformation studies. A more reliable paradigm would allow future 
studies to examine the effects of additional study manipulations potentially requiring 
a misinformation effect stronger in nature. Hence, the method and materials of this 
study were mainly in tune with Experiment 1, but some differences existed that will 
be elaborated on in the following. 
 We have previously mentioned that the question of how an item is positioned 
in movies or pictures slides can have an influence on if and how study items are later 
remembered. For example, looking at psychological literature, researchers have found 
evidence of higher hit rates for centrally relative to peripherally placed items in 
original misinformation slides (e.g. Wright & Stroud, 1998; but see Paz-Alonso & 
Goodman, 2008). However, closer inspection of materials showed that centrally 
placed items are often very dominantly placed in a picture slide and that they have a 
critical meaning in a scene (e.g. a shoplifter taking a bottle of wine that is positioned 
in the centre of the picture (see Wright & Stroud, 1998; and also Belli et al., 1992).  
 So how could these methods be translated into a product placement context? 
Placing products into pictures in a similar way would somehow contradict a more 
natural occurrence of brand placements in snapshot photographs. In regard to this, 
marketing research by Yang and Roskos-Ewolden (2007) found that the ‘level’ of 
product placement in movies influences explicit brand placement memory. The 
researchers applied a landscape model, positing that not all information activated in 
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memory is activated at the same level. Based on the idea of limited attentional 
resources, the theory suggests that it is information central to a scene that is activated 
at the highest level, followed by items embedded in a story that allow the story to 
proceed. Background information receives the lowest level of activation because of 
its lack of visual prominence and because it is usually not necessary for 
comprehending a storyline. By using this framework, the researchers found that 
participants recognized a brand more often when the product was used by one of the 
main characters and when the brand was an integral part of the scene. 
 In line with these findings, the current study aimed to increase attentional 
resources on the brands and hence the hits rate of originally presented items by 
applying two measures: First, normed brands from Experiment 2 were used as study 
stimuli in order to ensure that the strongest brands per category appeared in our 
photographs. Second, the product placements were inserted in the photos based on the 
following rules that derived from previous research: A brand either had to contribute 
somehow to the meaning of a photo scene, it had to be centrally placed, or it had to be 
used by a leading character in the photograph.  
We chose three different brand placement ‘modalities’ in order to preserve the 
incidental brand learning nature of the study. An obvious brand placement pattern 
(e.g. solely centrally placed brands) might have revealed the brand learning nature of 
the task. Although we predicted that these measures would increase the overall hit 
rates in this study, it was unclear how the production of misinformation false 
memories would be affected by these means. As previously demonstrated, research 
exists indicating that centrally presented original event information can suppress the 
creation of false memories for verbally presented misinformation (e.g. Wright & 
Stroud, 1998). Here, stronger encoding processes of originally presented pictorial 
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items might enable participants to correctly reject the verbally presented and 
contradicting information. However, a question arises about how these effects 
develop in a paradigm that uses pictorial stimuli during both event phases? 
Strengthening brands and brand placements in study materials would potentially also 
strengthen the influence of the misleading information. Regarding the reduction and 
further examination of foil false alarms, we used a set of normed brands lower in 
brand familiarity compared to actual study items. More specifically, the final test 
included a set of foil brands that were still known to participants but that were rated 
as less well known and less frequently used compared to their competitors that 
appeared as original and misleading items. From an Associative Activation Theory 
perspective (Howe et al., 2009), this measure should result in less activation of 
associated foil brands from the studied brands, consequently leading to a reduced 
amount of foil false alarms.  
 This study included the manipulation of an independent variable, which again 
concerned the delay between the stages of the misinformation paradigm. But unlike 
Experiment 1, this study focused on the second important time delay in the literature, 
the delay between original event and misinformation phase (Loftus, 2005). Here, 
research has shown that longer time delays can affect how original as well as 
misleading information is remembered. For example, Loftus et al. (1978) exposed 
some participants to misleading information immediately after the original event and 
others after a delay of 20 min, 1 day, 2 days, or 1 week. The results of a forced-choice 
test revealed that adults were more vulnerable to misinformation (as measures in 
memory impairment - correct responses to original event items) after a long delay 
relative to misinformation shortly presented after the original event. In fact, effects 
were largest after a delay of one week. Paz-Alonso and Goodman (2008) replicated 
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these findings by using a two-week delay between original event and misinformation 
phase. In their study, participants watched a murder video and read a misleading 
narrative either immediately or two weeks after. Shortly after the presentation of 
misinformation, participants completed a yes/no-recognition task for the video. The 
researchers found that misled participants falsely accepted more misleading details in 
the delay condition compared to participants in the immediate condition. The 
explanation proposed suggests that as memory for the original event fades with 
longer delays, participants tend to be more prone to falsely accept the misleading 
information because of higher alteration or interference processes (e.g. Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2005; Loftus et al., 1992). Alternatively, the Discrepancy Detection principle 
(Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986) posits that the likelihood of producing 
misinformation false memories is greater when inconsistencies between original 
event memory and misinformation phase are not instantly noticed. If a time delay 
allows the original event memory to weaken, the likelihood of detecting the 
inconsistencies is smaller compared to shorter delays (Loftus, 2005).  
 Based on these findings the current study included two delay conditions, a 
one-day as well as a one-week delay condition. Because at a practical level 
participants might be exposed to retroactive brand replacements in photographs 
following a delay of time, we considered a delay in both conditions appropriate. Also, 
delaying the misinformation for a day or more is a well-established manipulation in 
the literature (e.g. Pezdek & Roe, 1995). Equivalent to ‘time of test condition’ 2 of 
Experiment 1, we decided to conduct the final memory tests after another delay of 
one day instead of immediately after presentation of misinformation. While less 
common (but see Okado & Stark, 2005 for example), Experiment 1 has shown that 
this method has created a reliable misinformation effect and we believed that the 
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additional delay between misinformation presentation and test would further improve 
the ecological validity of our paradigm. In line with previous research we predicted 
that participants would be more likely to accept misleading items in the long relative 
to the short delay condition. Furthermore, we expected that participants’ original 
event memory would be weaker with a longer delay between the experimental stages.  
 We recorded an additional variable for Experiment 3. By using eye-tracking 
technology for a subset of participants, we recorded their eye-fixations on the brands 
during the first (original event) as well as during the second exposure to the photos 
(misinformation phase). This was important because these eye-fixations might 
provide additional information about the attention that was paid to the different 
brands, data that might improve our knowledge of what was being encoded and 
would benefit material selection in the following studies. For example, even though 
participants might have not remembered some of the brands in Experiment 1, no 
conclusions could be made about whether or not attention had been paid to brand 
placements. Analysing the fixation on the brands, might help to eliminate placement 
positions that were hardly ever fixated on.  
 On a related note, eye-fixations on the brands might shed light on the role of 
encoding processes in the misinformation effect. Research suggests that neural 
activity during encoding of the original event as well as the misinformation phase can 
predict false memories in the misinformation paradigm (Okado & Stark, 2005). More 
specifically, in an fMRI study, Okado and Stark (2005) found that when encoding 
activity was greater during the original event, the original items (hits) were 
subsequently recollected. When encoding activity was greater during the 
misinformation phase, the misleading items (false alarms) were subsequently 
recollected. Returning to visual attention data, even though it is possible that attention 
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is paid to a brand when it is not currently fixated, research suggests that an eye 
movement is unavoidably accompanied by a shift of attention (Hervet & Gue, 2011). 
In this light it seems reasonable to assume that an eye movement to a brand would 
indicate that attention to the brand had been paid. Fixation duration on the brands 
might be a good indicator of the amount of attention that is paid to a brand placement 
(Hervet & Gue, 2011). In line with these findings and thoughts, we aimed to 
investigate whether fixation duration during the first as well as second exposure to 
the photographs was associated with hits for the original items as well as false alarms 
for the misleading and foil items. However, because to our knowledge no study has 
examined the involvement of encoding processes in the misinformation paradigm by 
using eye-tracking technology, the outcome of this measurement was somewhat 
exploratory in nature. 
 In addition to our main experiment, we conducted a sub-experiment as part of 
Experiment 3 that was motivated by the high endorsement rate for foil items recorded 
in Experiment 1. Our aim was to contribute to the debate concerning whether 
memory errors in the misinformation paradigm and memory errors recorded in the 
DRM paradigm are related. This debate is important because it sheds light on the 
nature of false memory phenomena (Gallo, 2010) and whether or not different false 
memory errors share a common psychological mechanism (Otgaar et al., 2016). On 
the one hand, it is possible that both false memory types are unrelated considering 
that one is based on external suggestion and the other generated internally. However, 
on the other hand, both types of false memories might share an underlying 
mechanism, which is that both could be seen as spread of associative activation 
(Howe et al., 2009; Otgaar et al., 2016), as failures in source-monitoring (Gallo, 
2010), or both. 
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 Although researchers have examined the relationships between DRM false 
memories and false memories created by means of other false memory paradigms 
(see Ost et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2013, for reviews), only a few studies have 
specifically examined the correlations between misinformation and DRM effect 
measures. Findings across these studies have been mixed (Ost et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 
2013). For example, whereas Ost et al. (2013) did not find any correlations between a 
broad range of misinformation and DRM effect measures (mean r = -.01; see also 
Otgaar & Candel, 2011), Zhu et al. (2013) found a small but significant correlation (r 
= .12, p = .02) between the misinformation and DRM false alarms. The reason for the 
effect in one but not the other study might lie in the sample size used (N = 120 vs. 
430). Although the current experiment cannot match these sample sizes, we were 
specifically interested in examining a different correlation, namely, the one between 
the spontaneously generated false memories created in both paradigms. Is it possible 
that false alarms for the related but non-presented foils in the misinformation 
paradigm and false alarms for the lures and other non-presented but related items in 
the DRM task would be associated? Possibly because both are self-generated, 
participants who endorse foils in the one paradigm might also be more likely to 
endorse the non-presented items in the other paradigm. Studies exist that provide 
reason to assume that these variables could indeed be related. For example, Otgaar, 
Howe, Peters, Sauerland, and Raymaekers (2013) found moderate to strong positive 
correlations between false memories for the critical lure in the DRM paradigm and 
spontaneously generated false memories for obviously missing items in a ‘DRM 
video’ depicting a crime scene.  
 With these ideas in mind the current study aimed to replicate findings of 
Experiment 1 and examined whether retroactively replaced brands in photographs can 
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influence memories for originally seen brand placements. First, we exposed 
participants to photographs embedded in a fictitious Facebook account in which each 
photo contained brand placements. Half of these brands were contradicted by a 
competitor brand when participants saw the pictures the second time either after a 
delay of one day or one week. After another delay of one day, participants completed 
a recognition test followed by a source-monitoring task. For some participants, eye-
fixations were recorded to see whether fixation time on the brands would be 
associated the creation of true and false memories. In addition, all participants 
completed a DRM task after completion of the main study.  
Method and Measurement 
Participants  
 Fifty-two students and staff members (mean age = 25.63 years, SD = 6.70; 
31% male) of City, University of London participated in the experiment for course 
credit or remuneration.  
Materials 
 Misinformation task. 
 Brand norming. Brand selection was based on the norming data collected in 
Experiment 2. Brands selected for product placement (study items) were the three 
most popular brands of 24 brand categories. For selection of these items we mainly 
consulted the brand recall data as the more objective measure of participants ‘top of 
mind’ brand awareness. However, in some cases the semantic differential data was 
used as a decision parameter as well, for example when two brands were head-to-
head in the list (i.e. if they were recalled equally often). In this process, the similarity 
of product packaging across brands of a category was controlled for. For example, 
using the orange juice brand Capri Sun as an orange juice brand in a breakfast scene 
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was not considered to be a suitable placement next to Tropicana and Innocent 
because the nature of the product and the typical packaging stood out too much (small 
Capri sun pouch often consumed by children versus the more common fruit juice 
cartons of Tropicana and Innocent). This was done because a distinctive product 
packaging of one competitor in one category might direct participants to the study 
manipulation across brand categories in general. Hence, some brands in line that did 
not fit with their competitors were skipped in the brand selection process.  
 To select foil items for the memory test, the semantic differential data were 
used. Here, two brands per category with a total evaluation score of approximately 4-
5 were chosen as test items (in comparison, original and misleading items had a total 
evaluation score of approximately 1- 3). One reason for using the brand rating data as 
opposed to brand recall was that often the latter did turn out to be unsuitable for 
choosing the categorically-related foils. For example, recalled brands in later 
positions were often not clearly defined by a category (e.g. brands such as Eat or 
Greggs in the coffee shop category). Hence, decisions were mostly based on the 
brand rating data by using an average score across the dimensions of potency and 
frequency (the evaluation score was a more unstable measure and was not used). In 
this process we made sure that the brands of interest had a low score of ‘can’t say’ 
responses in the norming task. This way we tried to identify two brands per category 
that were still familiar to participants but that would also be weaker in associative 
strength to study items (the specific brand categories and brands used in this study 
can be found in Appendix H). 
 Study stimuli and apparatus. Study stimuli were presented in the same way 
as in Experiment 1. Twelve pictures were embedded into a fictitious Facebook 
account showing the account owner and/or groups of friends in different social 
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situations (e.g. friends at breakfast). Because our current study aimed to control 
somewhat for the effect of placement positioning, some photographs of Experiment 1 
were replaced based on our brand placement strategy to insert a brand placement in 
such a way that a brand either had to (1) contribute somehow to the meaning of a 
photo scene, (2) be centrally placed, or (3) be used by a leading character in the 
photograph. By using this rule of thumb, 24 brand categories were assigned to each of 
12 photos (e.g. a cereal and orange juice brand in the breakfast scene). Thus, the 
brands appearing in different pictures were differentiated thematically (cereal in one 
picture, camera brands in another) in order to avoid semantic intrusions. That is, to 
reduce the chance that the appearance of a brand in one picture would trigger false 
memories for a related brand that was actually presented in a different picture (but 
that might not have been encoded). Again, we created three versions of each 
photograph that each hosted two of the selected study brands throughout the study 
(e.g. one of the orange juice brands: Tropicana, Innocent, or SunnyD and one of the 
cereal brands: Kellogg’s Coco Pops, Nestlé Cheerios, or Weetabix, see Appendix I 
for examples of these photo versions). As in Experiment 1, during the original event 
participants were exposed to one out of three versions of these 12 pictures and hence, 
to one out of three categorically related study brands of each of the 24 brand 
categories.  
 Misleading information was provided for 12 out of 24 brands by replacing 
these items with contradicting/misleading brands during a second exposure to the 
pictures (misled item condition). For the remaining 12 brands that were originally 
shown, consistent information was provided (i.e. participants were not misled on 
these items – the non-misled control item condition). Whereas the remaining items of 
a brand category usually served as related foil items in the final memory test (e.g. in 
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Experiment 1), this was not done in this study. Instead, the weaker related foil items 
(see earlier) were next to original and misleading items included into the memory 
tests. For clarification, consider the following scenario in the breakfast scene: In the 
picnic photo a participant may have been misled on the cereal brand. If the cereal 
brand Weetabix was seen during the first exposure to the photos, Kellogg’s Coco 
Pops may have been used to mislead this participant during the second exposure to 
the pictures. The orange juice brand Tropicana may have appeared in a consistent 
manner during both exposures to the pictures and presented the control item 
condition. Last, instead of the remaining brands Nestlé Cheerios, Innocent and 
SunnyD, the weaker related foil brands Alpen and Coldpress were used as foil items 
in the memory test (but see Footnote 12 in the results section; see Figure 4). 
 Assignment of the three study brands (e.g. Kellogg’s Coco Pops, Nestlé 
Cheerios, and Weetabix) to item type (original item and misleading item) and to 
condition (misled item and control item condition) was counterbalanced across 
participants. Further, each of the competitor brands of a category served equally often 
as misleading/contradicting brand during the misinformation phase. To further reduce 
the risk of item effects, the two foils chosen per category (e.g. Alpen and Quaker) 
always appeared in the final memory test in a randomized order. To do all this this, 
twelve different conditions in which participants were exposed to different brand 
combinations (slide show combinations) were created for counterbalancing purposes. 
For each condition an individual memory test was created. Last, we also randomized 
the order in which participants were exposed to the single photographs.  
 For respondents in the eye-tracking condition, eye movements were recorded 
with a Tobii eye tracker (Tobii Technology, Tobii TX300, 2006). Here, a PC 
computer was used with a resolution of 1920x1080 pixels. The system’s resolution 
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and sampling rate were 0.258 and 300 Hz. The eye movements were captured by a 
camera integrated at the bottom of the 23’’ computer screen that was located at about 
60cm from the participants. Target areas of interest (AOIs) were set around target 
brands placed in the pictures.  
 DRM task. For the DRM task, five word lists were used that were obtained 
from the Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999) norms in accordance with the 
study procedure of Ost et al. (2013). Each list consisted of 13 words (e.g. bed, rest, 
awake) that were all semantically related to a non-presented word (i.e. the critical 
lure, sleep). The specific word lists used in this experiment were related to the 
following critical lures: rough; doctor; smell; sleep; and chair (see Appendix J for the 
full list of semantic associates). The word lists were presented in descending order of 
associative strength to the corresponding critical lure (please note that each of the five 
lists actually contain 15 words but that the last three words in the lists were excluded 
and used as foil items in the memory test; see measurement and analysis section). The 
presentation order of the five lists was randomized across participants.  
Procedure 
 Misinformation task.   
 Original event. Figure 4 shows the design of this study. The procedure was 
similar to Experiment 1. Participants were shown the Facebook profile and were 
instructed to gain an impression about their new but fictitious friend. Next, they 
clicked on ‘Photos’ and observed the personal pictures uploaded by their new 
acquaintance. To encourage engagement with the scenes, participants were asked to 
imagine that they were familiar with some of the account owner’s friends seen in the 
photos. In addition, they were asked to imagine that they were part of the events 
shown (consider what was been discussed in the scene, what it may have taken 
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place), even if they were of course not seen in the pictures. Importantly, at no point 
was reference made to any of the brand placements. To ensure that all participants 
engaged for the same time period with the pictures, photos changed automatically and 
participants were exposed to each photo for 12 seconds.  
 About half of all study participants (N = 24) completed this task in front of a 
normal computer screen. The remaining participants (N = 28) completed the task in 
front of an eye-tracker and eye-movements were recorded during the exposure to the 
stimuli. After informing these latter participants that their eye-movements would be 
recorded during the task, the eye-tracker system was calibrated before the beginning 
of the experiment: Participants were asked to follow with their gaze a red fixation dot 
that was moving over the computer screen. 
 
Figure 4. Study design  
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 Misinformation phase. Twenty-four hours or one week later, participants (Ns 
= 26 each) were asked to look at the Facebook profile again and to indulge in 
reminiscence by watching of what they thought were the same photographs as seen 
on day 1. This time however, participants saw the photos that were manipulated such 
that one brand per picture was replaced with a different brand of the same category, 
while the other brand did not change during the process. Participants were not warned 
about the potential discrepancies between the photographs presented at Time 1 and 
Time 2 and each photograph was presented for 12 seconds. Again, calibration of the 
eye-tracker preceded the task for participants in the eye-tracking condition. 
Final memory test. For all participants the final memory tests were carried 
out 24 hours later and the test format was identical to the ones used in Experiment 1 
(besides the fact that all test items were presented in their brand specific logo font in 
this current study and that the nature of the foil items differed). First, participants 
completed a yes/no recognition test for the original event including Remember, 
Know, and Guess judgments. Following, a final source-monitoring task was carried 
out to measure participants’ robust memory performance.  
 DRM task. About five minutes after completion of the misinformation 
memory tests, all participants were administered the DRM task. First, general 
instructions were read aloud to participants, explaining that different words would 
appear on the computer screen. Being an incidental learning task, participants were 
not informed that their memory for these words would be tested at a later stage. 
Instead, participants were told that the task was a word-pleasantness rating task that 
was carried out as part of a different experiment. Each word list was presented word-
by-word following an initial fixation point. Participants were instructed to read each 
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word and to rate it for its pleasantness after. Each word appeared on the screen for 
one second, followed by a blank screen for one second. After presentation of all lists, 
participants were given a 1-minute distractor task (simple math task) prior to the 
memory test. In an online-based recognition test, participants were asked to make 
old/new followed by Remember, Know, and Guess judgments. 
Measurement and analysis  
 Misinformation task. The 60 items on the recognition test consisted of 24 of 
the original items (12 on which participants were misled and 12 on which participants 
were not misled), 12 misleading items that contradicted their original counterparts, 
and 24 non-presented and weakly related foil items (including 12 foil items 
categorically related to the misled and 12 foil items related to the control item 
condition). Correct and incorrect yes-responses to these items were used to compute 
participant’s overall memory performance (i.e. hits and false alarms of correctly or 
falsely stating that an item had appeared during the original event). Robust memory 
performance in the source-monitoring task was the confirming scores of the 
recognition test answers under stricter source-monitoring criteria. These were coded 
as in Experiment 1 (but see notes of Table 5 in this Experiment).  
 Concerning the eye-tracking data, fixation duration on areas of interest (AOIs) 
in milliseconds and the number of fixations on AOI’s were recorded. Thus, fixation 
duration recorded was the duration of each individual fixation within an AOI. If 
during the recording the participant returned to the AOI, the new fixation was also 
included in the calculation.  
 The main analysis was similar to Experiment 1. We analysed the uptake of 
misinformation by applying statistical tests that would first compare participants’ 
memory performance (yes-responses to items) within the misled item condition and 
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then across conditions (misled vs. control item condition). Because the foil items 
were not used as study items in this experiment, a comparison between the 
misleading item in the misled and the foil items in the control item condition (see 
Experiment 1) was not conducted (but see Footnote 12). These main analyses were 
carried out separately for participants’ overall recognition scores, their Remember, 
Know, and Guess responses, as well as for participants’ robust memory performance 
of the source-monitoring task. Again, we set an overall standard alpha level equal to 
.05 for our main analysis (e.g. see Frost et al., 2002). Concerning the eye-tracking 
data, descriptive statistics of fixations on the brands were reported and evaluated. In 
addition, correlation analysis between the eye-fixation data and participant’s memory 
performance was computed.  
 DRM task. The 35-word DRM recognition test consisted of 15 old items (the 
words in the first, third and fifth positions of each DRM list), the five critical lures, as 
well as 15 related foil items (the last three items of each of the five DRM lists that 
were excluded from the study lists). Analysis involved comparing participants’ 
correct and incorrect yes- (or old-) responses to list items, the obviously missing 
critical lure word, as well as the foil items (i.e. hits and false alarms for stating that an 
items was old). To analyse potential relationships between misinformation and DRM 
effect measures, correlation analysis between the yes-responses and signal detection 
measures in both tasks were computed.  
Results 
Sample characteristics 
 Shapiro-Wilk’s tests (p > .05) and visual inspections of histograms, normal Q-
Q plots and box plots were used to examine whether the dependent variables of this 
study were approximately normally distributed. Analysis showed that the dependent 
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variable item endorsement was roughly normally distributed for Item type (original 
items and misleading items) Condition (misled and control item condition), and Time 
of misinformation (1 day and 1 week). However, participants’ foil false alarms in the 
misled and control item condition showed a positive skewness exceeding threshold 
values particularly in the immediate testing condition (Shapiro-Wilk’s tests: ps < .05). 
An inspection of the variables revealed no concrete outlier points that could have 
been removed from the data to solve the problem. Nevertheless, we decided to 
continue using parametric tests in this experiment for better comparability across 
experiments. However, please note that all analyses were rerun and results confirmed 
using non-parametric tests (however these tests are not reported here). Also, please 
note that neither participant’s age nor gender had any effect on the dependent 
variables of this study. In addition, it made no statistically significant difference 
whether participants completed the misinformation task in front of a normal PC or the 
eye-tracker. Hence, these variables were not included in the following analysis. 
 
Misinformation task 
 Recognition test data.  
 Raw score analysis. Table 4 shows the proportion of yes-responses to the 
three item types (original details, misleading details, and foil details) correctly and 
incorrectly accepted as being part of the original event as a function of Condition (i.e. 
whether participants were or were not misled on an item) and Time of misinformation 
(i.e. whether misinformation was received after a delay of one day or one week). 
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Condition
/Response 
type
Total 1 Day 1 Week Total 1 Day 1 Week Total 1 Day 1 Week 
Misled Item
Total .48 (.026) .49 (.046) .46 (.045) .47 (.026) .43 (.036) .51 (.043) .16 (.021) .16 (.036) .16 (.024)
R .16 (.022) .19 (.033) .14 (.028) .18 (.026)   .11 (.024) .25 (.036) .02 (.007)   .03 (.010) .02 (.010)
K .23 (.021) .23 (.029) .22 (.031) .20 (.017) .21 (.025) .19 (.024) .08 (.013) .07 (.016) .09 (.019)
G .09 (.018) .08 (.026) .10 (.026) .09 (.015) .11 (.023) .07 (.021) .06 (.013) .06 (.022) .05 (.013)
Control Item
Total .57 (.025) .56 (.033) .58 (.040) .15 (.019) .15 (.029) .16 (.026)
R .31 (.026) .31 (.036) .30 (.039) .02 (.007)   .03 (.010) .02 (.008)
K .20 (.021) .18 (.024) .22 (.034) .09 (.014) .07 (.016) .11 (.022)
G .06 (.013) .07 (.020) .05 (.017) .04 (.010) .05 (.017) .03 (.010)
Table 4.  Overall mean proportion (SE) of yes-responses with proportion of 
Remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G) responses for each item type as a function 
of Condition and Time of misinformation.
Notes. *Misleading items are not applicable to the control item condition since 
participants were not misinformed on the original items in this condition. Overall 
memory performances in bold font
n.a.
Item type/Delay Misinformation
Original items 
(hits)
Misleading items
(false alarms)
Foil items 
(false alarms)
 
 
 First, we compared participants’ overall yes-responses to the three item types 
in the misled item condition. We ran a 3(Item type: original item vs. misleading item 
vs. foil item) x2(Time of misinformation: 1 day vs. 1 week) mixed factor ANOVA. 
Analysis yielded a significant main effect of Item type, F(2, 100) = 75.67, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .60. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed no difference between original 
items and the misleading items. However, participants correctly accepted more 
original items (M = .48, SD = .23) than they falsely accepted the related foil items (M 
= .16, SD = .15, p < .001). In addition, misleading items (M = .47, SD = .20) were 
more often falsely accepted than the foil items (p = .004). There was no main effect 
of Time of misinformation (F < 1) and no significant Item type X Time of 
misinformation interaction, F(2, 100) = 2.11, p = .13.
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 We also examined participants’ yes-responses to the item types across 
condition and conducted 2(Condition: misled vs. control) x2(Time of misinformation: 
1 day vs. 1 week) mixed factor ANOVAs separately for the original and the foil 
details. For original items, there was a significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 50) 
= 12.56, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .20, showing that participants correctly accepted more 
original details in the control (M = .57, SD = .18) relative to the misled item 
condition. There was no main effect of Time of misinformation and no interaction 
between Item type X Time of misinformation (Fs < 1). Last, comparing foil items 
across condition revealed no significant main effect of Condition, Time of 
misinformation, and no interaction between the two variables (all Fs < 1).  
 Last, we examine whether participant’s behaviour to respond yes to the 
different items stood in any relationship and ran correlation analysis between hits and 
false alarms separately for each of the misinformation delay conditions. We report 
findings in the misled item condition only in order to reduce the complexity of this 
section. In the 1-day delay condition, hits for the original items were not associated 
with false alarms for the misleading or the foil items. However, in the 1-week delay 
condition, hits and false alarms to all items types were strongly and significantly 
correlated. Analysis revealed significant correlations between hits for the original 
items and false alarms for the misleading details (r = .75, n = 26, p < .01), as well as 
between the original items and the foil items (r = .45, n = 26, p = .004). In addition, a 
significant correlation between the latter false alarm types was obtained (r = .55, n = 
26, p = .004).
11
  
                                                        
11 Please not that these trends were also confirmed in participants more refined 
remember as well as robust memory performance in the source-monitoring task. 
Here, negative correlations between original items and misleading items were found 
in the 1-day delay condition and significant positive correlations in the 1-week delay 
condition.  
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 Hence, the overall recognition data suggest that participants were misled by 
the retroactively changed brands in the photographs. When participants were misled 
on an item, they did not have any ability to discriminate between originally seen 
items and the misleading details. In addition, they endorsed the misleading alternative 
more often than the related foil item.
12
 Further comparisons across conditions showed 
that participants produced more correct responses for the original details in the 
control relative to the misled item condition, suggesting the presence of a memory 
impairment effect. Whereas statistically, the time of misinformation manipulation did 
not reveal any differences between the means, numerically, data revealed a trend in 
the expected direction. Whereas yes-responses to the original details (in the misled 
item condition) seemed to decrease in the 1-week delay relative to the 1-day delay 
condition (.49 vs. .46) data indicated an increase of yes-responses to the misleading 
details with the longer delay of misinformation (.43 vs. .51.). Concerning the 
                                                        
12 One might argue that the endorsement of foil false alarms might not be an ideal 
baseline to determine whether this study created a reliable misinformation effect or 
not. Different to Experiment 1, the selected foil items in this study did never appear 
as original or misleading item in the photographs but only in the final memory test. 
We chose this approach because the aim was to investigate whether more weakly 
related test items would reduce the amount of foil false alarms. Concerning this 
matter, data of a small sub-experiment provides additional information that might 
ease potential concerns. A separate sample (N = 12) was exposed to the same 
Facebook photos only once and administered a yes/no recognition test two days later. 
Participants were not misinformed on the originally seen brands in that sub-study, but 
they underwent the remaining paradigm stages equivalent to the 1-day delay 
condition of main Experiment 3. Participants were tested on 24 originally seen items 
(e.g. Tropicana) as well as 48 highly related but non-presented foil items (e.g. 
SunnyD and Innocent). Thus, assignment of the brands to original items and foils was 
counterbalanced across the sample (for example a second participants might have 
seen SunnyD originally and Tropicana and Innocent were the foil items at test). We 
compared participants’ foil false alarms of that study with the false alarm rate for 
misleading items of the current study. Results revealed that misleading items were 
significantly more often falsely accepted as being part of the original event (M = .43, 
SD = .18) than the foil items (M = .25, SD = .07; t(36) = 3.24, p < .001), overall 
providing more evidence that our paradigm created a reliable misinformation effect.  
 
 
  
127 
correlations between participants’ hits and false alarms data revealed differences in 
behaviour when looking at the two time-delay conditions separately. Whereas no 
correlations were found in the immediate condition, in the delay condition more hits 
were associated with more false alarms for the misleading as well as the foil items. 
 Remember, Know, and Guess analysis. Table 4 shows the proportion of 
Remember, Know, and Guess responses for each item type as a function of Condition 
and Time of misinformation. First, we ran the same ANOVAs as above for 
participants remember responses only. A 3(Item type: original item vs. misleading 
item vs. foil item) x2(Time of misinformation: 1-day vs. 1-week) mixed factor 
ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of Item type, F(2, 100) = 27.06, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .35. Pairwise comparisons showed no difference between original items and 
misleading items but participants correctly remembered more original items (M = .16, 
SD = .16) than they falsely remembered the related foil items (M = .02, SD = .05). In 
addition, the misleading items (M = .18, SD = .17) were more often falsely 
remembered than the foil items (ps < .001). Analysis showed no main effect of Time 
of misinformation F(1, 50) = 1.59, p = .21, but there was a significant interaction 
between Item type and Time of misinformation, F(2,100) = 9.95, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .16. 
Further analysis of the simple main effects was conducted using Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha levels of .016 (.05/3). Looking at the effects of Time of misinformation at each 
level Response type, results showed that the misleading items were significantly more 
often remembered in the 1-week delay (M = .25, SD = .18) compared to the 1-day 
delay condition (M = .11, SD = .12), t(50) = 3.38, p = .001, d = .85. However, no such 
difference was found for the original and the foil items (all ps > .30; see Figure 5). 
Alternatively, looking at the effects of Response type at each level of Time of 
misinformation, results revealed main effects of Item type for both the 1-day delay, 
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F(2, 50) = 10.60, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .30, as well as the 1-week delay condition, F(2, 50) 
= 29.56, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .54. However, whereas in the 1-day delay condition pairwise 
comparisons showed a numerical trend of more remember responses for original 
items (M = .19, SD = .17) compared to the misleading items (p = .22), a reversed 
trend was found in the 1-week delay condition. Here, the misleading details were 
more often remembered than the original items (M = .14, SD = .12; p = .002). In both 
delay conditions, original as well as the misleading items were more often 
remembered than the foils (ps < .007).  
 Looking at remember responses for original items across condition, a 
2(Condition: misled vs. control) x2(Time of misinformation: 1-day vs. 1-week) 
mixed factor ANOVA revealed a main effect of Condition, F(1, 50) = 43.93, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .47. More original items were remembered in the control (M = .31, SD = 
.19) relative to the misled item condition. There was no main effect of Time of 
misinformation (F < 1), or a significant Item type X Time of misinformation 
interaction, F(1, 50) = 1.39, p = .244.  
 For completion, we ran the same analysis separately for participants’ know 
and guess responses. For participants’ know responses, there was significant main 
effect of Item type, F(2, 100) = 32.41, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .39. Here, pairwise 
comparisons showed no significant difference between original items (M = .23, SD = 
.15) and misleading items (M = .20, SD = .12), but know responses to both item types 
were higher compared to know judgements to the foil items (M = .08, SD = .09, both 
ps < .001). There was no main effect of Time of misinformation and no significant 
Item type X Time of misinformation interaction. Across condition, there were no 
main effects or interactions for know responses. For guess responses, no main effects 
or interaction within or across conditions were found (all Fs < 1). 
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 Hence, the misinformation effect found in the overall recognition scores was 
confirmed when participant’s remember as well as know responses only were 
compared. Data also suggested that Time of misinformation had a significant effect 
on participant’s remember responses that was only revealed numerically in the raw 
recognition scores. The 1-week delay of misinformation seemed to increase 
remember responses for the misleading items. Whereas statistically, no difference 
was found for the original and the foil items, numerically there was a reversed trend 
for original items in the misled item condition. Here, data suggest a decrease of 
remember responses in the 1-day delay compared to the 1-week delay condition (.19 
vs. .14). In addition, data suggested that remember responses for the original items 
numerically exceeded these of the misleading items in the 1-day delay condition but 
that a reversed and significant trend was found in the 1-week delay condition. 
We also investigated Remember, Know, and Guess response patterns within 
the different Item types in the misled item condition to see whether these patterns 
would differ as a function Time of misinformation. We ran 3(Response type: 
remember vs. know. vs. guess) x 2(Time of misinformation: 1-day vs. 1 week) mixed 
factor ANOVAs separately for original items, misleading items, and foil items. For 
original items there was a main effect of Response type, F(2,100) = 10.39, p < .001,  
ηp
2
 = .17. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that original items were more 
often known than guessed (M = .09, SD = .13; p < .001) and borderline more often 
remembered than guessed (p = .06). There was no difference between the amount of 
remember and guess responses (p = .15). There was no main effect of Time of 
misinformation and no significant Item type X Time of misinformation interaction 
(all Fs < 1). 
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 The same analysis for misleading items revealed a significant main effect of 
Response type as well, F(2,100) = 8.85, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .15. Whereas there was no 
difference between remember and know responses (p = 1.00), differences were found 
between remember and guess judgements (p = .007) and also between know and 
guess responses (p < .001). There was no significant main effect of Time of 
misinformation, F(1,50) = 2.80, p = .10, but as per the analysis above, there was a 
significant Item type X Time of misinformation interaction, F(2,100) = 9 
6.87, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .12. Simple main effects were analysed by examining the effect 
of Response type at each level of Time of misinformation. One-way repeated 
measure ANOVAs revealed main effects of Response type in both, the 1-day delay, 
F(2,50) = 4.89, p = .012, ηp
2
 = .16, as well as  the 1-week delay condition, F(2,50) = 
10.16, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .29. However, pairwise comparisons revealed different 
response patterns within each of these conditions. Whereas the misleading items were 
more often known (M = .21, SD = .13) than remembered (M = .11, SD = .12) in the 
1-day delay condition, after a delay of one week, there was no difference between 
remembering (M = .25, SD = .18) and knowing (M = .19, SD = .12, p = .44). In fact, 
numerically, the trend was reversed. For foil items a main effect of Response type 
was revealed as well, F(2,100) = 8.22, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .14, with pairwise comparisons 
showing that these items were more often known (M = .08, SD = .09) than 
remembered (M = .02, SD = .05; p < .001) with no other differences between 
response types. There was no main effect of Time of misinformation and no 
significant Item type X Time of misinformation interaction (all Fs < 1).
13
 
                                                        
13 In the control condition, analysis yielded a main effect of Response type for 
original items, F(2,100) = 28.23, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .36. More original details were 
remembered (M = .31, SD = .19) than both known (M = .20, SD = .15; p = .032) and 
guessed (M = .06, SD = .09; ps < .001). In addition, they were more often known than 
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Figure 5. Proportions of Remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G) responses in the 
misled item condition as a function of Time of Misinformation. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
 
 To summarize, data suggest that the response pattern within an item type only 
differed for the misleading items depending on the time the misinformation was 
presented. Whereas overall, there was no difference between remember and know 
judgements for the misleading items, further analysis showed that this trend was only 
valid in the 1-week delay condition. When misinformation was received after 24 
hours, know responses exceeded the amount of remember responses. However, with a 
longer delay between original event and misinformation phase, the trend was almost 
reversed with misleading items being (numerically) more often remembered than 
known. Whereas there was no difference between remember and know judgments for 
original items in the misled item condition, in the control item condition a clear 
                                                                                                                                                              
guessed (p < .001). There was no main effect of Time of misinformation and no 
significant Item type X Time of misinformation interaction (all Fs < 1). Last, there 
was a main effect of Response Type for control foil items, F(2,100) = 2.04, p < .001,  
ηp
2
 = .20, with foils being more often known (M = .09, SD = .10) than remembered 
(M = .02, SD = .05; p < .001) and more often known than guessed (M = .04, SD = 
.07; p = .006). There was no main effect of Time of misinformation and no 
significant Item type X Time of misinformation interaction (all Fs < 1). 
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pattern of more remember than know and more remember and know than guess 
responses was found. Last, the foil false alarms in misled and control item conditions 
were more often based on know, relative to remember responses.  
 Source-monitoring test data. Table 5 shows the proportion of overall robust 
memory performance as well as individual responses in the source-monitoring task to 
all three item types as a function of Condition and Time of misinformation. To recap, 
in the source-monitoring task participants were asked to reconsider the sources of 
their recognition test answers by choosing from different source options (see notes 
Table 5). We ran the same main ANOVAs as above on participants’ robust memory 
performance. Again, in the misled item condition, analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of Item type, F(2, 100) = 21.66, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .30. Bonferroni pairwise 
comparisons showed that more misleading items were falsely attributed to the 
original event (M = .23, SD = .17) than original items were correctly attributed to the 
original event phase (M = .14, SD = .16; p = .019). In addition, both items types were 
more often attributed to the original event than the foil items (M = .06, SD = .09, p < 
.001, p = .004). There was no main effect of Time of misinformation (F < 1), but 
there was a significant interaction between Item type and Time of misinformation, 
F(2,100) = 5.67 p = .005,  ηp
2
 = .10. Further analysis of the simple main effects with 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .016 (.05/3) revealed that robust false memory 
rates for misleading items were higher in the 1-week delay condition (M = .29, SD = 
.17) compared to the 1-day delay condition (M = .17, SD = .14), t(50) = 2.57, p = 
.013, d = .77. However, there was no difference in robust memory performance for 
the original and the foil items (all p’s > .05). 
 Comparison of original items across condition (misled vs. control) revealed a 
main effect of Item Type as well, F(1, 50) = 24.22, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .33, with more 
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correct source attributions in the control (M = .19, SD = .18) relative to the misled 
item condition. There were no other significant main effects or interactions (Fs < 1).  
 
Condition/
Response type
Total 1 Day 1 Week Total 1 Day 1 Week Total 1 Day 1 Week 
Misled item
 Robust .14 (.022) .17 (.040) .11 (.019) .23 (.023) .17 (.027) .29 (.034) .06 (.012) .06 (.014) .06 (.019)
(1) Saw 1 only .11 (.023) .14 (.041) .07 (.018) .05 (.009) .03 (.008) .07 (.015) .03 (.008) .02 (.007) .04 (.015)
(2) Saw 2 only .05 (.012) .04 (.016) .06 (.018) .05 (.009) .04 (.011) .06 (.014) .01 (.003) .01 (.005) .01 (.004)
(3) Both .13 (.017) .13 (.020) .14 (.027) .18 (.020) .14 (.027) .22 (.029) .03 (.008) .04 (.013) .02 (.010)
(4) Conflicted .03 (.008) .03 (.009) .04 (.013) .04 (.010) .04 (.012) .05 (.017) .01 (.005) .01 (.005) .02 (.008)
(5) Guessed .15 (.019) .16 (.026) .15 (.028) .15 (.016) .18 (.023) .12 (.021) .08 (.018) .08 (.033) .08 (.015)
Control item
 Robust .29 (.026) .29 (.036) .30 (.037) .06 (.011) .06 (.016) .06 (.016)
(1) Saw 1 only .07 (.015) .05 (.019) .08 (.024) .03 (.009) .04 (.011) .03 (.015)
(2) Saw 2 only .06 (.012) .05 (.015) .08 (.019) .01 (.003) .01 (.004) .01 (.004)
(3) Both .29 (.026) .29 (.036) .30 (.037) .03 (.006) .03 (.008) .03 (.009)
(4) Conflicted .03 (.011) .04 (.020) .03 (.009) .01 (.003) .01 (.004) .01 (.005)
(5) Guessed .11 (.013) .12 (.023) .10 (.014) .08 (.013) .07 (.019) .08 (.019)
Table 5.  Mean proportion (SE) of robust memory performances (source attributions) 
total and broken down by response for each item type as a function of Condition and 
Time of misinformation.
Note. Item types were coded robust when one of the following options were ticked by a 
participant: Original item: misled (1) or (4), control (3); Misleading item: (1) or (3), Foil 
item: misled and control (1) or (3). Robust memory performances in bold font. 
Item type/Delay of  Misinformation
Original items 
(hits)
Misleading items
(false alarms)
Foil items 
(false alarms)
n.a.
 
 
Hence, analysis of participants’ robust memories mirrored most trends found 
in participants’ overall memory performance and remember responses. One exception 
was found in that false attributions of the misleading items even exceeded correct 
source attributions of the original items in this task.
14
 As with participants remember 
responses, Time of misinformation affected false source attributions of the 
                                                        
14 Please note that this effect depends on how original items are coded as being robust 
in the source-monitoring task. One might argue that if false alarms for the misleading 
items are coded robust if ‘saw1 only’ and ‘both’ is selected, the latter being a ‘half 
true’ option, this should also apply for original items in the misled item condition. 
Please note that differences in robust memories performance between the item types 
disappear if ‘both’ is included in coding for the original items. 
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misleading items. After a delay of 1-week participants falsely attributed more 
misleading items to the original event than after a delay of 1-day. Whereas no such 
trend was found for the foil items, there was again a reversed numerical trend (non-
significant) for original items in the misled item condition suggesting a decrease of 
correct source attributions in the 1-week delay compared to the 1-day delay condition 
(.17 vs. .11). 
 To analyse participants’ robust false memories for the misleading items 
further we examined individual responses in the source-monitoring task as a function 
of Time of misinformation. Recall that a false alarm for a misleading detail was 
considered robust when participants falsely indicated that the misleading detail 
appeared during photo exposure 1 only (‘saw 1 only’) or during both exposure phases 
(‘both’). A 5(Response type: saw 1 only vs. saw 2 only. vs. both vs. conflicted vs. 
guessed) x 2(Time of misinformation: 1-day vs. 1-week) mixed factor ANOVA 
yielded a significant main effect of Response type, F(4, 200) = 22.69, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.31. Pairwise comparisons showed that participants falsely chose the ‘both’ option 
more often than the falsely chose the ‘saw 1 only’ option (p < .001). The correct 
options ‘saw 2 only’ and ‘conflicted’ were less often selected than ‘both’ was falsely 
selected or ‘guessed’ was chosen (ps < .001). In addition, ‘guessed’ was more often 
selected than ‘saw 1 only’ (ps < .05). No difference between ‘saw 1 only’, ‘saw 2 
only’, and ‘conflicted’ were revealed. There was no main effect of Time of 
misinformation, F(1, 50) = 2.40, p = .13, but there was a significant Response Type x 
Time of misinformation interaction, F(4, 200) = 3.24, p = .013, ηp
2
 = .06. Simple 
main effects were examined by analysing the effect of Time of misinformation at 
each level of Response type. However, using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .01 
(.05/5) revealed no significant differences between the misinformation delay 
  
135 
conditions. Nevertheless, several trends approaching significance are noteworthy. 
Whereas more participants falsely selected ‘saw 1 only’ as well as ‘both’ in the 1-
week delay relative to the 1-day delay condition (‘saw 1 only’: .07 vs. .03, t(50) = 
2.03, p = .048; ‘both’: .22 vs. .14, t(50) = 1.96, p = .055), the amount of time 
‘guessed’ was selected was lower in the 1-week delay relative to the 1-day delay 
condition, .22 vs. .14, t(50) = 1.90, p = .070. No numerical differences were found for 
‘saw 2 only, and ‘conflicted’ (ps > .30; see Figure 6) 
 In sum, data suggest that participants’ robust false memories for the 
misleading items mainly stemmed from falsely believing that the misleading items 
were seen during both exposures to the pictures (relative to believing that the items 
appeared during the first exposure to the photos only). Whereas this pattern persisted 
in both misinformation delay conditions, there was an increase of selecting ‘both’ and 
‘saw 1’ only in the 1-week delay condition. Here, it seemed that a shift of guessing 
responses to more ‘saw1 only’ and ‘both’ responses was the driving force for this 
effect. Although not reported above, it should be noted that there was no interaction 
between Item type and Time of misinformation for the original items in the misled 
item condition (Fs < 1). However, looking at the means in Table 5, the reduction of 
robust hits for original items in the 1-week delay condition seemed to stem from 
choosing the correct ‘saw 1’ option less often in that longer delay condition. It should 
also be noted that as in Experiment 1, participants frequently but falsely attributed the 
original items in the misled item condition to both exposures to the picture, again 
suggesting that source confusions were not reserved for the misleading details alone.  
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Figure 6. Mean proportion of robust memory performance for misleading items total 
and broken down by response as a function of Time of misinformation. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean. 
   
Results for the eye-tracking data   
 In total, 28 participants were tested in front of the eye-tracker. Of these, six 
participants had to be excluded from this analysis because of high blink rates or eye-
calibration problems. Eleven participants were tested in the 1-day delay and the other 
11 in the 1-week delay condition. 
 Descriptively, results of the eye-tracking data showed that participants fixated 
brands during the first exposure to the pictures on average 26 times (repeated 
fixations included). Repeated fixations excluded, on average 17.5 different brands 
were looked at which represented 73% of all brand placements. These values were 
similar for the misinformation phase (M = 24 and M = 16.8). Looking at total fixation 
times on brands during the first exposure to the pictures, results showed that 
participants fixated the brands on average for 8.6 seconds (SD = 3.8; range = 1.04 - 
19.28 seconds). During the misinformation phase, again, brands were fixated for 
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almost the same amount of time (M = 8.7, SD = 4.2; range = 2.21-18.00 seconds). 
Finally, correlation analysis revealed a significant positive relationship between 
fixation times on brands during exposure 1 and 2 (r = .62, n = 22, p = .002), 
suggesting that the longer a participant looked at brands during the first exposure to 
the pictures, the longer brands were fixated during the misinformation phase (please 
note that all these trends were similar looking at both delay conditions separately).   
 To examine whether participant’s fixation on the brands had some influence 
on our misinformation effect measures, we computed Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients between visual fixation on the brands and memory performance rates 
recorded in recognition and source memory tests. Collapsed over both delay of 
misinformation conditions, not many of these trends turned out to be significant. 
However, data revealed a consistent trend of positive correlations between fixation 
duration during both exposure phases to the photos (Fix 1
st
 and Fix 2
nd
) and hits for 
original items (in misled and control item condition) and negative correlations 
between Fix 1
st
 and Fix 2
nd
 and foil false alarms (in misled and control item 
condition).
15
 For the misleading items this trend was not as consistent as for the other 
memory types but one correlation was significant. Fix 2
nd
 was correlated with 
indicating that misleading brands ‘conflicted’ across phases in the source-monitoring 
task (r = .56, n = 22, p = .008). Hence, the longer participants fixated on the brands 
                                                        
15 Here, a few correlations between visual attention and hits as well as foil false 
alarms turned out to be significant. First, remember responses for the foil false alarms 
were significantly correlated with fixation duration on brands during the second 
exposure to the pictures (r = -.53, n = 22, p < .010). Second, in the misled item 
condition, fixation duration during the first as well as the second exposure to the 
photos was correlated with choosing the option ‘saw 1 only’ in the source-monitoring 
task for original items (r = .46, n = 22, p = .035, r = .53, n = 22, p = .014). Last, an 
association between fixation duration on brands during the first and second exposure 
to the photos and falsely choosing ‘both’ for foils in the misled item condition was 
found (r = -.47, n = 22, p = .033, r = -.43, n = 22, -44, p = .053). 
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during the second exposure to the photos, the more often they correctly indicated in 
the source task that the misleading item conflicted with the originally seen brand.  
 
Table 6. Spearman’s rank correlations between visual fixation data on the brands 
during both exposures to the photographs (Fix 1
st
 and Fix 2
nd
) and hits and false 
alarms (including overall recognition data, R, K, G judgements and source-
monitoring judgements) for original and the misleading items in the misled item 
condition as a function of Time of Misinformation.  
Condition Overall R K G Robust
Saw 1 
only 
Saw 2 
only 
Both Conflict Guessed
1-day
Fix 1st .434 .622* .299 -.512 .351 .532 -.418 .101 -.711* -.241
Fix 2nd .480 .311 .491 -.245 .812** .824** -.418 -.482 .000 .234
1-week
Fix 1st .101 .417 .005 -.245 .019 -.050 -.326 -.061 .035 .014
Fix 2nd .311 .216 .323 -.078 -.076 -.271 -.276 .229 .151 .139
1-day
Fix 1st -.483 -.142 .028 -.504 .120 .569 -.039 -.020 -.472 -.362
Fix 2nd -.336 -.538 -.283 -.014 -.247 .640* -.247 -.521 .319 .032
1-week
Fix 1st .493 .619* -.052 -.200 .496 -.289 -.213 .553 .764** -.070
Fix 2nd .696* .826** -.052 -.020 .608* -.318 .075 .708* .815** .010
Response Type/ItemType
Original item
Misleading item
Notes: N = 11; *p < .05, **p < .01.  
 
 Despite of the small sample size (Ns = 11) we decided to ran the same 
correlation analysis (Spearman’s Rank Order) separately for the 1-day delay and the 
1-week delay condition. Table 6 shows these correlations for the misleading items, as 
well the original items in the misled item condition. Looking at the original items, 
data revealed a trend of correlations in the expected direction including some 
significant effects (see Table 6). Data suggest that the longer participants fixated the 
brands, the more overall hits, remember responses, as well as robust hits they later 
created for these items. However, these correlations seemed to be somewhat stronger 
in the short compared to the long delay condition. For the misleading items the 
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correlational trend seemed to slightly differ depending on the delay of 
misinformation. In the 1-day delay condition, longer fixations to the brands seemed to 
result in a reduced occurrence of false alarms. However, after a delay of one week 1-
week the trend was reversed with more false alarms for the misleading items the 
longer brands had been fixated. Hence, overall data provide some indication that 
fixation on the brands did influence how these brands were later remembered.  
Results of the DRM task  
 Of 52 participants 50 completed the DRM task (two participants were not able 
to stay for DRM task completion).  
 Memory performance on the DRM task. We first examined whether the 
DRM paradigm produced a reliable false memory effect. To do this, participants’ yes-
responses (or ‘old’ responses) to the three item types (list items, critical lures, and foil 
items) were entered into a one-way within-participant ANOVA. There was a main 
effect for Item type, F(2,98) = 377.65, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .89. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that there were more correct yes-responses to list items (M = .96, SD = .06) 
than false yes-responses to the critical lure items (M = .62, SD = .28, p < .001). In 
addition, there were more yes-responses to both list items and critical lures than to the 
foil items (M = .08, SD = .09, ps < .001). Hence, our data indicated a reliable false 
memory effect.  
 Participants’ Remember, Know, and Guess responses to the three items types 
were analysed using separate one-way within-participant ANOVAs. For remember 
responses there was a main effect of Item type, F(2,98) = 324.32, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .97. 
Pairwise comparison showed that list items (M = .89, SD = .12) were significantly 
more often remembered than the critical lure items (M = .36, SD = .28) and foil items 
(M = .02, SD = .04, ps < .001) Further, lure items more often remembered than the 
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foils (p < .001). Hence, participants remember responses confirmed the trend found 
in the overall recognition scores. For know responses, there was a significant main 
effect of Item type as well, F(2,98) = 22.26, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .35. Here, results 
revealed more know responses for lures (M = .20, SD = .20) than for the list items (M 
= .06, SD = .09) and foils (M = .04, SD = .05, ps < .001). Last, there was a main 
effect of Item type looking at the guess responses, F(2,98) = 8.7, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .15, 
with more guesses for the lures (M = .06, SD = .11) than for list items (M = .01, SD = 
.02, p < .01) and the foils (M = .02, SD = .04, p < .05). 
 Correlations between DRM and misinformation measures. To see whether 
there was a relationship between our misinformation and the DRM effect measures 
we computed Pearson’s correlation coefficients between raw scores, signal detection 
parameters
16
, as well as Remember, Know, and Guess judgments recorded in both 
tasks. Table 7 shows these correlations for participants’ false memories recorded in 
both tasks, more specifically for their raw recognition scores and signal detection 
parameters. As can be seen, none of these correlations turned out to be significant. 
Looking at the correlations of core interest, it can be seen that false alarms for the 
misleading and the foil items in the misinformation paradigm and false memories for 
the lures and the foils in the DRM paradigm were not at all or even negatively 
correlated with each other. The strongest correlation (r = -.19, p = .18) was with 
participants’ foil discrimination in the misinformation task (4. Mis: STD d’ FOIL) 
and participants lure discrimination in the DRM task (9. DRM: STD d’ Lures). 
                                                        
16 Please note that we generally ran signal detection analysis for our misinformation 
studies throughout this work to separate participant’s memory discrimination (d’) 
from their response bias (c). However, these results are not reported since all results 
confirmed the analyses of our raw recognition analyses (including the effects and 
null-effects caused by our study manipulations). Generally, results showed better 
discrimination ability for foil items relative to misleading items and more bias to tick 
‘No’ when confronted with a foil item than when presented with a misleading item. 
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However, this trend was opposite to our expectations. Correlation analysis for 
remember responses and for participants’ true memories for presented items did not 
reveal any significant correlations either.  
 
Table 7. Pearson’s r correlations between raw recognition scores and signal detection 
parameters of misinformation effect measures and DRM memory performance 
measures (false alarms only). 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Mis: Misleading item .416
**
-.360
* .097 -.824
**
-.578
** -.121 .000 .080 -.042 .136 .063
2 Mis: Foil item .029 -.425
**
-.447
**
-.770
** -.160 -.129 .172 .107 .133 .092
3 Mis: SDT d' 
Suggested
 .634 ** -.224  -.420 ** .138 .032 -.139 -.042 -.111 -.022
4 Mis: SDT d' Foil -.488
** -.226   .141 .136 -.193 -.172 -.077 -.033
5 Mis: SDT c 
Suggested
.856
** .029 -.036 .019 .089 -.067 -.045
6 Mis: SDT c Foil .041 .034 -.024 .003 -.054 -.055
7 DRM: Lures .361
*
-.922
** -.196 -.939
**
-.429
**
8 DRM: Foil -.464
**
-.876
** -.226 -.751
**
9 DRM: SD d' Lures .468** .734** .258
10 DRM: SDT d' Foils -.069  .350
*   
11 DRM: SDT c Lures   .528
**
12 DRM: SDT c Foil
Misinformation measures DRM measures
 
Notes: N = 50; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Mis = Misinformation. SDT = 
Signal detection theory measures. Correlations of interest in bold font. 
 
 
Comparison of findings Experiment 1 and 3   
 In order to see whether measures present in Experiment 3 (more prominent 
brands placement and the use of normed brands) led to statistical differences in 
participants’ hit and false alarm rates, we ran an analysis across Experiments 1 and 3. 
However, in order to reduce the risk of confounding variables, we only compared the 
conditions that had used similar delay intervals between the paradigm stages (original 
event, misinformation phase, final tests). More specifically, we compared results of 
Experiment 1’s ‘Time of test condition 2’ (N = 30; Original event Day 1; 
Misinformation Phase 30 min later; Final test Day 2) and Experiment 3’s ‘Time of 
misinformation condition 1’ (N = 26; Original event Day 1; Misinformation Phase 
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Day 2; Final test Day 3). Whereas still not ideal for comparison, we believed that 
such an analysis would be a valid way of examining any potential trends due to these 
changes.  
First, we ran a 3(Item type: original item vs. misleading item vs. foil item) 
x2(Experiment: Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2) mixed factor ANOVA in the misled 
item condition. Here, we were specifically interested in whether there would be an 
interaction between Item type and Experiment. Analysis yielded a main effect of Item 
type, F(2,108) = 39.48, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .42. There was no main effect of Experiment 
(F < 1) but there was a significant Item type x Experiment interaction, F(2,108) = 
4.54, p = .013, ηp
2
 = .08. However, further analysis with Bonferroni adjusted alpha 
levels did not reveal any significant differences between the means. Nevertheless, the 
numerical trends should be reported. Whereas foil items were more often falsely 
endorsed in Experiment 1 (M = .24, SD = .27) compared to Experiment 3 (M = .16, 
SD = .18), t(54) = 2.07, p = .043, the misleading items were more often falsely 
endorsed in Experiment 3 (M = .43, SD = .18) compared to Experiment 1 (M = .33, 
SD = .20), t(54) = 1.90, p = .063. Numerically, also the hit rate for original items 
increased from Experiment 1 to 3 (.44 vs. .49). Last, running the analysis across 
condition, there was no significant Item type x Experiment interaction (F < 1) for 
original items. Here, the hit rate for control items did not increase from Experiment 1 
to 3 (.55 vs. .56).  
 Hence, comparison of results across experiments gave some indication that 
the measures applied in Experiment 3 were effective. That is, foil items were indeed 
less often falsely endorsed in Experiment 3 and at least in the misled item condition, 
hits for the original items slightly increased. However, the false endorsement rate for 
misleading items also increased in Experiment 3. In fact, participants in Experiment 3 
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were not able to discriminate between original items on which they were misled from 
their misleading alternatives. However, it is unclear whether these effects did indeed 
stem from the changed study materials or whether it was the further delay of 1 day 
between original event and misinformation phase in Experiment 3 that was 
responsible for this change.  
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 aimed to replicate the brand misinformation effect found in 
Experiment 1 and to deal with some unexpected study outcomes that were revealed in 
that study (low hit rates for presented items and high foil false alarm rates for non-
presented foils). To increase the hit rates in the paradigm, altered study materials 
were used with normed as well as more prominently positioned brands. To explore 
and to reduce the occurrence of foil false alarms, more weakly associated foils 
replaced the highly related foil items in the final memory test. In addition, the 
experiment explored whether the production of hits and false alarms of this study 
would differ depending on whether misinformation was received after one day 
compared to one week. Last, examination of eye-fixation data as well as a sub-
experiment examining potential correlations between misinformation and DRM effect 
measures, accompanied this study.  
Effects of retroactive product replacement on memory performance 
 Experiment 3 revealed a reliable misinformation effect caused by retroactive 
brand replacements in photographs. In the recognition test, 47% of the misleading 
brands were falsely attributed to the original exposure to the photos. This was the 
same amount that participants correctly attributed the originally seen brands to the 
original photo exposure (.48; but on which they were later misled). This finding 
suggests that participants were not able to discriminate between the originally seen 
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and the misleading brands. However, both original as well as the misleading brands 
were clearly more often attributed to the original event compared the weakly related 
foils, suggesting that our results were more than just caused by pure guessing 
mechanisms. Our data also suggest the presence of a memory impairment effect. 
Original event accuracy in the control item condition exceeded accuracy in the misled 
item condition (in which participants were misled on an original item). Again, we 
found all these patterns not only in the overall recognition scores but also in 
participants’ more refined remember responses as well as robust memory 
performance in the source-monitoring task (see theoretical discussion of Experiment 
1). Hence Experiment 3 replicated the brand misinformation effect that was already 
found in Experiment 1. In addition, even if in non-significant form, changes in study 
materials as well as brand norming in Experiment 3 seemed to slightly increase these 
effects. For instance, Experiment 3 did evince an overall higher hit rate as well as less 
foil false alarms compared to Experiment 1. 
Effects of misinformation delay on memory performance 
 Although numerically our data supported the predicted trends concerning the 
delay of misinformation (i.e. more false alarms for misleading items in the 1-week 
delay condition and more hits for original items in the 1-day condition) the effect was 
not significant in participants’ overall recognition scores. However, false alarms for 
the misleading brands were more often remembered and also more often robustly 
endorsed in the source-monitoring task after the long compared to the short delay of 
misinformation exposure. Further inspection of participants’ robust false alarms 
indicated that it might have been a shift of guessing responses (in the short delay 
condition) to more often falsely attributing the misleading items to the original event 
only or both event phases that seemed to have caused this effect in the long delay 
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condition (please note that this effect was not statistically significant). Hence, after a 
longer delay, participant’s belief that the misleading items indeed appeared during the 
first exposure to the photos seemed to be stronger. The explanation for these effects is 
likely to be found in the perceptual characteristics of the original event memory that 
changed over the delay (Loftus et al., 1992; Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008).  
 From a Discrepancy Detection principle point of view (Tousignant et al., 
1986) it is likely that these effects occurred because the delay reduced participants’ 
capability to detect the discrepancies between the original event and the 
misinformation phase. Specifically, for remember responses, over the short delay 
participants might have been more likely to reject a misleading item as being 
remembered because perceptual detail of the competing original memory trace was 
still relatively strong. This might have facilitated discrimination ability between the 
items. The fact that remember responses to the original items numerically exceeded 
those for the misleading items in the short delay condition speaks for this assumption. 
However, over the long delay, this trend shifted with participants remembering the 
misleading items more often than the original items. As specific details about the 
original event might have further decayed, discrepancies between perceptual details 
of both event phases might have been not or less often detected. Thus, the amount of 
remember responses for the misleading details increased. In this process the pictorial 
presentation format of our misinformation materials might have further boosted the 
amount of remember responses because they enforced perceptual detail for the 
misleading items. Similar mechanisms might have acted when participants robustly 
endorsed their recognition test answers in the source-monitoring task. As the original 
event memory weakened over the delay, participants were more vulnerable to falsely 
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attribute the misleading details to the original event because discrepancies were less 
often noticed. 
 In this context, the relationships between participant’s hits and false alarms 
should be mentioned that differed between both misinformation delay conditions. In 
the 1-day delay condition, participants’ hits for original items and false alarms for the 
misleading items were not correlated. However, looking at the long delay condition, 
it seemed that the more hits for original items, the more false alarms for the 
misleading as well as the foil items were produced by a participant. These results may 
be explained by using the Fuzzy Trace Theory positing that participants may have 
incorrectly recognised the (in this case) pictorial misinformation because it activated 
gist memory for the original information. Over the short delay, verbatim information 
for the original event information may have still been strong and stood in direct 
competition with the misleading and new foil information. However, with the delay 
of time, verbatim memory for the original event might have decayed more rapidly 
than the gist memory, resulting in accessing the latter representation when decisions 
were made. Because it is known that gist memory can lead to memory errors, this 
might have been what caused the increase in remember judgements as well as in 
robust memory performance (Reyna & Titcomb, 1997).  
 The reason why overall memory performance in the recognition test was not 
significantly affected by the time delay may have been due to the time intervals used 
in this study. Previous research typically compared relatively short (e.g. 10 minutes) 
to long intervals (e.g. 1 or 2 weeks). In our study we chose to compare 24 hours 
versus 1 week. In addition, the final memory test was not administered immediately 
after misinformation presentation but with another delay of one day. However, 
previous research suggests that misinformation effects are the strongest with a 
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substantial amount of time between the original event and misinformation phase and 
a final memory test that is applied soon after (i.e. minutes after the presentation of 
misinformation; Belli et al., 1992; Loftus et al., 1978). It is likely that the additional 
delay included in this study somewhat diluted our effects. This design was chosen 
because revisiting your Facebook page and the subsequent brand choice situations 
(e.g. choosing a brand in supermarket shelves) is unlikely to happen immediately. 
Anyway, our results provided some reason to assume that a delay of exposure to 
retroactively inserted brands in photos could strengthen consumer’s belief that such 
brands were originally experienced. 
Effects of visual fixation on the brands. 
 Participants’ eye-movements on the brands were recorded in order to see 
whether fixation on the brands would shed some light on the role of fixation/encoding 
processes in the misinformation effect. In regard to this a more general analysis 
showed that fixation time on the brands did not differ between the first and the 
second exposure to the pictures and that both variables were positively correlated. 
This means that the longer a participant looked at the brands during the first exposure 
to the pictures, the longer she or he fixated the brands during the misinformation 
phase. In turn this could suggest that some participants were aware of the brand 
placements in the pictures and others were not. 
 When looking at the correlation analysis, data revealed some evidence that the 
amount of time participants fixated the brands was associated with the hits and more 
false alarms that were later created. However, data also suggested that these effects 
differed depending on the misinformation delay condition. More specifically, more 
visual attention to the brands during both exposures to the photos seemed to be 
associated with more remember responses, as well as more robust true memories for 
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the originally seen brands. However, whereas visual attention to brands seemed to 
rather reduce misinformation false alarms in the short delay condition, over the long 
delay, visual fixation, particular during the second exposure to the photos, seemed to 
increase false alarms for the misleading items. Although data were based on a small 
sample size only, our results show that eye-tracking technology and visual fixation 
data might help to better understand encoding specific processes involved in the 
misinformation effect. Future studies should consider using a larger sample size to 
run more comprehensive analysis on bigger datasets. For example, due to time delay 
differences in participants’ behaviour our small sample size in each condition was not 
suitable to compute more comprehensive regression modelling. 
 Concerning improving the study materials for future studies, item position 
analysis showed that some placement positions were fixated longer than others but all 
in all only a few outliers were detected in the data (these data were not reported in the 
results section). On the lower end it was the computer brands, which were quite small 
and non-prominently placed, that were fixated the shortest. Website comparison 
brands on the other hand, which contributed strongly to the meaning of the scene and 
which might have presented rather unusual placements, were fixated the longest. A 
future study should consider excluding these placements from study materials.  
 DRM and misinformation effect measures. The aim of the DRM sub-
experiment was to see whether DRM false memories were somehow related to false 
memories created in the misinformation paradigm. Rather than only focussing on 
potential correlations between false alarms for the misleading items and false alarms 
for the critical lures, we were specifically interested in whether spontaneously created 
false memories in both paradigms were associated. To investigate this, participants 
completed a DRM task that was, similar to the misinformation task, an incidental 
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memory task. Although both false memory paradigms obtained a robust false 
memory effect, none of the variables recorded in our studies were significantly 
correlated. Consistent with previous research (e.g. Ost et al., 2013), no correlations 
between false alarms for the misleading items and any of the DRM effect measures 
were found. Hence, our findings are in line with studies supporting the notion that 
false alarms for the critical lures in the DRM paradigm and false alarms for the 
misleading items in the misinformation paradigm are different in nature. Considering 
that one memory error is internally generated (DRM false alarms) and the other based 
on external suggestion (misinformation false alarms), the memory errors created in 
the different paradigms may indeed rely on different underlying mechanisms (Ost et 
al., 2013; but see Otgaar et al., 2016).  
 Also in regard to spontaneously generated false memories created in both 
paradigms, no significant relation was found. Data did not provide any indication that 
those participants who were prone to falsely accept a non-presented foil brand in the 
misinformation paradigm were prone to create lure or foil false alarms in the DRM 
paradigm as well. In fact, if at all a negative relationship was found between the 
variables. These findings seem to be consistent with the study of Zhu et al. (2013) 
who did not find an association between spontaneously generated errors in both 
paradigms. However, rather than concluding that spontaneously created false 
memories across paradigms do not stand in any relationship either, it is possible that 
these null-effects may lay in methodological differences between the tasks. For 
example, on a more general level it is an entire associated word list that serves to 
trigger memory errors for the lures and foils in the DRM paradigm, whereas only one 
or two categorically related items lay the basis for the foil false alarms in the 
misinformation paradigm. Related to this, a study by Otgaar et al. (2016) did find 
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significant and positive relationships between DRM and misinformation effect 
measures by increasing the amount of associated items during the original event of a 
misinformation experiment. Hence, a next study should increase the amount of 
categorically related brands in the photos to see whether these results can be 
replicated in the brand paradigm used here. In addition, the characteristics of the 
study stimuli might be responsible for the null effect. For instance, whereas brands 
were used as study stimuli in the misinformation paradigm, participants dealt with 
presented and non-presented words in the DRM task. Future research should consider 
using a DRM brand learning task instead (Sherman, 2012; Sherman & Moran, 2011). 
Last, the small sample size used in this study should be noted of course and in order 
to reveal more conclusive results it should be increased in a future study. 
Implications of Experiment 1 and 3 
 In relation to the implications for consumers and advertising, Experiment 3 
and 1 support previous findings that post-experience advertising can influence 
consumer memory for previously seen brands (e.g. Braun & Loftus, 1998). The 
findings suggest that memory for an originally seen brand placement can be altered 
by using manipulated photographs. For advertisers, social network platforms provide 
the ideal and unique platform to expose consumers to misleading brand information. 
Billions of new pictures are uploaded on social network platforms each day – pictures 
that are liked, shared and re-shared by many other members of the social network. 
Many of these pictures show social situations at parties or group pictures that 
frequently contain unintentional brand insertions such as beer brands, soft drink 
brands, or crisp brands. Even without misleading measures, our data suggest that 
these brand occurrences might have an influence on consumer memory. In order to 
increase recognition and awareness of their brands, advertisers could make use of this 
  
151 
knowledge and strategically replace brands and products in pictures to their 
advantage.  
 It appears, then, that retroactive brand replacement could be a powerful tool. 
In Experiments 1 and 3, participants experienced the brands by seeing impersonalized 
photographs and brands that were not witnessed in a real-life setting. This approach 
was chosen in in a first step because photos might be watched and re-watched on 
social network platforms. Even if participants were not shown themselves in those 
photos, results of these proof of concept studies provide insights regarding how 
brands in photographs are remembered and how retroactive brands replacements in 
the photographs can influence such an original brand memory. However, in a next 
step it would be interesting to examine how these effects will develop under more 
real-life circumstances. Research has shown that participants can be misled on 
personally witnessed events and actions (e.g. Holmes & Weaver, 2010; Nash et al., 
2009). How will retroactively inserted brand photographs influence the original 
experience of a brand? 
Conclusion  
 To conclude, twice we have shown that retroactive brand replacements in 
photographs could mislead on brands that were originally experienced in 
photographs. Although Experiments 1 and 3 both revealed a reliable misinformation 
effect, more prominent brand placements as well as normed brands at study and test 
somewhat led to stronger effects in Experiment 3. Results showed that the timing of 
misinformation presentation might play an important role when participants are 
exposed to retroactive brand replacements. The greater the delay, the more the 
original event memory is forgotten, and the stronger the participants’ belief that 
misleading brands were experienced during an original event. We found evidence to 
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suggest that visual fixation on the brands as measured using eye-tracking technology 
might be a useful tool to better understand the encoding processes involved in the 
misinformation effect. Some evidence was found that longer fixations on the brands 
led to more true memories for originally seen brands but it also led to more false 
memories for the misleading brands. On the other hand, these results provide some 
reason to assume that longer fixation of study brands might reduce false alarms for 
non-presented foil items. However, the present data suggest that it might not only be 
attention to the brands that influences memory performance in the misinformation 
paradigm, but that this factor may interact with delay of misinformation presentation. 
More research using larger sample sizes is needed in order to further explore these 
effects. Last, our study did not reveal any indication that spontaneously created false 
memories between DRM and misinformation tasks are in any way related. However, 
future research needs to clarify whether the effect is indeed absent or whether it was 
methodological differences that were responsible.  
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Experiment 4 – Memory distortions for self-experienced brands caused by 
misleading SenseCam pictures 
 Experiments 1 and 3 revealed a reliable brand misinformation effect caused 
by retroactively changed brands in photographs. In both experiments, participants 
were exposed to the same photographs including brand placements on two occasions. 
When participants saw the pictures the second time, some product brands were 
replaced by a competitor brand. Results revealed that in some cases, participants 
indeed falsely attributed the competitor brands (misinformation) to the original photo 
exposure. Hence, both studies provided the first support for the effectiveness of 
retroactively replaced brands in photos on consumer memory.  
However, in these studies, the original brand experience was induced by 
exposing participants to photographs of strangers and brands were not personally 
experienced. One question that naturally arises then is how effects will develop under 
more personalized circumstances? We have already discussed research showing that 
manipulated pictorial stimuli can mislead on self-experienced events (e.g. Nash & 
Wade, 2008; Nash et al., 2009). As well, we have seen that contradicting brand 
information can mislead on previously self-experienced brands. For example, the 
study of Holmes and Weaver (2010) used a modified version of the misinformation 
paradigm to mislead on brand experiences (compiling a brand care package) via 
misleading narratives (misleading text on website) and were able to reveal a reliable 
misinformation effect. However, to our knowledge research has not yet used 
manipulated photographs to mislead on personally experienced brand information.  
 Another question that is important concerning the creation false memories is 
that of individual differences. For instance, research has shown that cognitive traits 
such as intelligence, working memory, and perception can be linked to performance 
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in the misinformation paradigm (see Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Li, Moyzis, et al., 
2010; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, He, Li, Xue, et al., 2010 for a review of such factors). 
One variable associated with several of these traits is a participant’s age, because it is 
well known that some cognitive abilities decline with increasing age. On a practical 
level this question is interesting because older customers represent an attractive 
market for businesses. For example, the number of people aged 65 and over has 
increased by 47% since mid-1974 and now makes up 18% of the total UK population 
(“Ageing of the UK population,” 2015). These age trends are expected to continue so 
that by 2020 people aged 65 or over will increase by another 12% (“Political 
challenges relating to an aging population: Key issues for the 2015 Parliament,” 
2015). In addition, more and more older adults use the Internet including social 
networking sites. According to a report by Pew Research Center (2015), 35% of 
all American adults aged 65 and older use social media, which is more than three 
times as much as reported in 2010 (“Social Media Usage: 2005-2015,” 2015). Hence, 
it can be assumed that older adults will increasingly become targets of online and 
social media advertising. Returning to retroactive product placement, the question 
arises how such deceptive advertising measures would affect the older adults?  
 Research has examined whether a participant’s age influences suggestibility 
to misinformation and findings generally suggest that older adults are more 
vulnerable to misleading information than younger adults (Karpel, Hoyer, & Toglia, 
2001; Loftus et al., 1992). For example, Cohen and Faulkner (1989) exposed 32 
younger (age range:  25 – 45) and 32 older (age range: 62 - 82) adults to a video clip 
depicting a crime scene and subsequently to a narrative about the video. Whereas the 
narrative described the video accurately for half of the participants in each age group, 
for the other half two original event details were contradicted in the narrative (e.g. 
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that a man carried a letter instead of a book when he was kidnapped). In a subsequent 
multiple choice-task, misled older and younger participants falsely accepted the 
misleading alternative more often compared to their non-misled counterparts. In 
addition, the misled older participants produced more false alarms for the misleading 
alternatives compared to the misled younger adults. The study of Schacter et al. 
(1997) showed a similar effect by using photographs to mislead participants on an 
originally seen video. When participants were shown photographs of scenes that had 
not appeared in the video, older but not younger adults falsely attributed the 
misinformation to the original event. In addition, accuracy for original event 
information of younger individuals exceeded that of the older participants.  
A commonly used explanation for these findings is that older adults have 
more problems in monitoring the sources of their memories due to age-related 
declines in some of their cognitive abilities (Schacter et al., 1997). However, studies 
exist that did not find age differences in the suggestibility to misinformation. For 
example, by using a source-monitoring task as opposed to simple recognition testing, 
studies have found that younger and older adults were equally vulnerable to 
misleading postevent information (e.g. Bulevich & Thomas, 2012; Dodson & 
Krueger, 2006, but see Mitchell, Johnson, & Mather, 2003). These studies suggest 
that source-monitoring problems of older adults may be improved by explicit source 
memory instructions (Bulevich & Thomas, 2012). So how will these age-related 
differences develop in an advertising context, more specifically, when participants are 
misled on self-experienced brand information?  
 Experiment 4 was carried out to address these gaps. It was conducted as part 
of a collaboration on a study of autobiographical memory in healthy ageing (referred 
to as the ‘main study’ henceforth). In that main study, younger and older participants 
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took part in several ‘group activities’, during which SenseCams were worn (sensor-
augmented wearable still cameras; Hodges et al., 2006). After two weeks, participants 
returned for the main study and memories for the activities experienced two weeks 
earlier were recorded. In this main study, SenseCam photographs were used to aid 
participants’ memories. Experiment 4, a misinformation study, was integrated into 
the main study such that participants were exposed to some brands on Day 1. 
Allegedly, these brands had to be evaluated by participants as part of a separate 
University survey. On Day 14, participants were then exposed to staged SenseCam 
pictures showing the brand arrangement seen on Day 1 as well as a staged survey 
result chart that both included misleading brand information. After 80 minutes, in 
which respondents continued with the normal autobiographical memory study, a 
recognition test followed by a source-monitoring task were used to examine the 
uptake of misinformation.  
 Hence, Experiment 4 differed from the preceding experiments of this project 
in that the brand stimuli were not seen as brand replacements in photographs, but that 
they were personally experienced during the original event. In addition, contrary to 
our previous experiments, the brands were consciously experienced during both event 
phases and were not presented as background information, a difference likely to 
influence test performance due to encoding specificity (Campbell, Edwards, Horswill, 
& Helman, 2007). Nevertheless, research has found reliable misinformation effects 
under comparable circumstances (e.g. Holmes & Weaver, 2010) and in line with such 
findings we predicted that participants would create source-confusions and falsely 
attribute the contradicting brand information to the original brand rating event. 
Another difference of Experiment 4 is that younger as well as older participants took 
part in this study and hence individual differences in false memory production were 
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examined. In line with previous research we predicted that older participants would 
not only falsely attribute more misleading details to the original event but also that 
the accuracy for original event information of younger participants would exceed that 
of the older individuals. Whereas this effect might be present in participants’ 
recognition test answers, these differences might disappear in the source-monitoring 
data. 
Method and Measurement 
Participants  
 Participants were 28 younger adults between 18 and 30 years old (mean age = 
22.89 years, SD = 3.80; 14% male) and 32 healthy older individuals over 65 years old 
(mean age = 71.31 years, SD = 9.55; 34% male). The two age groups were equivalent 
concerning their Geriatric Depression Scale test scores (M = 7.33, SD = 3.83 for 
younger adults; M = 7.22, SD = 6.46 for older adults; Yesavage & Brink, 1983) and 
their formal years in education (M = 15.93 years, SD = 2.62 for younger adults; M = 
14.81 years, SD = 3.65 for older adults). However older participants scored higher on 
a modified version of the WAIS (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test scores that 
were estimated from National Adult Reading Test scores; M = 107.50 years, SD = 
11.09 for younger adults; M = 117.95, SD = 28.30 for older adults), t(56) = 4.01, p < 
.001, d = 1.08; see section sample characteristics for further discussion). Participants 
completed the study in 10 groups of five to seven people. 
Stimuli 
 Brand selection. Study stimuli were selected based on the brand recall data 
collected in Experiment 2 and were the two most popular brands of eight brand 
categories. To be in line with our cover story (evaluation of brands for a new 
University shop), all brands fell under the food category. Here, we tried to make sure 
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that brand categories chosen were not gender and age biased, respectively that those 
brands were anticipated to be familiar to male, female, younger as well as older 
participants.
17
 In the end, study stimuli comprised a crisp brand (Walkers, Doritos), a 
chocolate brand (Cadbury, Galaxy), a water brand (Evian, Volvic), an orange juice 
brand (Tropicana, Innocent), a fizzy soft drink brand (Coca Cola, Pepsi), a coffee 
shop brand (Starbucks, Costa), a beer brand (Heineken, Carling), as well as a cider 
brand (Strongbow, Bulmers). To increase the ecological validity of our study, each of 
the brands was represented by a typical product of its category (e.g. a 100g Cadbury 
and Galaxy milk chocolate bar in the chocolate category). To select foil items for the 
memory test, the semantic differential data of Experiment 2 were used. Here, two 
brands per category with a total evaluation score of approximately 4-5 were chosen as 
test items (in comparison, original and misleading items had a total evaluation score 
of approximately 1- 2.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Study design 
                                                        
17 Please note that the brand categories and single brand were not normed for the 
older adults. The collaborative nature of the experiment did not allow a preceding 
norming study for this age group. This matter will be addressed and examined in the 
results as well as the discussion section of this report.   
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 Study stimuli. Figure 7 shows the design of this study. During the original 
event (brand rating task), participants were exposed to eight different brands (i.e. to 
one out of two categorically related study items for each of the eight categories; e.g. a 
Starbucks cup). The product brands were presented on a table that was placed outside 
of the main experiment area. The brands were clearly separated from each other and 
numbered from one to eight. For the brand evaluation task, short questionnaires were 
provided that listed eight 7-point Likert scales that were also numbered from one to 
eight. Numbers rather than the brand names were provided on the form in order to 
force participants to look at the products on the table when judgments were made. 
Participants were later misled on four out of eight originally rated brands by 
replacing these items with the remaining competitor brand of the category (misled 
item condition; e.g. the Starbucks cup was replaced by a Costa Coffee cup). For the 
remaining four brands that were originally rated, consistent information was provided 
(i.e. participants were not misled on these items – control item condition; e.g. the 
crisp brand Doritos remained the same). To expose participants to the brands again 
and to induce misinformation, two different media were used. First, participants were 
shown three manipulated SenseCam pictures of the brand arrangements (one full-
length shot of the table and two close-up shots of each side of the table). The second 
medium used was a staged survey results chart of the brand-liking data. The medium 
was added to the misinformation phase in order to provide a reasonable storyline 
about why participants were exposed again to the brands.  
Because participants took part in the study in groups, five to seven 
participants were always exposed to the same combination of originally rated and 
misleading brands. However, assignment of the two study brands (e.g. Pepsi and 
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Coca Cola) to item type (original item and misleading item) and to condition (misled 
and control) was counterbalanced across the 10 groups. To further reduce the risk of 
item effects, the two foils chosen per category always appeared in the final memory 
test in a randomized order. For each of the 10 groups, an individual memory test was 
created. And finally, the order in which brands appeared on the table was 
counterbalanced across the groups.  
Concerning the photos used to induce misinformation it should be noted that 
rather than manipulating pictures retroactively by means of photo editing software, 
brands on the table were simply replaced by a competitor brand and the new 
arrangements were captured with a conventional camera after participants had left. 
These pictures were later edited to look like the outcome of a SenseCam photograph. 
This procedure allowed equally good quality shots for all 10 participant groups, 
which could not have been assured by using participants’ SenseCam pictures. In 
addition, results of the brand liking bar chart were manipulated in such a way that all 
brands scored more or less equally on how much they were liked. This was done to 
avoid differences in recognition depending on higher and lower scores.  
Procedure   
 Original event. After completion of the main study tasks on Day 1, 
participants met for a final gathering in the refreshment and waiting area, with most 
participants still wearing their SenseCams. Here, participants were exposed to the 
brands that were positioned on a table. Brands were laid out just prior to the final 
gathering in order to avoid different exposure times to the brands. Participants were 
told that a sponsor (the University) supports the experiment in return for a short and 
anonymous survey on these eight brands – ones that were considered to be included 
into the product range of a new University shop. Participants were asked to simply 
  
162 
indicate for each of the eight brands how much they liked these brands by using 7-
point scales.
18
 With this procedure we ensured that all participants encoded the 
original brand information.  
 Misinformation phase. On Day 14 participants returned to the lab for the 
recall and review session of the main experiment. However, before participants 
started the tasks concerning the main experiment, they were shown the staged 
SenseCam pictures as well as the manipulated survey chart that depicting the 
misleading information. Participants were told that the University would like to 
inform participants about the outcome of the brand liking task due to ethical reasons 
of appropriate research conduct. To remind participants of the brands, first the three 
SenseCam pictures were shown to participants (for 12 seconds each). Participants 
were (falsely) told that the photos were taken by different SenseCams of their group 
colleagues two weeks earlier. This approach was chosen because it was not plausible 
to tell participants that the pictures were taken by their own SenseCam. Participants 
rated the brands in groups and might have become suspicious to learn that their own 
camera had produced such clear shots of the brand arrangement. Following the photo 
exposure, the bar chart with the brand liking was shown to participants for 14 
seconds. Participants were not warned about the potential discrepancies between 
brands rated two weeks earlier and brands seen in the manipulated media. After, 
participants continued with the main experiment. 
 Final memory test. The final memory tests were carried out after 
participants completed the main experiment, which took on average 80 minutes.  
First, participants completed a yes/no recognition test for the original event. Here, 
                                                        
18 Please note that these brand evaluation data were not used for analysis. The reason 
was the collaborative nature of the study that required the task to be quick, simple, 
and anonymous.  
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participants were explicitly told that the test strictly referred to the brand-rating task 
that was completed two weeks earlier. Brand logos appeared on the screen one at a 
time and participants were instructed to press the ‘yes’ key for brands that were rated 
and seen on the table two weeks earlier and to press the ‘no’ key if they were not. If 
‘yes’ was clicked were participants asked to make a Remember, Know, or Guess 
judgment. Participants were asked to press ‘Remember’ when they were able to 
consciously recollect and mentally relive the appearance of that item on the table two 
weeks earlier. They were asked to consider whether they could visually re-experience 
the item as well as its position on the table. To press ‘Know’ when the judgment was 
based on a feeling of familiarity, described as a sensation that the item was on the 
table but could not be visually re-experienced it on the table. Finally, to press ‘Guess’ 
for items when they could neither recollect nor recognize it on the basis of 
familiarity, but which they could not definitely reject. Following this, a final source-
monitoring task was carried out. Five options were provided for each of the items 
endorsed in the recognition test: (1) seen on the table two weeks earlier only, (2) seen 
in the pictures and the graph at the beginning of this session today only, (3) seen 
during both phases (on the table two weeks ago and in the pictures and the graph 
today), (4) brands conflicted with each other across both events, (5) just guessed (see 
Zhu et al., 2012).  
Measurement and analysis 
The 20 items of the recognition test consisted of eight of the original items (4 
on which participants were misled on and 4 on which participants were not misled 
on), 4 misleading items that contradicted their original counterparts, and 8 non-
presented foil items (including 4 foil items categorically related to the misled and 4 
foil items related to the control item condition). Robust memory performance in the 
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source-monitoring task was coded in line with previous research (e.g. Okado & Stark, 
2005; but see notes of Table 9). 
The main analysis was similar to Experiments 1 and 3. We analysed the 
uptake of misinformation by first comparing participants’ memory performance (yes-
responses to items) within the misled item condition and then across conditions 
(misled item vs. control). These main analyses were carried out separately for 
participants’ overall recognition scores, their Remember, Know, and Guess 
responses, as well as for participants’ robust memory performance of the source-
monitoring task. Again, we set an overall standard alpha level equal to .05 for our 
main analysis (see also Frost et al., 2002). Apart from that, further sub-analyses such 
as a by-item analysis complemented the results section. 
Results 
Sample characteristics 
 Because our dependent variables (yes-responses to the item types) were hits 
and false alarm scores out of four questions only, data were not normally distributed 
and often strongly skewed (e.g. foil items that were hardly ever robustly endorsed). 
Despite this, given the analyses used in the literature for similar datasets (e.g. Frost, 
2000; Frost et al., 2002), we used parametric test statistics for the analysis of our data. 
However, note that all analyses were rerun and effects and null-effects confirmed 
using non-parametric tests (however these tests are not reported here).  
As mentioned earlier, older participants of our sample scored higher on the 
WAIS compared to younger participants. Entering WAIS scores as a covariate did 
not influence the effect of age group on the dependent variables of this study. Hence 
the variable was not included in the analyses reported here. Also, please note that 
inspection of the data showed participant’s gender had no effect on the dependent 
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variables of this study and that the variables was not further considered in the 
analysis. 
Recognition test data  
 Raw score analysis. Table 8 shows the proportion of yes-responses to the 
three item types (original details, misleading details, and foil details) correctly and 
incorrectly accepted as being part of the original event as a function of Condition and 
Age group. 
 
Table 8. Overall Mean proportion (SE) of yes-responses with proportion of 
Remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G) responses for each item type as a function 
of Condition and Age group. 
Condition
/Response 
type
Total Younger Older Total Younger Older Total Younger Older
Misled item
Total .58 (.041) .61 (.058) .56 (.057) .61 (.036) .63 (.054) .59 (.050) .07 (.021) .05 (.027) .08 (.031)
R .34 (.036) .29 (.050) .38 (.050) .35 (.039) .35 (.059) .35 (.052) .01 (.006) .00 (.000) .02 (.012)
K .17 (.026) .22 (.041) .13 (.032) .18 (.026) .19 (.042) .18 (.034) .04 (.012) .05 (.018) .03 (.015)
G .07 (.019) .09 (.032) .05 (.022) .07 (.018) .09 (.032) .05 (.019) .02 (.010) .00 (.000) .03 (.019)
Control item
Total .89 (.021) .90 (.027) .88 (.032) .06 (.015) .04 (.018) .08 (.024)
R .68 (.034) .65 (.049) .70 (.047) .02 (.011) .01 (.010) .03 (.019)
K .18 (.026) .21 (.040) .16 (.033) .03 (.010) .02 (.015) .03 (.015)
G .03 (.010) .04 (.017) .02 (.013) .02 (.011) .01 (.012) .02 (.018)
n.a.
Item type/Age group
Original items 
(hits)
Misleading items
(false alarms)
Foil items 
(false alarms)
 
 We compared participants’ overall yes-responses to the three item types in the 
misled item condition to examine whether participants could distinguish between 
originally seen items and originally non-seen items (misleading details and the foils). 
In addition, we examined whether Age group had any effect on participants’ yes-
responses in the misled item condition. We ran a 3(Item type: original item vs. 
misleading item vs. foil item) x2(Age group: younger vs. older adults) mixed factor 
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ANOVA. Analysis yielded a significant main effect of Item type, F(2, 116) = 76.54, 
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .57. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that there was no 
difference between yes-responses to original items (M = .58, SD = .31) and the 
misleading items (M = .61, SD = .28) but that both were more often accepted than the 
foil items (M = .07, SD = .16; both ps < .001). There was no main effect of Age 
group, and no significant Item type X Age group interaction (Fs < 1). 
For further comparison we examined participants’ yes-responses to the item 
types across condition and conducted 2(Condition: misled vs. control) x2(Age group: 
younger vs. older adults) mixed factor ANOVAs separately for the original and the 
foil details. For original items, there was a significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 
58) = 48.14, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .45, showing that participants correctly accepted more 
original details in the control (M = .89, SD = .16) relative to the misled item 
condition. There was no main effect of Age group and no interaction between Item 
type X Age group (Fs < 1). Last, comparing foil items within and across condition 
revealed no significant main effect of Condition, Age group, and no interaction 
between the two variables (all Fs < 1).  
When combined, the endorsement rates for original items as well as 
misleading items exceeded a total of 100%. This suggests that in some cases, 
participants’ responded yes to both brands of a category.19  To examine the 
relationship between hits and false alarms to these items types, we computed Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficients. A negative correlation between original 
items in the misled and the misleading items was found, r = -.28, n = 60, p = .028, 
suggesting that the more misleading items were falsely accepted, the less original 
                                                        
19 Please note that this finding is not of concern because it was for this reason, among 
others, that a source-monitoring task followed the recognition test. Here, participants 
had the chance to correct the sources of their recognition test answers.  
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items were correctly endorsed. No associations between original items and the foils 
and between misleading items and the foils were found.  
Hence, the overall recognition data suggest that participants were misled by 
the retroactively changed brands in the photographs. When participants were misled 
on an item, they did not have any ability to discriminate between originally seen 
items and the misleading items. Further comparisons across conditions showed that 
participants produced more correct responses for the original details in the control 
relative to the misled item condition, suggesting the presence of a memory 
impairment effect. The factor age group did not lead to any statistical differences in 
the data.
20
 Numerically, small trends of more hits and less foil false alarms for the 
younger compared to older participants can be seen in the data. For misleading items, 
if at all, the amount of false alarms was numerically higher for the younger 
participants.  
Remember, Know, and Guess analysis. Table 8 shows the proportion of 
Remember, Know, and Guess responses for each item type as a function of Condition 
and Age group. We first ran the same ANOVAs as above for participants’ remember 
responses only. Analysis yielded a significant main effect of Item type, F(2, 116) = 
38.28, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .40, but no main effect of Age group, F(1, 58) = 1.08, p = .30, 
or an interaction between the two variables (F < 1). Pairwise comparisons of the 
significant main effect showed no differences between remember responses to 
original (M = .34, SD = .28) and the misleading items (M = .35, SD = .30) but both 
                                                        
20 Please note that we additionally ran all analyses reported in the results section with 
a sample that only included participants less than 25 years of age (N = 18) and over 
70 years of age (N = 18). This was done to see whether ‘Young-younger’ and ‘Old-
Older’ participants would differ concerning their memory performance. However, 
none of the comparisons led to any significant differences between the dependent 
variables of this study. Also, no effects were found when older participants who 
obtained a score greater than one standard deviation above the mean reported for the 
WAIS were excluded from the analysis.  
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were more often remembered than the foil items (M = .01, SD = .05; both ps < .001). 
Looking at remember responses for original items across condition, analysis revealed 
a main effect of Condition, F(1, 58) = 55.06, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .49. More original items 
were remembered in the control (M = .68, SD = .26) relative to the misled item 
condition.  
For participants’ know responses in the misled item condition, there was 
significant main effect of Item type as well, F(2, 116) = 14.28, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .20. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed no significant difference between original items (M = 
.17, SD = .20) and misleading items (M = .18, SD = .21), but know responses to both 
item types were higher compared to the foil items (M = .04, SD = .09, both ps < 
.001). There was no main effect of Age group, F(1, 58) = 2.03, p = .16, or an 
interaction between the variables, F(2, 116) = 1.35, p = .26. Analysis of original items 
across condition showed no main effect of Item type (F < 1), but a significant main 
effect of Age group, F(1, 58) = 4.53, p = .038,  ηp
2
 = .07, with more know responses 
to original items in the younger (M = .22, SD = .21) compared to the older age group 
(M = .14, SD = .18). There was no Item type X Age group interaction (F < 1).  
Last, there was a main effect of Item type for guess responses in the misled 
item condition as well, F(2, 116) = 4.74, p = .010,  ηp
2
 = .08, with more guess 
responses to original (M = .22, SD = .21) and misleading items (M = .22, SD = .21) 
compared to foil items (M = .04, SD = .09, ps = .031 and .011). There was no main 
effect of Age group, (F < 1) and no significant Item type X Time of misinformation 
interaction, F(2, 116) = 1.62, p = .203. Across condition no main effects or 
interactions were found for guess responses to the items (all Fs < 1). 
To summarize, the trends revealed in participants’ overall recognition scores 
were also revealed when looking separately at participants’ remember, know, and 
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partially also their guess judgments to the item types. Statistically, participant’s age 
had little to no effect on memory in this task. However, numerically, the data 
suggested a trend concerning participants’ yes-responses to the original items. 
Whereas participants’ overall raw recognition scores (see earlier) suggested a trend of 
more hits for younger compared to older participants, participants’ remember 
responses showed a trend that was reversed. Here, more original items were 
remembered by older compared to younger participants. Considering that the younger 
participants seemed to respond overall more with know judgments to original items, 
it seems to have been ‘knowing’ that led to the initial lead in original item hits for the 
younger participants. 
To examine Remember, Know, and Guess response patterns within the 
different Item types, we ran 3(Response type: remember vs. know. vs. guess) x 2(Age 
group: younger vs. older adults) mixed factor ANOVAs separately for original items, 
misleading items, and foil items. To summarize and emphasize results of interest: 
Analysis revealed significant main effects of Response type for original items in 
misled, F(2, 116) = 20.98, p < .001 ηp
2
 = .27, and control item condition, F(2, 116) = 
126.43, p < .001 ηp
2
 = .67, as well as for the misleading items, F(2, 116) = 18.08, p < 
.001 ηp
2
 = .24. No effect of Response type was found for the foils in either of the 
conditions (Fs < 1). Pairwise comparisons for original and misleading items showed 
that all items types were more often remembered than known, and also more often 
known than guessed (all ps < .015). There was no main effect of Age group and no 
Response type X Age Group interaction for any of the item types (Fs < 1). Hence, 
participants’ yes-responses to original items and the misleading items were overall 
more often remembered, than known, and also more often known than guessed. For 
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the foils, no significant difference between response types was found. If at all, these 
items were more often known than remembered. 
Source-monitoring test data  
 Table 9 shows the proportion of overall robust memory performance as well 
as individual responses to all three item types in the source-monitoring task as a 
function of Condition and Age group. We conducted the same main analysis as above 
on participants’ robust memory performance. In the misled item condition, analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of Item type, F(2, 114) = 32.04, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .36. 
Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that more misleading items were falsely 
attributed to the original event (M = .38, SD = .27) than original items were correctly 
attributed to the original event phase (M = .24, SD = .28; p = .012). In addition, both 
item types were more often attributed to the original event than the foil items (M = 
.02, SD = .06, ps < .001). There was no main effect of Age group and no interaction 
between Item type and Age group (Fs < 1).  
 Comparison of original items across condition (misled vs. control) revealed a 
main effect of Item Type as well, F(1, 57) = 39.95, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .41, with more 
correct source attributions in the control (M = .59, SD = .34) relative to the misled 
item condition. There was no main effect of Age group, F(1, 57) = 2.81, p = .10, and 
no significant interaction between Item type and Age group (F < 1). Hence, analysis 
of participants’ robust memories mirrored the trends found in participants’ overall 
memory performance and remember responses. The factor Age group did not lead to 
significant differences in participants’ robust endorsement rates. 
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Table 9. Mean proportion (SE) of robust memory performance (source attributions) 
total and broken down by response for each item type as a function of Condition and 
Age group. 
 
Notes. Item types were coded robust when one of the following options were ticked 
by a participant: Original item: misled (1) or (4), control (3); Misleading item: (1) or 
(3), Foil item: misled and control (1) or (3). Robust memory performance in bold 
font.  
 
 When analysing participants’ response patterns within the source-monitoring 
task individually for the misleading items and the original items in the misled item 
condition, significant main effects of Response type were found, F(4,228) = 11.51, p 
< .001,  ηp
2
 = .17; F(4,228) = 18.73, p < .001,  ηp
2
 = .25, but no interaction effects 
between Response type and Age Group for both items types. Hence, the individual 
responses made when monitoring the sources of the memories seemed not to be 
significantly affected by participant’s age. However, looking at Table 9, it can be 
seen that the younger adults chose the ‘saw 2 only’ for misleading items option more 
often than older participants. Because an analysis including all source-monitoring 
options might not have been sensitive enough to reveal this effect we ran an 
Condition/
Response 
type
Total Younger Older Total Younger Older Total Younger Older
Misled item
 Robust .24 (.038) .26 (.056) .24 (.048) .38 (.035) .37 (.049) .40 (.052) .02 (.008) .02 (.012) .02 (.011)
(1) Saw 1 only .20 (.037) .22 (.057) .19 (.048) .08 (.021) .06 (.021) .09 (.036) .01 (.006) .01 (.010) .01 (.008)
(2) Saw 2 only .02 (.009) .03 (.015) .02 (.011) .08 (.021) .14 (.037) .03 (.015) .01 (.009) .01 (.010) .02 (.016)
(3) Both .22 (.036) .20 (.047) .25 (.053) .31 (.037) .30 (.052) .31 (.054) .01 (.006) .01 (.010) .01 (.008)
(4) Conflicted .04 (.014) .04 (.017) .05 (.021) .03 (.011) .03 (.015) .03 (.015) .01 (.007) .01 (.010) .02 (.011)
(5) Guessed .09 (.021) .13 (.033) .06 (.025) .11 (.018) .09 (.026) .12 (.026) .02 (.009) .01 (.010) .03 (.015)
Control item
 Robust .59 (.044) .66 (.060) .52 (.062) .01 (.007) .01 (.010) .02 (.012)
(1) Saw 1 only .18 (.037) .13 (.049) .23 (.053) .01 (.004) .01 (.010) .00 (.000)
(2) Saw 2 only .05 (.014) .05 (.020) .04 (.020) .01 (.006) .01 (.010) .01 (.008)
(3) Both .59 (.044) .66 (.061) .52 (.062) .01 (.006) .00 (.000) .02 (.012)
(4) Conflicted .02 (.008) .04 (.017) .00 (.000) .01 (.007) .01 (.010) .02 (.012)
(5) Guessed .05 (.015) .03 (.015) .07 (.024) .04 (.016) .03 (.020) .05 (.024)
Item type/Age group
Original items 
(hits)
Misleading items
(false alarms)
Foil items 
(false alarms)
n.a.
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independent t-test with Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .01 (.05/5). Analysis 
showed that younger participants (M = .14, SD = .20) selected the ‘saw 2 only’ option 
significantly more often than the older adults (M = .03, SD = .09), t(57) = 2.84, p = 
.006, d = .71. What this suggests is that older compared to the younger participants 
hardly ever noticed that the misleading items falsely endorsed in the recognition test 
did only appear in the misleading materials. 
 
Results item analysis  
 Last, performance by item was plotted overall as well as separately for 
younger and older adults (see Appendix K for a table showing the average hit and 
false alarm rates for all brands used in this study overall and split by age group). First, 
we computed Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for correct and 
incorrect yes-responses to the items between younger and older adults. This was done 
to see whether younger and older participants behaved similar concerning particular 
items. Only participants’ hits for original items in the misled item condition were 
significantly correlated between younger and older adults. This suggest that the more 
hits for a certain item in that condition was created by one age group, the higher the 
amount endorsed by the other age group as well, r = .65, n = 16, p = .007. Although 
not significant, this trend was also found for foil endorsement in misled, r = .44, n = 
16, p = .086, and control item conditions, r = .52, n = 16, p = .057. However, 
although not significant, negative correlations were found for the original items in the 
control as well as the misleading items, which indicates a different behaviour to 
particular brands between age groups in these conditions. 
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Table 10. Pearson’s r correlations between yes-responses for each item type and 
brand knowledge variables recorded in Experiment 2 as a function of condition and 
age group  
Brand knowledge
variables Ex. 2
Original 
Item
Misleading
 item
Foil 
item
Original 
Item
Foil
item
Potency -.045 -.390 -.163 -.326 -.194
Evaluation -.108 -.399 -.385 -.396 -.010
Activity -.154 -.458 -.290 -.347 -.162
Recall .072 .253 n.a.* .353 n.a.
Potency -.110 -.085 -.444 .178 -.303
Evaluation -.375 -.113 -.398 .151 -.024
Activity -.348 -.045 -.159 .004 -.426
Recall .008 .156 n.a. -.346 n.a.
Misled item
 condition 
Control Item 
condition
Young adults
Older adults
Condition/Item Type/Age Group
 
Notes: N = 16. *Not applicable because no recall data existed for the weakly 
associated foils 
 
To see whether brand familiarity could play a role in different behaviour of 
age groups to the item types, we also ran correlation analyses between our brand 
norming data recorded in Experiment 2 and the hit and false alarm rates for the items 
recorded in this study (see Table 10). None of the correlations were significant. 
However, for younger adults, particularly for misleading items and original items in 
the control item condition, a trend of moderate and negative correlations with the 
brand rating scale variables as well as positive correlations with the recall data were 
found. In addition, false endorsement of foil items seemed to be associated with the 
brand rating variables. Hence, the data suggest a trend of more hits as well as more 
false alarms for items that were more often recalled and that were rated more well 
known, better, and as more frequently used in Experiment 2. However, whereas for 
the older adults this trend was found for original items in the misled item condition as 
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well as for foil items as well, correlation coefficients were weaker for the misleading 
items and indicated an opposite trend for original items in the control item condition 
(compared to the younger adults). Hence, considering that brand selection of this 
study was based on brand preferences of younger individuals (because brand norming 
in Experiment 2 was administered by younger adults), it might be that the knowledge 
about a brand led to different behaviour when these items appeared as misleading 
items or control items. For example, it might have been different mechanisms that 
drove these hits as well as false alarms in the older age group.  
Discussion 
 Experiment 4 differed from previous studies in that participants were 
misinformed on event details that were consciously experienced. Misinformation was 
induced by exposing individuals to staged SenseCam pictures as well as to a staged 
survey result chart. The main aim of this study was to see whether the staged 
materials could misinform participants about actual pasts with brands. In line with 
our previous studies, results suggested that participants confused the sources of 
information and falsely attributed the misleading brands from the misinformation 
materials to the original brand-rating event. Again, these effects were not only found 
in participants’ overall recognition scores but also in the more refined remember 
responses. For the majority of the falsely accepted brands, participants indicated 
remembering having rated these brands on the table two weeks earlier. In 
comparison, false memories for the foil items were more often associated with know 
responses (i.e. participants had the sensation that a brand was presented but they did 
not remember specific details about the brand on the table). In general, results 
showed that participants Remember, Know, and Guess response patterns for the 
falsely accepted misleading items matched that of the original items and not that of 
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the foils. Overall, this indicates that foil and misinformation false alarms were not 
only different in nature but that the latter false memory type contained the same 
phenomenological characteristics as participants’ veridical memory retrieval of the 
original items.  
A misinformation effect was also revealed when we gave participants the 
chance to reconsider the sources of their memories. More specifically, even the clear 
instruction to rethink the sources of their memories led participants to falsely attribute 
38% of the misleading brand to the original event exposure. Here, most participants 
falsely believed that the item appeared during both the original event and the 
misinformation phase rather than during the original event only. This suggests that 
participants remembered the misleading details from the misinformation materials.  
 The effects obtained in this study are stronger compared to the findings of 
Experiment 1 and 3. Overall, participants produced higher hit rates with more 
remember responses and also more correct source attributions of originally seen 
brands. Even if participants were not informed in this experiment that their memories 
for the brands would be tested at a later stage, it was likely these encoding specific 
differences led to this outcome. However, stronger original encoding processes 
seemed not to protect participants from creating high false alarms rates for the brands 
that were suggested to them.  
Two factors may be responsible for this effect. First, the time delay between 
the original and misinformation events was two weeks. It can be assumed that this 
delay allowed the original event to be forgotten to such an extent that participants 
simply did not notice the discrepancies between the original event and the 
misinformation phase. Second, we believe that the staged SenseCam pictures were 
perceived as compelling evidence that the depicted misinformation must be true. The 
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fact that we told participants that the pictures were taken by one of their colleague’s 
SenseCams might have increased the credibility that was associated with these 
photographs. Although we cannot determine how far the staged survey results chart 
contributed to this effect, we believe that these two factors, combined with a credible 
cover story, might have led to the adoption of lower source-monitoring criteria when 
judgments were made.  
 Participant age hardly affected the dependent variables of this study. Neither 
did the older participants attribute more misleading items to the original event nor did 
they show any sign of reduced accuracy for original event items. Only one effect was 
found in the source-monitoring task potentially suggesting a different behaviour 
between the age groups. When participants received the chance to reconsider the 
sources of their recognition answers, data suggested that the younger participants 
correctly selected the ‘saw 2 only’ option for the misleading items more often 
compared to the older participants (M = .14 vs. .03). Hence, although the older 
participants might have overall not been more suggestible to misleading information, 
they hardly ever seemed to be aware of the fact that some brands had indeed only 
appeared in the staged materials seen on Day 14.  
 Although there might be some weak indication that older adults were more 
vulnerable to misleading brand information in this study, it is surprising that 
participant’s age did not affect memory performance in the recognition task. In a 
meta-analysis recently conducted by Wylie et al. (2014), results indicated that 31 out 
of 39 independent effect sizes showed a trend in the predicted direction (i.e. older 
adults were more prone to misleading information than younger adults). The 
remaining eight studies either revealed an opposite effect or null results. Because our 
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sample size was comparable with that of other studies (e.g. Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; 
Schacter et al., 1997) why is it that our study produced a null effect?  
Several factors might be responsible for this outcome. First, it might be 
methodological issues that suppressed a potential age effect. Although the meta-
analysis of Wylie et al. (2014) did not find any moderating effects of factors such as 
how the original event was presented (video or slides/ photographs), the type of 
misinformation materials (narrative, recall questions, photographs, audio), or type of 
memory test (free recall, cued recall, or recognition) on age related differences in 
misinformation performance, it is possible that our paradigm was not sensitive 
enough to tap these effects. For example, the ceiling effect for original items in the 
control item condition might be an indication that our task was simply too easy to 
produce differences in memory accuracy. On the other hand, our study manipulation 
might have been so effective that false memory production was pushed to its limits in 
both age groups with no scope for age related differences. Maybe additional test 
items including a warning that misinformation was received would create a test 
sensitive enough to uncover age-related differences in our paradigm. 
Second, it might be that the older participants of our study were high 
functioning individuals with comparable cognitive abilities to the younger adults. The 
fact that the older participants scored overall higher on the WAIS speaks for this 
assumption. Although controlling for IQ in our analysis did not lead to any 
differences in the overall outcome, it might be other cognitive traits such as 
participant’s working memory that were superior in the older sample as well. These 
variables were not recorded in the main study and further research is needed to gain 
clarity. In any event, our results showed that younger and older adults were equally 
vulnerable to be misled on originally experienced brands. 
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 Lastly, Experiment 4 provides further evidence that brand familiarity factors 
may influence how brand stimuli are correctly and incorrectly recognized. 
Particularly for the younger participants, there was a trend that suggested associations 
between brand knowledge variables recorded in Experiment 2 and the hits and false 
alarms recorded in this study. This trend was not found for the older adults, which is 
not surprising considering that brand norming in Experiment 2 was based on brand 
perceptions of younger adults. Although none of these correlations turned out to be 
significant (but data showed a consistent trend), Experiment 4 is the first to show that 
false alarms for the misleading items might have been associated with these brand 
knowledge variables. Data suggested that the younger participants created more false 
alarms for misleading brands when these brands were rated in Experiment 2 as more 
well known, better, and as more frequently used.  
 Although our study provides evidence to suggest that retroactively changed 
brands in photos have the potential to influence one’s past experience with a brand, it 
would be interesting to see how these effects develop under even more personalized 
circumstances. In this study, the original brand liking task on Day 1 was included to 
trigger brand evaluation processes potentially reflecting brand consideration 
behaviour in everyday life consumer choice situations. However, an important next 
step would be to examine whether retroactive brand replacements in photographs 
could also mislead on brands that are chosen based on a participant’s individual brand 
preferences. In this context it would also be important to ask the question whether 
false brand memories will have any consequences for individuals. This is important 
because previous research has shown that false memories can be associated with 
attitudinal and behavioural consequences for falsely remembered experiences. For 
example, Bernstein, Laney, Morris, and Loftus (2005) let participants falsely believe 
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that they got sick in their childhood consuming some food. Later, these subjects 
reported less interest in eating those foods. In this light, appropriate next steps in this 
research would necessitate an examination of the effects of retroactive product 
placement in a more personalized environment and to investigate potential brand 
preference changes and brand buying changes associated with false brand memories. 
Conclusion 
 Results of this study showed that participants could be misled on personally 
experienced brands when they were exposed to retroactively changed brands in 
photographs. This finding extends the brand misinformation effect revealed in 
Experiments 1 and 3 to a context in which brands were originally not only seen in 
photographs, but personally witnessed. The misinformation effect revealed was 
equally strong for younger and older adults and there was hardly any indication that 
the older participants of our study were more suggestible to the misleading 
information. Future research has to clarify whether it was the method used or the 
specific sample characteristics of the older adults (i.e. higher IQ of older adults) that 
was responsible for this null-effect. Because our research has established that brand 
misinformation effects are robust, a next study should examine the potential 
downstream consequences of falsely remembered brand information.  
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Experiment 5 – Using retroactive brand replacements in doctored photographs 
to influence brand preferences 
 Experiment 4 showed that retroactively replaced brands in photographs were 
able to mislead participants on actual pasts with a brand. Hence, the study showed 
that source misattributions of misleading brands in photographs occurred under more 
personalized circumstances. However, brands presented during the original event 
were not tailored to participants’ own preference. Because data from previous 
Experiments suggested an involvement of brand knowledge factors (including brand 
awareness and brand image factors; see Experiment 2) in the creation of true and 
false memories, it remains unclear whether a misleading brand could challenge 
participants’ memories for personally selected and preferred brands. For example, 
could we replicate a misinformation effect under circumstances in which participants 
were misled that a ‘less-liked’ competitor brand was chosen when in fact, a more 
favoured brand was initially selected. Or would participants simply reject this 
suggestion because stronger and more connected memory traces for the original 
brand choice stand in stronger competition with the misleading information? To our 
knowledge, no study exists that has misled on preference for brands that were self-
selected based on preference. In this context, the perceived plausibility of the 
misleading information might play an important role. As stated earlier, it is generally 
believed that relatively implausible events are less often falsely remembered than 
more plausible events (Hyman & Loftus, 1998; Pezdek et al., 1997). On the other 
hand, research has shown that participants could be led to falsely believe that events 
were plausible (Mazzoni et al., 2001). In this regard, doctored images may skew 
participants’ plausibility judgments as they may be perceived as authoritative 
evidence that an event really occurred (Otgaar et al., 2009; Wade et al., 2002). In 
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particular when participants appear in doctored images themselves the adoption of 
lower source-monitoring criteria when judgments are made may increase the 
likelihood of memory errors (Nash et al., 2009).  
 Another important question in this context is whether false brand memories 
created under such personalized circumstances would have any consequences for 
individuals. More specifically, if participants create false memories for brands, do 
these false memories have any attitudinal and behavioural effects downstream? This 
is of concern because several studies have provided evidence to suggest that memory 
distortions may have practical repercussions. Earlier, we reviewed studies that have 
demonstrated these effects in an ‘advertising misinformation effect’ context. For 
example, one of these studies examined the effects of misleading advertising 
information on the taste of a previously tasted product (Braun, 1999). Participants 
first tasted an orange juice and were asked to describe its flavour afterwards. 
Following this, some participants were exposed to misleading advertising that 
described the juice as better than it in fact had been (e.g. as ‘sweet, pulpy and pure’ 
when in fact the juice had a salty and sour taste). As a result, participants remembered 
the taste of the original orange juice as better as it had been (see also Braun-LaTour, 
LaTour, & Loftus, 2006; Braun, 1998, for similar findings in different advertising 
contexts). However, these studies used false advertising in the traditional ‘narrative 
form’ to mislead on original experience. To our knowledge, only the study of Sacchi, 
Agnoli, and Loftus (2007) has used doctored photos to examine the consequences of 
misleading information on an original event. Here, participants were exposed to 
doctored images depicting real protests in Beijing and Rome as being more violent 
than they actually were. As a result, participants remembered these events as more 
violent, negative and they recalled more damage compared to participants who had 
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viewed the original and non-doctored photo version. In addition, misled participants 
indicated that they would be less inclined to participate in future protests.  
 The explanation proposed for these findings suggests that in the reconstructive 
process of remembering, participants may retrieve pieces of information consistent 
with the misleading suggestion and consequently misattribute and integrate the 
information into the original event experience (e.g. Braun, 1999; Sacchi, Agnoli, & 
Loftus, 2007). Hence, what these studies have in common is that they focused on 
false memories for misleading attributes of experienced events and the consequences 
for the original brand experience. However, returning to retroactive product 
replacement, we are specifically interested in the consequences of false memories for 
misleading and competitive brands that directly challenge a consumer’s original 
brand choice. Hence, not only the consequence for the originally chosen brand (once 
it is potentially overwritten or blocked by the misleading information) is important, 
but also how the misleading information itself is evaluated after having been falsely 
accepted. As well, clearly monitoring potential preference changes for real brand 
stimuli requires measuring preference changes before and after exposure to the 
misleading information – an approach not applied in these studies. Several implanted 
false memory studies exist that tracked participants’ preference changes from pre-to 
post manipulation and that examined preference changes specifically for the 
misleading event. For example, by using personalized false feedback based on a 
series of food preference questionnaires, Laney et al. (2008) planted the positive food 
suggestion that participants loved asparagus as a child. Misinformed participants did 
not only show an increase in their confidence that they loved asparagus the first time 
they tried it but also an increase in their general liking of asparagus and willingness to 
pay more for the food from pre- to post-manipulation relative to control participants 
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(see also Berkowitz et al., 2008, for similar findings in a different context). So how 
would these effects develop when participants are misled on a previous experience 
with a brand that is contradicted in a doctored postevent photograph? 
 With these ideas in mind the following experiment examined whether 
retroactively ‘less-liked’ competitor brands in doctored photographs can change 
memories for personally chosen brands. In addition, we examined whether false 
memories might lead to attitudinal and behavioural consequences for falsely 
remembered brands. We invited participants to the lab under the auspices of 
examining their personal brand lifestyle. Participants constructed a ‘brand profile 
basket’ that was then captured in a photo showing participants and their ‘shopping’ 
basket. After a delay, participants were exposed to a doctored photograph, in which 
some of the self-chosen brands were replaced by their ‘less-liked’ competitor brands. 
Memory tests for the original event as well as pre- and post-manipulation brand 
preference ratings were used to examine the uptake of misleading information as well 
as potential preference changes for falsely remembered brands. In line with previous 
research, we expected that misinformation would interfere with participants’ original 
memories and consequently lead to the false acceptance of misinformation items. In 
addition, we predicted that participants would rely on their false memories in the 
post-manipulation preference rating task and rate falsely remembered misinformation 
brands more favourably from pre- to post-test.  
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Method and Measurement 
Participants 
Fifty university students and staff (mean age = 23.54 years, SD = 7.03; 26% 
male) of City, University of London individually took part in this experiment over 
three sessions for either course credit or remuneration. 
Stimuli  
 Figure 8 shows the design of this study. Stimulus selection for pre- and post-
manipulation brand rating task, brand compiling task, as well as memory tests was 
based on the norming data collected in Experiment 2. Of these, 12 product groups 
belonging to the food category were chosen and the six most popular brands per 
category were selected. Of these, three brands per category were used as actual study 
stimuli and the remaining three brands were used as filler items in the memory and 
brand rating tasks. In order to increase the ecological validity of the study we decided 
to represent all brands by a typical product of its category throughout the whole study 
(e.g. a 30g Doritos crisp pack in physical form during the brand-compiling task and in 
pictorial form in memory test and preference ratings). In order to limit the influence 
of characteristic product packaging on memory performance, we made sure that the 
packaging of categorically related brands was similar to each other (e.g. we made 
sure that for the fizzy soft drink brands Coca Cola, Pepsi, Dr Pepper, Fanta, Sprite, 
and Tango each brand was represented as a 500ml bottle). In this process, some 
brands from the norming data had to be excluded because of typical packaging 
differences. For example, using the crisp brand Pringles (usually sold in long 
cylindrical containers) would not be a suitable brand next to Walkers and Doritos 
because the nature of the product and the typical package form stood out too much 
next to its competitors. 
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Figure 8. Study design 
  
 Brands provided for creating the brand basket (offered items) were the three 
most popular brands of each of the 12 brand categories. Of these, participants chose 
one brand per category for basket inclusion so that each personal brand basket 
contained 12 products in total. To induce misinformation, participants were later 
misled on four of these originally chosen items by replacing the brands with 
contradicting brands in the manipulated photograph (misled item condition). More 
specifically, misinformation was presented for four brand categories using a 
competitor brand that had not been picked from the offered items in the construction 
of the personalized brand basket (out of two remaining brands of a category). For the 
remaining eight brands consistent information was provided in the photograph, i.e. 
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participants were not misled on these items (control item condition). Last, unused 
offered basket items served as foil items in the final memory test  
Assignment of the brands to the three item types (original item, 
misinformation item, and foil item) and to the condition (misled item and control item 
condition) was counterbalanced across participants as best as possible; however, 
given this is a personal preference task, counterbalancing was partially out of our 
hands. For example, we could not influence a participant’s original brand choice and 
hence, whether a brand appeared as an original item or not was contingent on the 
particular participant. Nevertheless, given the design we did the best that we could to 
assure that: (1) originally chosen brands appeared in the misled and in the control 
item condition in a balanced manner and (2) that brands appeared about the same 
number of times as a misinformation or a foil item. However, it should be noted that 
the assignment of brands to an item type was also influenced by other factors. For 
example, misinformation selection was subject to the constraint that the item’s 
preference lay somewhere between the most (the brand that was originally chosen for 
the basket) and the least preferred brand of the three offered basket items. We 
obtained this information from the earlier pre-manipulation brand preference rating. 
Thus, a misinformation brand was always less liked than its original counterpart but it 
was not the least liked brand. Here, we chose the brand ‘in the middle’ in order that 
manipulation appeared as plausible as possible given that the least preferred brand of 
a category might have been too distinctive relative to the originally chosen item. 
Nevertheless, the preference ‘distance’ between original and misinformation items 
differed across items in the study (i.e. one misinformation item may have been two 
scale points ‘less-liked’ than the original item and the next four scale points ‘less-
liked’ than its original counterpart).  
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Last, we also included some measures that were aimed at reducing the risk of 
the influence of any confounding variables. Specifically, we made sure that the 
misinformation categories chosen for each participant varied in overall favourability 
for a brand category, meaning that the categories chosen included not only categories 
in which brands were generally highly rated but also others that included brands that 
were less highly rated. The same was done for how often brands of the chosen 
categories were purchased by a participant in general, a question that was asked at the 
end of the previous brand rating questionnaire for each of the categories. These 
measures were included to avoid a behaviour driven by the prominence of certain 
types of misinformation categories (e.g. high false memory rates driven by categories 
much liked or frequently purchased).  
The memory test as well as the pre- and post-manipulation preference-rating 
tasks contained all 72 brands that were selected from the norming study. These 
included all 36 offered brand items classified in three item types of interest: original 
items, misleading items, and foil items, as well as the 36 categorically-related filler 
items. Brands were presented in random order except in the preference rating tasks 
where brand category blocks were presented in a random order.  
Procedure 
Session 1. On arrival in the lab on Day 1 we informed participants that the 
purpose of the study was to create different brand lifestyle profiles as part of a wider 
consumer research study. They were also told that their profile would include a 
picture showing them and a personal brand profile basket that they would compile 
during the first session of the experiment. To limit the influence of demand 
characteristics, we did not tell participants that their memory for brands as well as 
potential preference changes for brands would be recorded at a later stage. 
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Participants first completed the brand preference questionnaire and evaluated 72 
brands on 10 point Likert-type scales for how much they liked these brands (1 
= Absolutely hate the brand - 10 = Absolutely love the brand) as well as for the 
likelihood of buying these brands (1 = Absolutely not - 10 = Absolutely yes). Here, 
participants were instructed to make judgments based on their personal and current 
attitudes towards the brands. We chose scale labels to be quite extreme in order to 
allow room for potential attitude changes at both ends of the scale. For the case where 
a participant did not know a particular brand, a ‘can’t say’ answer option was 
provided. In order to measure how much experience participants had with the 
different product categories, participants rated how often products from these 12 
categories were purchased. Following the brand preference task, participants were 
shown the brands for the basket-compiling task. Participants were told that they 
would now get the chance to compile their personal brand lifestyle basket by 
choosing one brand per brand category that they preferred the most and to hand it to 
the experimenter. In total, 12 brands were chosen and were placed into the brand 
basket by the researcher. In order to ensure encoding of the selected brands, 
participants were asked to specify in written form approximately how much they had 
paid for each individual product in the past. Afterward all the brands had been 
selected and placed in their basket, a photograph was taken showing the participant 
and basket. Overall, Session 1 took about 20 minutes to complete. 
Session 2. On Day 8, participants returned to the lab for a short session and 
were exposed to their brand profile picture. They were asked to confirm whether they 
were comfortable with this picture being included into their brand profile. To induce 
misinformation from the picture, four brands that were initially packed into the brand 
basket were replaced by less-liked competitor brands. In order to ensure that this 
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misinformation was processed, participants completed a short questionnaire about the 
brands in which they indicated for each of the specific brands the maximum price that 
they would pay for that product in a shop. To make sure that participants would not 
retrieve their basket items from memory, we asked them to write down the brand 
name of each individual item from the basket in the photograph. In order to reinforce 
the cover story used for the experiment, participants then provided some information 
about their general attitudes towards advertising. 
Session 3. On Day 9, we invited participants back to the lab under the 
pretence that some final follow up questionnaires about their brand profile had to be 
filled out. However, participants were confronted with a surprise memory test instead. 
First, participants were given a recognition test that recorded their overall memories 
for the original event. Here, participants were explicitly told that the test strictly 
referred to the items from the original brand-packing task carried out nine days 
earlier. Brand items appeared on the screen one at a time and participants were 
instructed to press the ‘yes’ key for brands that were included in the original personal 
brand basket and to press the ‘no’ key if they were not. Only if ‘yes’ was clicked 
were participants asked to make a Remember, Know, and Guess judgment. 
Participants were asked to press ‘remember’ when they were able to vividly 
remember choosing a particular brand for the basket; to press ‘know’ when the 
judgment was based more on a feeling of familiarity (i.e. they had the sense that they 
included the brand into the basket but they could not really remember it); and finally 
to press ‘guess’ when they guessed the brand was included but they were not really 
sure. It should be noted that response times were recorded in this task. However, 
participants were not informed about that fact and completed the task in their own 
pace.  
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Following the recognition test, a final source-monitoring task was carried out 
in which we gave participants the chance to reconsider the presentation sources of 
items endorsed during the recognition test. Five options were provided for each of the 
items: (1) included in brand basket on Day 1 only, (2) seen in the photo on Day 8 
only, (3) included in brand basket and seen in photo, (4) item differed between the 
actual basket and the photograph, (5) just guessed. We used this procedure in order to 
further affirm whether participants believed that they had chosen the misleading 
detail themselves during the original event (see Zhu et al., 2012). We chose this 
practice over an explicit ‘misinformation-warning’ procedure because we did not 
want to bias participants’ behaviour for the task that would follow. 
After participants completed the memory test, a filler activity consisting of 
three short working memory tasks was carried out for about 10 – 15 minutes. 
Following these tasks, the post-manipulation preference rating was completed. Here, 
we gave participants the same preference-rating task they completed on Day 1 in 
which they were asked about their current attitudes about brands and the likelihood 
that they would purchase each of the 72 brands. Before participants were fully 
debriefed and dismissed, we asked them if they had noticed anything during the 
experiment that they would like to share and what they thought the experiment was 
about. These questions were included so we had an additional and objective measure 
about the effectiveness of our cover story about the purpose of our study, one that 
could later be used to examine differences in participant’s behaviour. Overall, this 
session took about 35 minutes to complete.  
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Measurement and analysis 
 Our study addressed two main questions. The first was whether participants 
would create false memories for misleading items and the second, whether these false 
memories would have any consequences for individuals, namely, lead to attitudinal 
and behavioural after effects for falsely remembered brands. To answer Question 1, 
data were analysed as in preceding experiments. We analysed the uptake of 
misinformation by first comparing participants’ memory performance (yes-responses 
to items) within the misled item condition and then across conditions (misled item vs. 
control item condition). These main analyses were carried out separately for 
participants’ overall recognition scores, their Remember, Know, and Guess 
responses, as well as for participants’ robust memory performance of the source-
monitoring task. 
 To answer Question 2, we examined attitudinal and behavioural changes for 
falsely remembered misleading items from pre- to post-manipulation. The dependent 
measure was a participant’s mean rating on the liking as well as the likelihood of 
buying scales for endorsed misleading items at Times 1 and 2. To create a more 
comprehensive test, we added a variable where we compared attitude changes 
between endorsed (falsely accepted) and non-endorsed (correctly rejected) misleading 
items. In this way each participant served as his or her own control. For further 
comparison, we ran the same analysis with other item types and also compared 
preference changes across endorsed item types. 
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Results 
Sample characteristics 
 Regarding the memory data, as in Experiment 4, the dependent variables (yes-
responses to the item types) were hits and false alarm scores out of four to eight 
questions only. In addition, ceiling effects were found for some variables (e.g. yes-
responses to original items in the control item condition). Hence, data were not 
normally distributed and often strongly skewed. However, we used parametric test 
statistics for the analysis of our data. However, please note that all analyses were 
rerun and effects and null-effects confirmed using non-parametric tests (however 
these tests are not reported here). Hence these variables were not further considered 
in the analysis. Concerning the preference rating data, the dependent variables 
(average preference rating data for item types) Shapiro-Wilk’s tests (p > .05) and 
visual inspections of histograms, normal Q-Q plots and box plots showed that most 
variables were approximately normally distributed. Inspection of the data showed that 
participant’s gender, age as well as performance on the working memory tasks had no 
effect on the dependent memory variables of this study and were not considered in 
the following analysis. 
Misinformation effect data 
Recognition test data.  
 Raw score analysis. Table 11 shows the proportion of yes-responses 
for the three item types (original details, misinformation details, and foil details) 
correctly and incorrectly accepted as being part of the original event as a function of 
condition (i.e. whether participants were or were not misled on an item).
21
 
                                                        
21 Responses to filler items were not considered in this report in order to reduce the 
complexity of the analysis. Please note that false alarm rates for fillers (M = .02, SD = 
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To see whether participants were misinformed by the retroactively inserted 
brands in the photos, we first compared their overall endorsement rates of original 
items, misleading items, as well as foil items in the misled item condition. A one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Item type, F(2, 98) 
= 51.57, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .51. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that 
participants falsely accepted more misleading items (M = .69, SD = .33) than they 
correctly accepted original items (M = .30, SD = .32, p < .001). Results also showed 
that both the misleading and the original items were more often accepted than were 
the related foil items (M = .05, SD = .11, p’s < .001).  
 
Table 11. Mean proportion of ‘Yes’ responses with proportion of Remember, Know, 
and Guess responses (SE) for each item type as a function of condition. 
 
 
 
Next we examined participants’ responses to the item types across condition 
(misled item vs. control item condition). For original items, analysis showed that 
participants correctly accepted more original details in the control item condition (M 
                                                                                                                                                              
.05) did not statistically differ from that for foils (M = .05, SD = .11), t(49) = 1.57, p 
> .05. 
Condition
Response 
type
Total .30 (.046) .69 (.047) .05 (.016)
Remember .17 (.034) .54 (.046) .01 (.007)
Know .11 (.028) .13 (.029) .03 (.012)
Guess .02 (.010) .02 (.010) .01 (.007)
Total .95 (.013) .03 (.006)
Remember .80 (.032) .01 (.003)
Know .12 (.024) .01 (.003)
Guess .02 (.009) .02 (.005)
Original items 
(hits)
Misleading items
(false alarms)
Foil items 
(false alarms)
Item type
--
--
--
Control
item
Misled
item
--
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= .95, SD = .09) than in the misled item condition, t(49) = 13.14, p < .001, d = 2.39. 
We also compared misinformation false alarms in the misled item condition with foil 
false alarms in the control item condition. Analysis revealed more false alarms for the 
misleading items in the misled than foil false alarms in the control item condition (M 
= .03, SD = .04), t(49) = 13.75, p < .001, d = 2.66. No difference was found between 
the foils retrieved in misled and control item condition (p > .05). Hence, the overall 
memory performance data showed that participants were misled by the retroactively 
changed brands in the photographs.  
Last, we examined whether participant’s behaviour to respond yes to the 
different items stood in any relationship and ran correlation analysis between hits and 
false alarms to the item types. Analysis showed significant negative correlations 
between hits for the original item in the misled item condition and false alarms for the 
misleading items (r = -.76, n = 50, p < .01). No significant correlation was found 
between original items and the foils as well as misleading items and the foils.  
Hence, analysis of participants’ raw recognition data suggest that participants 
were misled by the retroactively replaced brands in the photographs. When 
participants were misled on an item, they accepted the misleading alternative more 
often than they accepted the item they actually chose. However when they were not 
misled on an item, participants had not only higher hit rates for the originally chosen 
items, but they also accepted the categorically related foil items less often than the 
misleading alternatives in the misled item condition.
22
  
                                                        
22 One might argue that the endorsement of original items in the control condition 
might not be an ideal baseline to determine whether memory impairment occurred in 
this study or not. Because original items in the control condition were seen twice 
compared to only once for original items in the misled item condition the question 
rises whether it was retrieval strength in the control condition that led to this 
advantage in hit rates. Concerning this matter, data of a sub-experiment provides 
additional information. A separate sample (N = 17) was simply asked to create their 
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 Response time analysis. We analysed participants’ reaction times to respond 
to trials in the recognition test. Figure 9 shows response times in milliseconds to say 
‘yes’ that an item was seen during the original event (hit for original items and false 
alarm for the misleading and foil item) and ‘no’ that it had not (miss for original 
items and correct rejections for the misleading and the foil items) as a function of 
condition. First, we compared whether reaction times to falsely respond ‘yes’ to a 
misleading item differed from correctly stating ‘yes’ that an original item was chosen 
originally. Results of paired sample t-tests showed no difference in response times 
between false alarms for the misleading items (M = 1858.59 ms, SD = 1271.17) and 
hits for original items in the misled (M = 2378.65, SD = 1368.95) and control item 
condition (M = 1614.95 ms, SD = 589.10). Hence, data indicate that incorrect 
responses to the misleading items were as quickly made as correct responses.  
 Comparing response times for hits across condition, analysis showed that 
participants were slower in the misled compared to the control item condition, t(30) = 
                                                                                                                                                              
personal brand baskets and administered a yes/no recognition test 8 - 10 days later. 
Although a photo was taken from participants and their basket on Day 1, participants 
were not exposed again to the photo and hence, they were not misinformed on the 
originally seen brands. In the recognition test participants were tested on 12 originally 
chosen brands, 24 presented foil items (i.e. foils that were offered basket items but 
that were not chosen), as well as 36 categorically related filler items. We ran a 2(Item 
type: Original item vs. misleading item vs. filler item) x 2(Experiment: Main vs. Sub-
experiment) mixed factor ANOVA (please note that the equivalent of misinformation 
items in the sub-experiment were the offered but non chosen foils). There was a main 
effect of Item type, F(2, 130) = 38.78, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .37, as well as a significant 
Item type x Experiment interaction, F(2, 130) = 44.26, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .41. Further 
analysis of the simple main effects with Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .008 
(.05/6) revealed more hits for original items in sub- (M = .78, SD = .17) compared to 
the main experiment (M = .30, SD = .32), t(65) = 7.85, p < .001, as well as less false 
alarms for the foils in the sub- (M = .13, SD = .10) compared to false alarms for the 
misleading items in the main experiment, (M = .69, SD = .33), t(65) = 10.40, p < 
.001. No difference was found for the filler items between experiments. Hence, even 
when the original items were not shown a second time, participants created 
significantly more hits for these items when they were not later misled on them. 
Overall this finding provides further support that participant’s original event memory 
was impaired as a result of the retroactive product replacement. 
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-2.70, p = .012, d = .72. Thus, when participants were misled on an original item, 
they were slower to correctly press ‘yes’ compared to when an item had appeared in a 
consistent manner during original event and misinformation phase. For ‘No’ 
responses (misses) to the original items no significant difference was found between 
misled (M = 1874.26, SD = 996.49) and control item condition (M = 1619.81, SD = 
1246.68). Hence, when an originally chosen item on which participants were misled 
was missed, response times did not differ from misses of the control items. Last, false 
‘yes’ responses to foil items in the control item condition (M = 2208.14, SD = 
1781.81) did not differ from these to the misleading items and participants’ hits (not 
enough participants endorsed foils in the misled item condition to run statistical 
analysis, N = 7).
23
 
 
Figure 9. Mean response times in ms (SE) for each item type as a function of 
condition and response. 
 
                                                        
23 Please note that a more comprehensive statistical analysis was not possible due to 
missing reaction time data points for certain item types. For example, many 
participants did not falsely endorse any of the foil items in the misled item condition, 
meaning that no response times existed in these cases. A more comprehensive 
analysis including response types of several item types would have reduced the 
analysis to a few cases. 
  
198 
Remember, Know, and Guess analysis. The pattern found for participants’ 
raw recognition scores was clearly confirmed when participants’ recollective 
experiences only were analysed. Participants falsely remembered the misleading 
alternative more often than they correctly remembered the item they actually chose. 
In addition, when they were not misled on an item, participants had not only more 
remember responses for the originally chosen items, but they also remembered the 
categorically related foil items less often than the misleading alternatives in the 
misled item condition (remember responses; all ps < .001; see Table 11). For know 
responses in the misled item condition, there was significant main effect of Item type 
as well, F(2, 98) = 4.28, p = .017,  ηp
2
 = .08. Pairwise comparisons revealed no 
significant difference between original items (M = .11, SD = .20) and misleading 
items (M = .13, SD = .20), but know responses to both item types were higher 
compared to the foil items (M = .03, SD = .08, p = .024; p = .005). Across condition 
there was no significant main effect of Item type for know judgments (F < 1). For 
guess responses no effect of Item type within or across conditions was found (all Fs 
< 1). 
Analysis of Remember, Know, and Guess response patterns within the 
different Item types, revealed significant main effects of Response type for original 
items in misled, F(2, 98) = 8.06, p = .001 ηp
2
 = .14, and control item condition, F(2, 
98) = 224.93, p < .001 ηp
2
 = .82, as well as for the misleading items, F(2,98) = 64.18, 
p < .001 ηp
2
 = .57. No effect of Response type was found for the foils in either of the 
conditions (Fs < 1). Pairwise comparisons showed that original control items and the 
misleading items were more often remembered than known, and also more often 
known than guessed (all ps < .004). For original items in the misled item condition, 
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there was no difference between remember and know responses, but both were more 
often made than guess responses (ps < .004).  
Source-monitoring test data  
 Table 12 shows the proportion of overall robust memory performance as well 
as individual responses to all three item types in the source-monitoring task. We 
conducted the same main analysis as above on participants’ robust memory 
performance. In the misled item condition analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of Item type, F(2, 98) = 15.03, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .24. Pairwise comparisons showed no 
significant difference between original items (M = .18, SD = .29) and the misleading 
items (M = .32, SD = .31: p > .05) but both items types were more often attributed to 
the original event than the foil items (M = .02, SD = .06, ps < .001). Comparison of 
original items across condition (misled vs. control) revealed a main effect of Item 
Type as well, F(1, 49) = 78.75, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .62, with more correct source 
attributions in the control (M = .68, SD = .26) relative to the misled item condition.  
 To analyse participants’ robust false memories for the misleading items 
further we examined individual responses in the source-monitoring task. A one-way 
(Response type: chosen 1 only vs. saw 2 only. vs. both vs. conflicted vs. guessed) 
repeated measures ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of Response type, F(4, 
196) = 15.36, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .24. Pairwise comparisons showed that there was no 
difference between the false option ‘Both’ and the correct option ‘saw 2 only’ but that 
both were significantly more often selected than all of the other options (all ps < 
.006). 
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Table 12. Mean proportion (SE) of robust memory performance (correct and 
incorrect source attributions to the original event) total and broken down by response 
for each item type as a function of condition. 
 
Control
 Robust .18 (.041) .68 (.037) .32 (.043) -- .02 (.011) .01 (.004)
(1) Chosen 1 .12 (.034) .08 (.019) .03 (.017) -- .00 (.000) .00 (.001)
(2) Saw2 .01 (.005) .10 (.028) .28 (.049) -- .02 (.011) .00 (.002)
(3) Both .09 (.022) .68 (.037) .29 (.043) -- .00 (.000) .01 (.003)
(4) Conflicted .06 (.026) .07 (.016) .07 (.019) -- .03 (.011) .00 (.002)
(5) Guessed .03 (.012) .02 (.007) .03 (.012) -- .01 (.007) .01 (.005)
Original item
(hits)
Foil Items
(false alarms)
Misleading item 
(false alarms)
Misled Control Misled Misled Control
 
Note. Item types were coded robust when one of the following options were ticked by 
a participant: Original item: misled (1) or (4), control (3); misleading item: (1) or (3), 
foil item: misled and control (1), or (2), or (3). 
 
 
Preference rating data 
 Results for the misleading items. To answer our second question, namely, 
whether false memories would have any consequences for individuals, we examined 
attitudinal and behavioural changes for falsely remembered misleading items from 
pre- to post-manipulation (participants overall yes-responses in the recognition test). 
Here, we analysed participants’ mean rating on the liking as well as the likelihood of 
buying scales for endorsed misleading items at Times 1 and 2. We started with 
participants’ attitudes towards the brands (liking scale). As predicted, results of paired 
samples t-tests showed that participants rated endorsed misleading items higher at 
Time 2 (M = 6.87, SD = 1.45) than at Time 1 (M = 6.26, SD = 1.42), t(44) = -3.28, p 
= .002, d = .49. Next, we conducted the same analysis for our behavioural measure 
(likelihood of buying scale). Again, as expected, participants rated endorsed 
misleading brands higher at Time 2 (M = 6.75, SD = 1.58) than at Time 1 (M = 6.13, 
SD = 1.45), t(44) = -2.89, p = .006, d = .43.  
  
201 
 
Figure 10. Mean ratings of endorsed and non-endorsed misleading items on the 
liking- (left) and the likelihood of buying (right) questionnaire, pre- and post-
manipulation. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
To create a more comprehensive test, we added a variable where we compared 
attitude changes between endorsed (falsely accepted) and non-endorsed (correctly 
rejected) misleading items (see Figure 10). In this way each participant served as 
his/her own control. To do this this, we conducted a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA using the factors Misinformation endorsement (endorsed vs. non-endorsed) 
and Time (time 1 vs. 2). For the liking scale the analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of Endorsement, F(1, 25) = 5.78, p = .024, ηp
2
 = .19, where participants rated 
endorsed misinformation items higher than non-endorsed misinformation items. 
However, there was no significant interaction of Time and Endorsement, F(1, 25) = 
1.65, p = .21, ηp
2
 = .06. Thus, although the data showed a trend in the expected 
direction (i.e. that there was an increase in liking from time 1 to 2 for endorsed 
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misleading items but not for non-endorsed items), the trend was not statistically 
significant.
24
 
The likelihood of buying scale analysis yielded a significant main effect for 
endorsement, F(1, 25) = 6.56, p = .017, ηp
2
 = .21 as well, showing that participants 
rated endorsed misinformation items higher than non-endorsed misinformation items. 
In addition, there was a significant Endorsement X Time interaction, F(1, 25) = 4.80, 
p = .038, ηp
2
 = .16. Analysing the simple main effects with Bonferroni using adjusted 
alpha levels of .0125 per test (.05/4), confirmed that participants rated endorsed 
misinformation higher at Time 2 than at Time 1 (see test statistics for this t-test at the 
beginning of this section) while this was not the case for non-endorsed 
misinformation items). In addition, they rated endorsed misinformation items (M = 
7.10, SD = 1.53) higher at time 2 than non-endorsed items (M = 5.57, SD = 1.92), 
t(25) = 3.39, p = .002, d = .67 (whereas no difference was found at time 1).
25
 
  
                                                        
24 A prior power computation with a medium effect size f = 0.25 and power = 0.95, 
showed that the sample size needed would be N = 36 [G*Power 3.1.7 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2009)]. Thus, a sample size of 50 was considered 
adequate for revealing the expected effect. However, because our study manipulation 
turned out to be very effective, analysis reported was based on only 25 participants 
who created both false alarms as well as correct rejections for misinformation items 
(endorsed vs. non-endorsed misinformation items). Forty per cent of our participants 
falsely endorsed all misinformation items and 10% correctly rejected all misleading 
items. Hence, these participants were not included into the analysis due to missing 
data points, which reduced statistical power by 50%. This was supported when we 
used the Expectation-Maximization (EM) method to impute the missing values for 
our liking data (SPSS 22.0). When we ran the same two-way ANOVA with the new 
and complete data set, results revealed not only a significant main effect for 
endorsement F(1, 49) = 11.17, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .19, but also a significant time and 
endorsement interaction, F(1, 49) = 4.90, p = .032, ηp
2
 = .09. 
25 We also compared attitude and behaviour changes for remember responses only vs. 
non-endorsed items in the recognition test and compared robust misinformation 
acceptances vs. non-endorsed items in the source-monitoring task. Here, trends were 
similar to the findings reported, but for these subjective experiences of recognition, 
the findings were not significant. 
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Comparison across item types. For additional comparison, we conducted an 
analysis that would compare preference changes over time between endorsed 
misleading items and other endorsed item types. For this, we conducted two-way 
repeated measures ANOVAs with the factors endorsed item type (misleading item vs. 
other item type) and time (time 1 vs. 2) separately for original items and foil items in 
the misled and control item conditions. However, because foil items were hardly ever 
endorsed in the misled item condition (N = 7), we decided to collapse the foil 
responses across conditions (misled vs. control) (the preference change trend in both 
conditions was the same). Also, in order to reduce the complexity of this section, we 
focused on the matter of interest: the interaction between Item type and Time that 
would show whether or not potential preference change effects were more 
pronounced for one item type or the other (a table showing the descriptive statistics of 
the preference data for all items types can be found in Appendix L).
26
 
When we conducted the analysis with original items in the misled item 
condition, results showed significant Item type X Time interaction for liking, F(1, 25) 
= 4.53, p = .043, ηp
2
 = .15, as well as one for likelihood of buying, F(1, 25) = 5.55, p 
= .027, ηp
2
 = .18. Further analysis of the simple main effects using paired sample t-
tests showed that the preference change effect found for misleading items (see earlier) 
was not present for originally chosen items on which participants were misled on (for 
both scales ps  > .05). Conducting the analysis with original items in the control item 
condition, the Item type X Time delay interaction did not turn out to be significant 
(liking: F(1, 44) = 3.29, p = .070; likelihood of buying: F(1, 44) = 3.70, p = .061). 
                                                        
26 Please note that the analysis revealed significant main effects of item type when 
comparing misinformation items with original items in misled and control condition. 
Here, results showed that endorsed original items were rated higher on the liking and 
likelihood of buying scale than misinformation items. Considering how 
misinformation items were chosen in this study (less-liked competitor brands) this is 
outcome is not surprising. No main effects were found for the foil items. 
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Nevertheless, we used the low p-values as justification to do a further analysis of the 
simple main effects. Results showed that only on the liking scale, participants rated 
endorsed original items higher at Time 2 (M = 7.89, SD = 1.29) than at Time 1 (M = 
7.63, SD = 1.43), t(48) = 2.85, p = .006, d = .42. Thus, the preference change trend 
found for misleading items was also present for participants’ attitudes towards brands 
that had appeared in a consistent manner in basket and photo. Last, we found 
significant Item type X Time delay interactions for the foil items as well, with F(1, 
19) = 11.00, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .37 for liking and F(1, 19) = 4.23, p = .039 for likelihood 
of buying. Further analysis showed that participants’ preferences for foil items did 
not change from time 1 to time 2 on both scales (all ps > .05).  
Results for the other item types. For completion, we also ran the same 
Endorsement (endorsed vs. non-endorsed) X Time (time 1 vs. 2) AVOVA as above 
separately for the other item types. The only significant effect we found was for foil 
items (foils collapsed across condition). Analysis revealed a significant endorsement 
main effect for liking, F(1, 22) = 22.65, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .51, as well as for likelihood 
of buying, F(1, 22) = 20.31, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .48, showing that endorsed foil items 
were higher rated than non-endorsed items on both scales. However, in contrast to 
misleading items, changes for the endorsed foils differed not only from non-endorsed 
foils at Time 2 but also at Time 1, suggesting that endorsed foil items were more 
preferred in the first place compared to non-endorsed foils. 
Discussion 
 By using a modified version of the misinformation paradigm, Experiment 5 
examined if memories for personally chosen brands could be altered by exposing 
individuals retroactively to ‘less liked’ competitor brands embedded in manipulated 
photographs. In addition, we investigated whether memory errors would lead to 
  
205 
preference changes for falsely remembered brands. Participants were asked to 
compile their personal ‘brand lifestyle basket’, which was then captured in a photo 
showing the basket and participant. After one week, participants were exposed to the 
photograph, in which some originally chosen brands were replaced by different 
brands of the same category. The final memory test as well as the post manipulation 
preference-rating task were administered to participants after another delay of one 
day.  
 Results of Experiment 5 indicated a reliable and strong misinformation effect 
caused by retroactive brand replacements in photographs. In the recognition test, 70% 
of the non-chosen and less-liked misleading brands were falsely attributed to the 
original brand-packing event. Of these, the majority of responses were associated 
with recollective experiences (Remember judgments), meaning that in about 80% of 
the cases, participants were able to vividly remember choosing a particular 
misinformation brand for the brand basket. Our data also suggest that participants’ 
original event memories were strongly affected by the study manipulation. Items that 
were originally chosen for the basket but were later replaced by a competitor in the 
photo were correctly remembered in only 30% of the cases and only half of these 
were vividly remembered. In comparison, we found 95% (85% remembered) correct 
recognition for control brands that were included into the basket and that did appear 
in the photo. When we gave participants the chance to reconsider the sources of their 
memories in the source-monitoring task (included on Day 1 vs. seen on Day 8 vs. 
both vs. brands conflicted vs. guessed) these trends were still present in the data. 
However, when confronted with the source options, participants were able to correct 
some of their memory errors created in the recognition test. Importantly, 32% of the 
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misleading items were still robustly misattributed to the brand-packing event on Day 
1.  
From a memory impairment point of view it is possible that participants 
falsely remembered the misleading brands because the misleading information 
somehow changed the memory trace for the originally chosen brands. As a result, 
participants might have updated their memory for the original brand compiling task 
by including the memory for the misleading competitor brand (Loftus et al., 1978). 
The fact that participants created considerably more hits for control brands (shown in 
a consistent manner) compared to items on which they were misled speaks for this 
assumption. Additional support for a memory impairment view comes from the sub-
experiment reported in Footnote 22. The results of that sub-study revealed evidence 
of memory impairment even when a more conservative baseline measure was used. 
More specifically, when the original control item was solely encountered during the 
brand compiling task (and not again in the photograph) and tested after a delay of one 
week, participant’s hit rate for these brands was still significantly higher compared to 
the hit rate found in the misled item condition (.78 in sub-experiment vs. 30 in main 
experiment). This suggests that participant’s original event memory was initially 
strong but that it was affected by the false information. This might indicate that 
participants did not solely ‘fill in’ memory gaps with the memory for the misleading 
post event items.  
 From a source-monitoring point of view participants might have falsely 
accepted the misleading brands because they confused the sources of the memory for 
the misleading brand with the memory for the brand originally chosen (Zaragoza & 
Lane, 1994). One reason for these source confusions might have been participant’s 
failure to successfully access source-relevant information when the judgements were 
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made (Johnson et al., 1993). This source-monitoring failure might have been 
facilitated by the photographic nature of the misleading materials that might have 
triggered thoughts, feelings, and images similar to the original brand experience 
(Wade et al., 2002). In addition it is likely that that the doctored photographs were 
perceived as compelling evidence that the misleading brands were indeed originally 
chosen. In line with the arguments by Nash et al. (2009), it is possible that the strong 
misinformation effect revealed was at least partially due to the high credibility that 
was associated with these photographs that depicted participants themselves. It is 
possible that these factors, combined with an effective cover story, led to the adoption 
of lower source-monitoring criteria when judgments were made. 
Our data also suggest that false brand memories can lead to attitudinal and 
behavioural consequences for individuals. Specifically, after participants created false 
memories for retroactively inserted brands they rated these brands more positively on 
the liking and likelihood of buying scales. Also, misleading brands that were falsely 
accepted for basket inclusion were more positively rated on both scales than 
misleading brands that were correctly rejected. In addition, we have seen that this 
preference change effect was more pronounced for misleading items than for any of 
the other items types. Indeed, for these other item types, the effect was either 
completely absent or weaker. To explain this positive shift in ratings, consider the 
findings from Laney et al. (2008). In a first attempt to analyse the underlying 
mechanisms of their preference change effect, Laney et al. (2008) discovered that in 
combination with the false feedback, the mere sight of a photo showing their critical 
item ‘asparagus’ led some participants to rate asparagus more positively in the photo 
rating task. These two steps (false feedback and photo) were combined in our 
experiment and the post manipulation rating was carried out shortly after in pictorial 
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form (i.e. product picture icons were rated). When participants saw the 
misinformation brands in our post-rating test, product icons might have been 
processed more fluently because of the previous encounter in the photograph. If this 
fluency was interpreted as brand familiarity, this might be what caused the shift in 
favourable ratings (Laney et al., 2008). 
Some might argue that this effect was simply a mere exposure effect rather 
than being associated with false memories. We argue that this is unlikely due to 
several factors. First, our analysis was based on comparing endorsed versus non-
endorsed misleading items. If a mere exposure effect was responsible for the trend we 
obtained, then we would expect a positive shift in attitudes for non-endorsed items as 
well (all misleading items appeared equally often and we made sure that all 
misleading items were processed during the misinformation phase). Second, the shift 
in preferences was not found for the other item types to this extent. For example, if 
we compare control items (packed in basket and seen in photo) with misleading 
items, then we are comparing item types that were seen the same amount of time (in 
pre-test, on the table, in the photo, in the post-test). In fact, we can assume that 
control items were processed even more intensively because participants themselves 
chose them for basket inclusion. Hence, if a mere exposure effect had been the 
driving force behind our effect one would expect an even greater preference change 
for these control items. However, although we did measure an increase of preference 
for these control brands as well, the effect was weaker and was only present for the 
attitudinal measure, not the behavioural scale.  
 Others might suggest that demand characteristics are responsible for our 
effects.  However again, this seems unlikely. First, participants were invited to the lab 
under false pretences and we made sure that the cover story was plausible throughout 
  
209 
the entire experiment. Second, we asked participants at the end of the study if they 
had noticed anything during the experiment that they would like to share. Here, only 
six participants pointed out a suspicion that something was wrong with the picture. 
Of these, only three participants were positive that the picture was manipulated. 
However, when participants were asked if they could guess what the real purpose of 
the study was, only two participants made a guess in the right direction. That is, they 
assumed the study was about false brand memories, but no participant suspected that 
our intent was to measure preference changes for falsely remembered brands. When 
debriefed on the purpose of our study, most participants appeared surprised. Also, 
five of our six suspicious participants produced zero misinformation false alarms. If 
demand characteristics had been the driving force of our effects, then we would 
assume high false alarm rates in these cases as well. Furthermore, it should be 
mentioned that our target items were embedded in a substantial number of filler items 
which would have made it hard for participants to apply any kind of strategy (see 
Laney et al., 2008, for a similar argument on this matter). Last, reaction times 
recorded for false acceptances of misleading brands did not statistically differ from 
that of original memories, which speaks against the involvement of deliberation 
processes.  
It would seem reasonable to conclude that the effects we obtained are largely 
driven by the fact that participants relied on their false memories when post-rating the 
brands. However, on reflection given these considerations, it would be important to 
examine whether it was specific responses in this experiment that led to the 
preference changes in our paradigm. We did reveal the positive shift in attitudes and 
behaviour for the misleading brands when analysing participants overall yes-
responses in the recognition tests. Although the same trends were found when we 
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analysed preference changes in remember responses only and participants’ robust 
memory performance in the recognition test, not all of these trends were statistically 
significant. Whereas this could be due to a power issue (because less misleading 
items were remembered and robustly endorsed compared to the overall recognition 
scores), another explanation might be indeed the specific nature of these responses. In 
regard to this, previous research has shown that preference changes accompanied 
participants’ false beliefs rather than participants’ false memories when memory and 
belief questionnaires were used to examine the uptake of false memories (Bernstein et 
al., 2015; Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). Our study was not designed to disentangle these 
processes but future research should consider using alternative questionnaires such as 
memory and belief questionnaires. 
Nevertheless, our findings contribute to the false memory literature in two 
ways. First, we extend the applicability of the classical misinformation paradigm by 
showing reliable misinformation effects in a new and ecologically relevant context – 
retroactively changed brands in personal photos. Second, following from this, our 
research builds on previous studies and shows the additional consequences of false 
memories for highly competitive stimuli that aimed to overwrite or suppress 
participants’ original brand choice. However, these results go beyond showing the 
after effects of misinformation-based false memories and extend previous research by 
providing insights into other changes (attitudinal and behavioural) that occur 
downstream following a memory task. Interestingly, we did not find any indication 
that preferences for originally chosen but replaced items changed once they were 
‘missed’ and potentially overwritten by misleading information. Hence, rather than 
completely restructuring participants’ brand attitudes and behaviour, these changes 
occurred (to this extent) only for the misleading brands. For internally generated foil 
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false memories, a very different trend was obtained. In contrast to all item types, here 
preferences at Time 1 differed significantly between endorsed and non-endorsed 
foils, suggesting that it was the more preferred brands of this category in the first 
place for which spontaneously generated false memories were created. In addition, 
and in contrast to misinformation false alarms, no preference changes for foil brands 
were recorded. In fact, endorsed foils were more negatively rated at Time 2 than at 
Time 1 (but these differences were not significant). Future research should examine 
whether this trend applies in general for all forms of spontaneously generated false 
memories.  
 Finally, our study has several limitations that should be addressed. Coming 
back to our initial question of whether retroactively replaced brands in photos have 
the potential to influence one’s past experience with a brand, additional research is 
needed to fully answer this question. Although this study provides evidence to 
suggest that this might be the case, the way in which participants in this study 
encoded the misleading stimuli (focusing the attention to each brand by answering a 
question) does not accurately reflect how peripheral details in photos would be 
normally processed. In addition, considering that the post-manipulation preference-
rating task was carried out shortly after the final memory test, the question rises 
whether these preference changes last over a longer delay. In a next step a follow up 
questionnaire should be administered to examine this matter. Last, a next step in this 
research would be to investigate whether false brand memories affect participant’s 
real purchasing behaviour. An increase of preferences on a scale might not 
necessarily mean that particular brands will actually be purchased. However, as 
discussed earlier, rather than completely restructuring participants’ brand preferences 
we only found a positive shift in attitudes for the falsely accepted misleading items 
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but not a negative shift for the missed originally chosen brands. Hence, participant's 
preferred brand might still be the originally chosen one. Future studies should 
monitor the development of these effects with repeated exposure to misinformation 
materials. It is possible that retrieval strength might lead to changes in participant’s 
brand preference structure.  
Conclusion 
Experiment 5 showed that it is possible to implant false memories for ‘less-
liked’ competitor brands that were retroactively inserted into personal photographs. 
Hence, this study replicated a brand misinformation effect in a context in which brand 
stimuli were tailored to a specific participant. Moreover, we showed that once these 
false memories were formed, they were associated with a positive increase in 
attitudinal and behavioural consequences. Future research should examine whether 
preference change effects can be elicited under more implicit retroactive product 
placement circumstances. 
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Final Discussion 
By using a modified version of the misinformation paradigm, this thesis 
examined the effectiveness of a futuristic advertising measure: Retroactive brand 
replacements in photographs. Two main research questions were addressed of which 
the first was whether retroactively replaced brands in photographs could distort 
memories for previously experienced brands. Second, if we form false memories 
about brand experiences, do these memory errors have any attitudinal or behavioural 
effects downstream? To examine these questions five experiments were carried out 
that included four misinformation studies (Experiment 1, 3, 4 and 5) as well as one 
brand norming study (Experiment 2). Whereas all four misinformation studies 
examined the effects of a ‘brand misinformation effect’, Experiment 5 went one step 
further and looked at consequences of false brand memories. Data collected in 
Experiment 2, the brand norming study, served to provide a pool of normed brands 
that could be used for stimuli selection in Experiments 3-5 and to obtain information 
about the role of brand awareness factors in the misinformation effect.  
In line with previous research, the results of all misinformation studies 
indicated reliable brand misinformation effects caused by retroactively replaced 
brand in photographs. More precisely, when participants were misled on a brand 
placement or a product brand, many of the competitor brands in the misleading 
photos were later falsely attributed to the original event. In addition, these memory 
distortions were often rated as being ‘remembered’, meaning that participants were 
able to re-experience the misleading brands as part of the original event. On the other 
hand, data suggested that participant’s original brand memory was impaired as a 
result of the intervention (i.e. when originally experienced brand details were 
contradicted by a misleading brand in the photographs, the hit rates for these original 
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brand details were lower compared to the hit rates for original items in a non-misled 
control item condition). Throughout this project, these results were not only revealed 
in participants’ overall yes-responses in the recognition test but also in participants’ 
remember responses as well as in their more refined source-monitoring judgments. 
Furthermore, the results of this thesis suggest that false brand memories can have 
practical repercussions. That is, data of Experiment 5 showed that false brand 
memories led to attitudinal and behavioural effects downstream. Together, these 
findings contribute to the false memory literature in two ways. First, we extend the 
applicability of the classical misinformation paradigm by showing reliable 
misinformation effects in a new and ecologically relevant context – retroactively 
changed brands in personal photographs. Second, our research shows the additional 
consequences of false memories for a new kind of stimuli that are real and 
competitive in nature and are associated with participants’ personal preferences. 
Experiment 1 and 3 tested the effects of retroactive brand replacements on 
memory in a setting in which brand placements occurred naturally in social snapshot 
photographs. Participants watched what they thought was the same Facebook photos 
twice but during second exposure, some brand insertions were replaced by a 
competitor brand. The experimental design aimed to reflect a situation in which a 
social network user browses a person’s Facebook photos twice and is incidentally 
exposed to original and misleading brand placements in this process. Results of both 
studies showed that a misinformation effect could be replicated in this context. 
However, analysis revealed relatively low hit rates in the misled and control item 
conditions, suggesting that originally seen brands might not have always been 
encoded. This outcome may be not too surprising considering the ‘product placement 
nature’ of these tasks and that no mention of the studies’ brand focus was made until 
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test. As well, the hit rates are consistent with some previous misinformation studies 
that have used rather peripherally placed critical items in slide shows (e.g. 
McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). A surprising finding of Experiments 1 and 3 was that 
they elicited relatively high false-alarm rates for non-presented but related foil 
brands. Because the endorsement of these foil items was a baseline rate for 
misinformation false alarms, the misinformation effect revealed was not as strong 
compared to other misinformation studies. On the one hand, it might have been the 
weak encoding processes that caused these findings. For example, from a Fuzzy 
Trace Theory point of view, it is possible that participants’ verbatim memory traces 
for the originally seen placements decayed rapidly so that judgements at test were 
predominantly based on the gist of originally seen brands. Consequently, not only the 
related misleading brands but also the associated foil brands were readily endorsed. 
However, on the other hand, it is possible that it was brand specific characteristics 
responsible for the effect because previous research has obtained similar results in 
explicit brand learning tasks (e.g. Sherman & Moran, 2011). Every day we are 
exposed to brands in their competitive environment (e.g. in supermarket shelves), 
which might activate strong brand category themes. Because, according to 
associative-activation theories it is the spreading activation of particularly highly 
interconnected concepts in one’s knowledge base that drives the creation of internally 
created false memories (Howe & Derbish, 2010; Howe et al., 2009) this is what 
might have caused the high error rates.  
However, this work also showed that these study outcomes could be 
somewhat ‘improved’. For instance, by using more loosely associated foil brands in 
the test, Experiment 3 did obtain a lower false alarm rate for these foils. In addition, 
by placing brands more prominently into the photos and by using brands that were 
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normed, we were able to increase attention to the brands and hence, increase the hit 
rates in Experiment 3. However, in turn, these measures seemed to increase the 
susceptibility to misinformation because these measures seemed to trigger stronger 
encoding of the misleading brand placements as well. In this regard, more research is 
necessary to examine the factors that are likely to influence performance in the 
misinformation paradigm when examining product replacement in photographs. For 
example, research that used narratives to implant misinformation showed that more 
prominently inserted items in original picture slides led to an increase in hit rates for 
these details. This has also been shown to reduce false alarm rates for verbally 
suggested information (depending on factors such as retention interval or source 
credibility; Belli et al., 1992). However, when misleading details are suggested via 
photographs, it is exactly these measures that strengthen the influence of the 
misleading information as well. Here, research examining the effectiveness of 
product placement on memory may be informative as numerous factors have been 
identified that are likely to influence memory for brands placed in movies or game 
scenes (La Ferle & Edwards, 2006; Law & Braun, 2000). These factors include 
exposure time (Brennan, Dubas, & Babin, 1999), placement prominence (Gupta & 
Lord, 1998; Lee & Faber, 2007), the degree of brand integration in a scene (Yang et 
al., 2006), as well as whether a placement is referred to by a leading character or not 
(d’Astous & Chartier, 2000). Future research should further examine these factors in 
in a retroactive product placement context.  
Turning to Experiments 4 and 5, data revealed strong misinformation effects 
in settings in which participants were misled via doctored photographs on actual pasts 
with a brand. Whereas this effect has generally been found before using brand details 
in a suggestive narrative paradigm (Holmes & Weaver, 2010), Experiments 4 and 5 
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were the first to extend these effects to doctored photographs. However, between 
Experiments 4 and 5, the degree of personalization of study materials differed. 
Participants in Experiment 4 evaluated a set of brands as part of the original event 
and saw misleading SenseCam photos (allegedly taken by one of the participants’ 
SenseCams) of that brand arrangement during the misinformation phase. In 
Experiment 5, participants chose their preferred target brands themselves and were 
misled via photographs that depicted not only the misleading brands but also 
themselves. Hence, study materials in Experiment 5 were tailored to a specific 
participant. Comparing the results of both studies, data suggest that although both 
types of experimental design elicited strong misinformation effects, the effects were 
somewhat stronger in Experiment 5 (Experiment 5: M = .70, Experiment 4: M = .60). 
In fact, these differences may be somewhat underestimated considering that the 
retention interval between the original event and the misinformation phase in 
Experiment 4 was twice as long as that in Experiment 5 (2 weeks vs. 1 week).  
For further comparison, maybe the most similar study to ours is that of 
Holmes and Weaver (2010) who used a modified version of the misinformation 
paradigm to mislead on brand experiences (compiling a brand care package) via 
misleading narratives (misleading text on website). The researchers recorded false 
memory rates of .16 to .31 depending on when the final memory test was conducted 
in that study (immediately vs. 1-week delay). Hence, comparing these false alarm 
scores to our data suggest that misleading photographs may be more effective to 
mislead on an experience with a brand compared to misleading narratives. However, 
these differences have to be seen in the context of methodological differences. 
Whereas our studies included delays between original event and misinformation 
phase, the study of Holmes and Weaver (2010) manipulated when the final test 
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occurred. Although both retention intervals have shown to increase the suggestibility 
to information (e.g. Loftus et al., 1978) a future study should keep such 
manipulations constant in order to draw more reliable conclusions. In this context, the 
study by Garry and Wade (2005) should be considered who used the implanted false 
memory approach to specifically investigate the effectiveness of misleading 
narratives versus misleading photos. The researchers found that it was narratives that 
were more likely to elicit false childhood memory reports. The explanation proposed 
suggests that narratives are more likely to trigger feelings of familiarity. These in turn 
may encourage cognitive processes that lead to mental representations that are more 
likely to be confused with actual experiences (Garry & Wade, 2005). However, 
research has yet to examine whether or not these effects can be replicated in the 
classical misinformation procedure in which participants are misled on existing 
memories. 
Last, Experiment 5 also showed that false brand memories led to attitudinal 
and behavioural repercussions. Specifically, after participants created false memories 
for retroactively inserted brands in the photos, they rated these brands as being more 
positive on the liking and likelihood of buying scales. This finding is consistent with 
previous research that has examined behavioural consequences for implanted false 
memories (e.g. the experience of a fictitious brand; Rajagopal & Montgomery, 2011). 
However, although Experiment 5 uncovered these effects, the way in which 
participants encoded the misinformation stimuli (focusing the attention to each brand 
by answering a question) did not accurately reflect how peripheral details in photos 
would be normally processed. We showed in Experiments 1 and 3 that brand 
misinformation effects could be revealed under more implicit learning conditions. 
However, in these studies the brand stimuli were not personalized to a participant. 
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Future research has yet to address the question of whether false memories as well as 
preference change effects can be elicited under such circumstances. Because the 
effects in Experiments 1 and 3 were generally less strong compared to Experiment 5, 
it is possible that more sensitive tests would have to be used in order to tap into 
potential preference change effects in such a study. For example, one possibility is to 
measure preference changes using an implicit association test as supposed to an 
explicit brand rating task.  
From a theoretical point of view, the source-monitoring framework is a 
suitable model to explain our results. From this perspective, the misinformation effect 
found in this study is likely to be caused by source confusions, more specifically, by 
confusing the source of the misleading brand memory with the original brand 
exposure (Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). Several findings of this project speak for a 
source-monitoring account. First, participants falsely attributed the misleading items 
to the original event phase even when their source-memory was directly tested by 
using a source-monitoring task. Hence, even if presumably more extended reasoning 
was involved at test, participants still misattributed some of the misleading postevent 
details to the original event phase. Moreover, the original items in the misled item 
condition (seen during the first brand exposure only) were sometimes falsely 
attributed to the second or both event phases. Hence, these memory errors were not 
reserved for the misleading items alone but occurred for other item types as well. 
However, it is possible that these source-monitoring errors might have 
interacted with memory impairment and memory interference mechanisms and that 
participant’s original event memory trace was affected by the study manipulations. 
Throughout this project, evidence for a memory impairment view was found in more 
accurate item memory in the control relative to the misled item condition. 
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Participants created more hits for control brands (shown in a consistent manner) 
compared to items on which they were misled. A sub-experiment in Experiment 5 
revealed this trend even when a more conservative baseline measure was used. More 
specifically, when participants were not misled on originally experienced brands (and 
also not exposed twice to them) but were tested on these items after a delay of one 
week, the hit rate for these brands was still higher compared to that recorded in the 
misled item condition of Experiment 5. These findings suggest that participant’s 
original event memory was initially existent and strong but that it was affected by the 
misleading information.  
Another explanation for the misinformation-based false alarms recorded in 
this project are ‘non-false memory’ related mechanisms such as social demands, 
recency effects, as well as guessing biases. Although we do not exclude the 
possibility that these mechanisms were behind some of the misinformation false 
alarms recorded here, we believe that our methodology and cover stories should have 
kept such effects to a minimum. First, the critical items in the recognition tests were 
embedded in a substantial amount of related foil items, which should have made it 
hard to apply any kind of strategy. Second, in cases in which these mechanisms might 
have influenced the recognition test results, such responses were likely to be filtered 
out in the final source-monitoring task. Here, we specifically encouraged participants 
to reconsider the sources of their recognition test answers.  
It is possible that, to some extent or other, several of the above-mentioned 
processes contributed to the brand misinformation effects revealed in this work. 
Although some control measures were applied, the mechanisms reported above 
cannot be disentangled in the paradigm used. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to 
assume that in some cases, participants genuinely believed that a misleading brand 
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from the photos was indeed experienced originally. In cases in which misinformation 
false alarms were indeed based on more endogenous processes (i.e., memory traces as 
supposed to more exogenous possesses such as demand characteristics), alternative 
theories can account for our findings. For example, according to Fuzzy Trace Theory 
(Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) participants might have falsely recognized the misleading 
detail because it triggered memory for the gist of the originally seen information 
(Reyna & Titcomb 1997). Alternatively, spreading activation models such as 
Activation Monitoring Theory (Roediger et al., 2001) and Associative-Activation 
Theory (Howe et al., 2009) suggest that at encoding of the original event information 
the related but misleading item was activated due to spreading activation across 
meaning-connected information in memory (Otgaar et al., 2016). Together with the 
actual presentation of the misleading item, strong activation for these items might 
have been responsible for the false memories revealed. From an Activation 
Monitoring Theory perspective (see also Source of Activation Confusion model; 
Ayers & Reder, 1998) false memories might have been created at the time of memory 
retrieval as well, in which participants distinguished between activation resulting 
from originally presented items and the more recently seen and potentially stronger 
activated misleading detail. In this process, source monitoring-errors might have 
occurred (Steffens & Mecklenbräuker, 2007).  
  The misinformation effects revealed in this work were found by using 
different ‘types’ of photographs. That is, a reliable misinformation effect was 
detected by using misleading photos taken by strangers (Experiments 1 and 3), photos 
that were (allegedly) taken by participants (Experiment 4), as well as photographs 
that showed the participants themselves (Experiment 5). Hence, independent of the 
type of picture that was used, participants falsely attributed the misleading brands to 
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the original event. In line with the findings of Nash et al. (2009), these results suggest 
that feelings of familiarity might have been one factor why participants created these 
source-misattributions. When the misleading brands were accompanied by a rush of 
familiarity that was also experienced for the originally experienced brands, 
participants might have falsely assumed that the misleading brands must have 
appeared or must have been chosen originally (Nash et al., 2009). In addition, data 
suggest that the credibility associated with the photographs might have played a role 
in these effects. More specifically, in Experiment 5, in which participants were 
depicted in the photo, the false alarm rate for the misleading items was higher 
compared to Experiment 4, in which participants were not depicted in the photos. 
Hence, it is possible that participants in Experiment 5 perceived the photos as being 
more credible and as a result, they adopted a lower source-monitoring criteria when 
the judgments were made (Nash et al., 2009). However, although these results are 
somewhat in line with previous research, this work did not specifically examine how 
misinformation effects differ depending of the specific type of photograph.   
In order to further evaluate the nature of misinformation acceptances revealed 
in our studies, some measures can be reviewed across experiments. For example, 
looking at participant’s phenomenological experience associated with memory 
retrieval of misleading items, the results of all experiments provided evidence that the 
Remember, Know, and Guess pattern for misinformation false memories often 
matched that of participants’ veridical memories. Experiments 4 and 5, that included 
a delay between original event and misinformation phase, revealed a clear pattern of 
more remember than know, and more know than guess responses for misleading 
items. Whereas in Experiment 4 the same pattern was found for original items in the 
control and misled item conditions, in Experiment 5 this was only the case for 
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original items in the control item condition. In the misled item condition, no 
statistical difference between remember and know judgements was found. 
Interestingly, the same pattern (more remember than know judgements for misleading 
items but no difference for original items in misled item condition) was found in 
Experiment 3’s 1-week delay condition, in which the same retention intervals were 
used as in Experiment 5. Overall this suggests that particularly in longer delay 
situations, false memories for the misleading brands seem to be perceived as having 
the same subjective qualities that veridical memories enjoy (compared to veridical 
memories for non-misled, control items).  
Previous research that has used false narratives to implant misleading 
information suggests a different trend for items that contradicted an original event 
detail. In these studies, the false retrieval of contradicting misinformation items was 
associated with higher scores of know than remember responses, independent of the 
question when the final test was carried out. However, these studies specifically 
examined delays between the original event and final test and it is unclear whether it 
was the misleading photos or the different retention intervals that caused these 
differences. Nevertheless, in the paradigm used here, the distinct psychological 
experiences that accompanied participants’ true and false memory retrieval turned out 
to be similar in nature. Interestingly, in all studies, no difference between Remember, 
Know, and Guess judgements were found for the foil items. In the main, foil false 
alarms were more often known than remembered, suggesting that misinformation 
false alarms and foils false alarms were indeed perceived as having different 
subjective qualities. 
Another measure that provides information about the nature of misinformation 
acceptances is the attributions of items to the individual source options in the source-
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monitoring task. When we further analysed participants’ source attributions, 
consistent with previous research (e.g. Zaragoza & Lane, 1994), we found that most 
robust source misattributions were made because participants falsely attributed the 
misleading brand to both the original event and the misinformation phase. Rarely 
were misleading items falsely attributed to the original event only. In addition, 
although many false alarms recorded in the recognition test were corrected when 
judgments were made under more systematic decision-making processes in the 
source-monitoring task, throughout all studies, participants hardly used the ‘brands 
conflicted across phases’ answer option. Together these results suggest that many 
participants did not notice that the brands differed across original event and 
misinformation phase.  
Another finding that speaks for this fact is that many of the originally 
experienced brands were also falsely attributed to both event phases. Although these 
findings are not unusual (e.g. see Okado & Stark, 2005), results suggest that source 
misattributions to both event phases were not reserved for the misleading items alone 
(particularly in Experiments 1, 3, and 4). An explanation for this finding comes from 
a consistency assumption perspective (Blank, 2009). Here, it is proposed that unless 
participants are warned or are suspicious about the misinformation, they presume the 
misleading postevent information to be consistent with the original event. Although 
we did ask participants to reconsider the sources of their recognition test answers in 
the source-monitoring task, we did not explicitly warn participants about potential 
inconsistencies in the materials. Hence, in a next step it would be interesting and 
important to examine how the effects revealed in our studies would develop in a 
misinformation warning condition. Although warnings have been shown to reduce 
the magnitude of the misinformation effect compared to non-warning conditions, 
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reliable misinformation effects have been revealed under these conditions (e.g. Eakin 
et al., 2003).  
Our findings have implications for marketers including insights into the 
effectiveness of a new, albeit futuristic, advertising measure. Traditional 
advertisements serve to ‘remind’ consumers to purchase a product again. However, 
advertisements are often thought of with disdain, designed to manipulate buying 
habits. As a result, consumers develop advertising avoidance strategies such as using 
online advertising blockers or online TV services such as Netflix. Retroactive implicit 
brand placement could lead consumers to reinterpret and reconstruct their past 
experiences (believed that they consumed one particular brand over the other; Braun, 
1999; Braun & Loftus, 1998; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). This then becomes part of 
their own decision-making experiences. Our study provides evidence that brand 
attitudes and buying behaviour might be influenced as a result. Indeed, as Loftus and 
Pickrell (see also Braun & Loftus, 1998) note, this type of situation may be ripe for 
memory distortion: `New information invades us, like a Trojan horse, precisely 
because we don't detect its influence' (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995, p. 720). 
 Another point to mention is the importance of protecting consumers from 
such implicit advertising techniques. This is particularly important for young 
consumers who create sophisticated ‘online personalities’ and spend many hours on 
unregulated Internet sites and thus might be particularly vulnerable to these 
manipulations. Our results will also help policy makers evaluate the effects of 
deceptive advertising techniques and develop programs for stopping them at an early 
stage. But even if the manipulation of personal photos on social network platforms 
fails on legal grounds, our findings can be translated into other marketing techniques. 
For example, in ambush marketing, advertisers try to associate their own brand with a 
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sponsoring event (without paying for official sponsoring rights) at the cost of a true 
and official sponsor (Cornwell & Humphreys, 2013). If marketers manage to create 
false positive associations between brands and the sponsored event, attitudes and 
purchasing behaviour for these brands might change (see also Braun-LaTour et al., 
2006, for potential areas of application of the advertising misinformation effect and 
its consequences). It appears, then, that retroactive brand replacement could be a 
powerful tool. 
This research has implicated cognitive mechanisms by which consumers fall 
prey to deceptive advertising techniques (see also Braun, 1999; Braun & Loftus, 
1998; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). However, marketers should be aware that these very 
cognitive mechanisms might also lead to product liability. Holmes and Weaver 
(2010) highlight the issue of civil ‘toxic tort’ cases. Here, individuals allege that some 
product they used in the past caused them harm. For example, the past exposure to 
asbestos in various products is now causing serious health problems. Witnesses 
maybe shown a series of photographs to ‘refresh’ their recollection of products they 
may have used from the past that are now known to contain asbestos. However, we 
have seen that in the memory literature the extent to which a witness’ memory is 
‘refreshed’ as opposed to ‘created’ or ‘altered’ is a matter of heated discussion, and 
has clear serious implications for these civil product liability cases (Holmes & 
Weaver, 2010). 
We have already mentioned several limitations of this research and made 
suggestions how these shortcomings could be addressed in future research. Examples 
include a further investigation of factors that potentially influence encoding processes 
of brand placements in photos, the usage of alternative tests to examine the uptake of 
misinformation and preference change phenomena, as well as the need for 
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‘misinformation warnings’ in future studies. Another factor to consider is the 
inclusion of different control groups/conditions in future studies. In this regard, a 
commonly used baseline for misinformation acceptances is the false alarm rate for 
foil items in the control condition. In a counterbalanced design this can be done 
because these foils ‘would’ have been used to mislead on original event experience in 
the misled condition. This design was used in Experiment 1 and 5. However, 
although we included a small control sample in Experiment 3 (see Footnote 12), the 
more loosely associated foils in Experiments 3 and 4 were not used as actual study 
items. The reason for applying this method was our specific research question, which 
centred on the high amount of foil false alarms recorded in Experiment 1. However, 
detached from this motivation, a more elegant design would have included the foils at 
study in Experiments 3 and 4. Related to this, one might argue that the endorsement 
of original items in the control item condition might not be an ideal baseline to 
determine whether memory impairment occurred in our studies or not. Because 
original items in the control item condition were seen twice compared to only once 
for original items in the misled item condition, the question arises as to whether it 
was retrieval strength in the control item condition that led to this advantage in hit 
rates. Although this approach has been used in other studies (e.g. Holmes & Weaver, 
2010; Loftus et al., 1978) typically, original items are not or are only vaguely 
mentioned again during the exposure to misinformation. As mentioned above in this 
discussion, in Experiment 5 we did report the results of a sub-experiment (see 
Footnote 22), suggesting the occurrence of memory impairment even by using a more 
conservative baseline. However, the effects in Experiment 5 were generally quite 
strong and it has yet to be examined whether or not these effects can be replicated in 
a more incidental brand learning design as used in Experiments 1 and 3. Again, we 
  
229 
believe that the usage of more sensitive tests might be needed in order to reveal these 
effects.  
 Even with these limitations in mind, this research has given insight into a 
creative, albeit controversial, advertising method. Today marketers encounter a fierce 
advertising environment that demands creative and effective measures that 
specifically target the potential consumer. We showed that it is possible to implant 
false memories for brands that were retroactively inserted into personal photographs. 
Thus, naturally-occurring misinformation can be implanted to make consumers 
falsely believe that a past experience contained details other than what was originally 
experienced (Braun & Loftus, 1998). Moreover, the data suggested that once these 
false memories are formed, they might be associated with a positive shift in 
attitudinal and behavioural consequences. These findings provide good evidence that 
many of the laboratory-based false memory effects are robust when examined in a 
more ecologically relevant environment and serve to extend the generalizability of 
these effects. Although several questions remain to be addressed as part of this 
research agenda, we have provided convincing evidence to suggest that retroactive 
product replacement might be a powerful tool in an advertiser’s armament. Although 
false memories are neither inherently good nor bad (Howe, 2011; Schacter, Guerin, & 
St. Jacques, 2011), the current research has demonstrated that in yet another context, 
the emergence of memory illusions can have some potentially costly consequences.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
 
Experiment 1: Table showing brand categories and brands used with mean 
proportions of yes-responses in the recognition test as a function of Item type and 
Condition. 
 
Brand categories Brand 
names
Original 
Item
Misleadi
ng 
Item
Foil 
Item
Original 
Item
Foil 
Item
Total 0,35 0,41 0,34 0,60 0,37
Fosters 0,67 0,50 0,69 0,77 0,63
Stella 0,20 0,45 0,22 0,43 0,28
Heineken 0,18 0,27 0,11 0,60 0,19
Total 0,44 0,55 0,30 0,69 0,29
Buxton 0,64 0,82 0,33 0,64 0,29
Evian 0,38 0,56 0,31 0,43 0,23
Volvic 0,30 0,27 0,27 1,00 0,35
Total 0,44 0,22 0,21 0,82 0,29
Sky 0,42 0,23 0,00 0,85 0,23
BT 0,55 0,18 0,13 0,60 0,27
Virgin 0,36 0,25 0,50 1,00 0,38
Total 0,39 0,26 0,23 0,63 0,44
Nikon 0,54 0,25 0,55 1,00 0,42
Kodak 0,20 0,18 0,14 0,45 0,38
Canon 0,42 0,33 0,00 0,43 0,54
Total 0,60 0,30 0,35 0,52 0,18
Sixt 0,67 0,33 0,54 0,60 0,23
Hertz 0,55 0,09 0,33 0,64 0,12
Europcar 0,60 0,46 0,18 0,33 0,20
Total 0,50 0,40 0,41 0,73 0,29
Special K 0,55 0,70 0,56 0,50 0,45
Nestle Fitnesse 0,40 0,29 0,43 0,68 0,17
Weetabix 0,56 0,21 0,25 1,00 0,25
Total 0,46 0,41 0,18 0,40 0,20
Strongbow 0,56 0,63 0,29 0,64 0,29
Bulmers 0,33 0,18 0,25 0,00 0,07
Blackthorn 0,50 0,42 0,00 0,57 0,24
Total 0,60 0,43 0,40 0,54 0,49
Walkers 0,90 0,40 0,70 0,67 0,63
Dorritos 0,50 0,45 0,22 0,58 0,31
Kettle 0,40 0,44 0,27 0,38 0,53
Total 0,43 0,41 0,18 0,65 0,22
Cadbury 0,13 0,38 0,44 0,79 0,44
Milka 0,55 0,64 0,10 0,50 0,15
Galaxy 0,62 0,23 0,00 0,67 0,08
Total 0,55 0,32 0,31 0,80 0,28
Topshop 0,62 0,42 0,25 0,77 0,25
River Island 0,71 0,20 0,31 0,83 0,22
next 0,31 0,33 0,38 0,80 0,37
Total 0,72 0,41 0,30 0,91 0,26
Costa 0,64 0,50 0,78 1,00 0,36
Nero 0,88 0,30 0,00 0,87 0,11
Starbucks 0,64 0,44 0,11 0,86 0,31
Total 0,38 0,22 0,14 0,51 0,15
Confused 0,20 0,11 0,00 0,29 0,13
Gocompare 0,55 0,25 0,25 0,64 0,20
Comparethem 0,40 0,30 0,18 0,62 0,11
Total 0,48 0,36 0,24 0,31 0,21
Monster 0,46 0,42 0,09 0,46 0,23
Rockstar 0,25 0,17 0,17 0,00 0,21
Red Bull 0,73 0,50 0,46 0,45 0,20
Clothes shop 
Condition/Item Type
Energy drink 
Coffee shop 
Misled item Control item
Compare website 
Chocolate 
Broadband 
Car rental
Camera 
Chips 
Cider 
Beer 
Bottled Water 
Cereal 
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Red Bull 0.73 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.20
Brand categories Brand 
names
Original 
Item
Misleadi
ng 
Item
Foil 
Item
Original 
Item
Foil 
Item
Total 0.72 0.39 0.32 0.71 0.17
KFC 0.60 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.12
McDonalds 0.90 0.56 0.38 0.92 0.33
Burger King 0.67 0.17 0.13 0.71 0.06
Total 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.63 0.22
Dr Pepper 0.22 0.36 0.29 0.60 0.12
Coca Cola 0.25 0.22 0.10 0.64 0.24
Pepsi 0.50 0.29 0.50 0.64 0.29
Total 0.42 0.33 0.19 0.48 0.18
Playstation 0.63 0.45 0.14 0.50 0.23
X Box 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.60 0.12
Wii 0.38 0.25 0.20 0.33 0.19
Total 0.37 0.35 0.21 0.29 0.21
Innocent 0.45 0.36 0.00 0.22 0.36
Tropicana 0.56 0.45 0.45 0.65 0.21
Don Simon 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.00 0.04
Total 0.42 0.37 0.13 0.65 0.18
Easyjet 0.67 0.20 0.38 0.80 0.28
Ryanair 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.79 0.14
Flybe 0.10 0.57 0.00 0.36 0.13
Total 0.32 0.26 0.11 0.51 0.25
Peugeot 0.38 0.40 0.23 0.54 0.23
Ford 0.40 0.18 0.00 0.33 0.38
VW 0.18 0.20 0.10 0.67 0.13
Total 0.27 0.35 0.14 0.40 0.20
HTC 0.44 0.50 0.13 0.71 0.14
LG 0.00 0.33 0.18 0.22 0.24
Motorola 0.36 0.22 0.13 0.27 0.22
Total 0.51 0.39 0.19 0.56 0.13
Yahoo 0.70 0.63 0.11 0.73 0.21
Bing 0.38 0.30 0.13 0.40 0.05
Google 0.44 0.25 0.33 0.56 0.15
Total 0.22 0.26 0.14 0.38 0.17
Shell 0.36 0.45 0.33 0.50 0.19
Aral 0.11 0.20 0.09 0.36 0.11
Total 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.29 0.20
Total 0.41 0.29 0.28 0.61 0.16
Tesco 0.50 0.57 0.30 0.73 0.33
Asda 0.50 0.11 0.40 0.71 0.00
Morrisons 0.22 0.18 0.14 0.40 0.16
Total 0.31 0.19 0.20 0.31 0.25
Nike 0.29 0.25 0.18 0.33 0.30
Adidas 0.33 0.11 0.13 0.27 0.29
Puma 0.30 0.22 0.29 0.33 0.17
Sports clothes
Fastfood 
Service station 
Mid-range car
Game console 
Fizzy soft drink
Supermarket 
Orange juice 
Search engine 
Mobile 
Control itemMisled item
Condition/Item Type
Energy drink 
Low cost airline
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Appendix B 
Experiment 1: Example photo versions ‘Picnic scene’ and ‘Shopping Centre scene’  
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Appendix C 
 
Experiment 1: Recognition test responses: Table showing the mean proportion of yes-
responses (SE) for each item type as a function of Condition, Time of test, and 
Stimuli test format (Format) 
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Appendix D 
Experiment 1: ANOVA summary tables recognition test raw score analysis 
Appendix D1: Raw recognition score analysis misled item condition 
Test statistics of 3(Item type: original item vs. misleading item vs. foil item) x2(Time 
of test: immediate vs. delay) x2(Stimuli test format: font vs. pictorial) mixed factor 
ANOVA in the misled item condition 
 
Appendix D2 
Raw recognition score analysis comparisons across condition  
Test statistics of 2(Condition: misled vs. control) x2(Time of test: immediate vs. 
delay) x2(Stimuli test format: font vs. pictorial) mixed factor ANOVA separately for 
original items, misleading items, and foil items 
Original items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 1.149 2 0.575 20.126 0.000 0.272
Item Type * Time of Test 0.002 2 0.001 0.039 0.962 0.001
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.041 2 0.021 0.722 0.488 0.013
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.091 2 0.046 1.595 0.208 0.029
Error (IT) 3.083 108 0.029
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 19.507 1 19.507 361.090 0.000 0.870
Time of Test 0.000 1 0.000 0.001 0.971 0.000
Stimuli Test format 0.047 1 0.047 0.861 0.358 0.016
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.003 1 0.003 0.061 0.807 0.001
Error 2.917 54 0.054
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.391 1 0.391 19.108 0.000 0.261
Item Type * Time of Test 0.002 1 0.002 0.091 0.765 0.002
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.002 1 0.002 0.091 0.765 0.002
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.008 1 0.008 0.407 0.526 0.007
Error (IT) 1.105 54 0.020
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 28.318 1 28.318 551.882 0.000 0.911
Time of Test 0.000 1 0.000 0.009 0.926 0.000
Stimuli Test format 0.135 1 0.135 2.624 0.111 0.046
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.007 1 0.007 0.135 0.715 0.002
Error 2.771 54 0.051
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
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Misleading items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foil items 
 
 
  
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.432 1 0.432 25.403 0.000 0.320
Item Type * Time of Test 0.008 1 0.008 0.478 0.492 0.009
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.011 1 0.011 0.635 0.429 0.012
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.032 1 0.032 1.874 0.177 0.034
Error (IT) 0.919 54 0.017
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 8.479 1 8.479 197.453 0.000 0.785
Time of Test 0.002 1 0.002 0.046 0.832 0.001
Stimuli Test format 0.001 1 0.001 0.022 0.884 0.000
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.037 1 0.037 0.872 0.355 0.016
Error 2.319 54 0.043
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.022 1 0.022 2.272 0.138 0.040
Item Type * Time of Test 0.002 1 0.002 0.205 0.653 0.004
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.008 1 0.008 0.818 0.370 0.015
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.014 1 0.014 1.454 0.233 0.026
Error (IT) 0.530 54 0.010
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 5.778 1 5.778 162.740 0.000 0.751
Time of Test 0.008 1 0.008 0.226 0.636 0.004
Stimuli Test format 0.002 1 0.002 0.057 0.813 0.001
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.011 1 0.011 0.308 0.581 0.006
Error 1.917 54 0.036
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
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Appendix D3
: 
ANOVA summary tables recognition test analysis remember responses
 
Analysis remember responses misled item condition 
Test statistics of 3(Item type: original item vs. misleading item vs. foil item) x2(Time 
of test: immediate vs. delay) x2(Stimuli test format: font vs. pictorial) mixed factor 
ANOVA in the misled item condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D4 
Analysis remember responses across condition  
Test statistics of 2(Condition: misled vs. control) x2(Time of test: immediate vs. 
delay) x2(Stimuli test format: font vs. pictorial) mixed factor ANOVA separately for 
original items, misleading items, and foil items 
Original items 
 
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.920 2 0.460 21.118 0.000 0.281
Item Type * Time of Test 0.037 2 0.018 0.842 0.433 0.015
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.048 2 0.024 1.099 0.337 0.020
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.022 2 0.011 0.508 0.603 0.009
Error (IT) 2.353 108 0.022
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 5.008 1 5.008 212.213 0.000 0.797
Time of Test 0.148 1 0.148 6.279 0.015 0.104
Stimuli Test format 0.280 1 0.280 11.873 0.001 0.180
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.056 1 0.056 2.376 0.129 0.042
Error 1.274 54 0.024
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.221 1 0.221 21.202 0.000 0.282
Item Type * Time of Test 0.024 1 0.024 2.350 0.131 0.042
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.022 1 0.022 2.148 0.149 0.038
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.022 1 0.022 2.148 0.149 0.038
Error (IT) 0.563 54 0.010
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 1.479 1 1.479 77.585 0.000 0.590
Time of Test 0.035 1 0.035 1.811 0.184 0.032
Stimuli Test format 0.051 1 0.051 2.652 0.109 0.047
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.038 1 0.038 1.994 0.164 0.036
Error 1.029 54 0.019
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
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Misleading items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foil items 
 
 
 
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.230 1 0.230 16.212 0.000 0.231
Item Type * Time of Test 0.014 1 0.014 0.977 0.327 0.018
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.019 1 0.019 1.306 0.258 0.024
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.049 1 0.049 3.483 0.067 0.061
Error (IT) 0.766 54 0.014
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 11.081 1 11.081 179.410 0.000 0.769
Time of Test 0.139 1 0.139 2.249 0.140 0.040
Stimuli Test format 0.290 1 0.290 4.687 0.035 0.080
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.073 1 0.073 1.174 0.283 0.021
Error 3.335 54 0.062
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.010 1 0.010 2.716 0.105 0.048
Item Type * Time of Test 0.002 1 0.002 0.443 0.508 0.008
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.007 1 0.007 2.020 0.161 0.036
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.005 1 0.005 1.382 0.245 0.025
Error (IT) 0.200 54 0.004
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 0.716 1 0.716 54.229 0.000 0.501
Time of Test 0.005 1 0.005 0.369 0.546 0.007
Stimuli Test format 0.026 1 0.026 1.979 0.165 0.035
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.014 1 0.014 1.034 0.314 0.019
Error 0.713 54 0.013
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
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Appendix D5: ANOVA summary tables recognition test analysis know responses 
Analysis know responses misled item condition 
Test statistics of 3(Item type: original item vs. misleading item vs. foil item) x2(Time 
of test: immediate vs. delay) x2(Stimuli test format: font vs. pictorial) mixed factor 
ANOVA in the misled item condition 
 
 
Appendix D6 
Analysis know responses across condition  
Test statistics of 2(Condition: misled vs. control) x2(Time of test: immediate vs. 
delay) x2(Stimuli test format: font vs. pictorial) mixed factor ANOVA separately for 
original items, misleading items, and foil items 
Original items 
 
 
 
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.020 2 0.010 1.212 0.302 0.022
Item Type * Time of Test 0.065 2 0.033 3.990 0.021 0.069
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.002 2 0.001 0.123 0.884 0.002
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.017 2 0.009 1.044 0.356 0.019
Error (IT) 0.885 108 0.008
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 1.768 1 1.768 90.479 0.000 0.626
Time of Test 0.012 1 0.012 0.605 0.440 0.011
Stimuli Test format 0.054 1 0.054 2.768 0.102 0.049
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.001 1 0.001 0.072 0.789 0.001
Error 1.055 54 0.020
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.015 1 0.015 1.389 0.244 0.025
Item Type * Time of Test 0.028 1 0.028 2.579 0.114 0.046
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.003 1 0.003 0.283 0.597 0.005
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.012 1 0.012 1.073 0.305 0.019
Error (IT) 0.593 54 0.011
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 1.583 1 1.583 100.876 0.000 0.651
Time of Test 0.036 1 0.036 2.302 0.135 0.041
Stimuli Test format 0.034 1 0.034 2.138 0.149 0.038
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.000 1 0.000 0.008 0.931 0.000
Error 0.847 54 0.016
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
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Misleading items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foil items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.027 1 0.027 4.658 0.035 0.079
Item Type * Time of Test 0.000 1 0.000 0.013 0.910 0.000
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.001 1 0.001 0.168 0.683 0.003
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.004 1 0.004 0.764 0.386 0.014
Error (IT) 0.308 54 0.006
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 1.066 1 1.066 78.019 0.000 0.591
Time of Test 0.002 1 0.002 0.183 0.671 0.003
Stimuli Test format 0.033 1 0.033 2.410 0.126 0.043
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.001 1 0.001 0.045 0.833 0.001
Error 0.738 54 0.014
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Item Type 0.001 1 0.001 0.228 0.635 0.004
Item Type * Time of Test 0.009 1 0.009 2.539 0.117 0.045
Item Type * Stimuli Test format 0.000 1 0.000 0.071 0.790 0.001
Item Type * Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.007 1 0.007 1.810 0.184 0.032
Error (IT) 0.196 54 0.004
Source SS df MS F Sig. η p
2 
Intercept 0.807 1 0.807 69.320 0.000 0.562
Time of Test 0.003 1 0.003 0.256 0.615 0.005
Stimuli Test format 0.039 1 0.039 3.315 0.074 0.058
Time of Test * Stimuli Test format 0.002 1 0.002 0.135 0.715 0.002
Error 0.628 54 0.012
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
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Appendix E 
 
Experiment 1: Recognition test responses: Table showing the mean proportion of 
Remember (R), Know (K), and Guess (G) responses (SE) for each item type as a 
function of condition, Time of test, and Stimuli test format (format). 
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Appendix F 
 
Experiment 1: Table showing proportion of correct and incorrect source attributions 
(robust memory performance rates) for each item type as a function of Condition, 
Time of test, and Stimuli test format (Format). 
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Appendix G 
 
Experiment 2: Table showing the brand recall data of Task 1 including the six most 
often recalled brands per category in alphabetical order of brand categories used 
 
 
Brand 
Category
Brands
Recall 
Score
Brand 
Category
Brands
Recall 
Score
Heineken 0.41 Starbucks 0.92
Guinness 0.37 Costa 0.65
Fosters 0.33 Nero 0.55
Carlsberg 0.31 Pret a manger 0.53
Stella Artois 0.25 Greggs 0.04
Budweiser 0.24 Eat 0.04
Evian 0.76 Compare the market 0.51
Volvic 0.37 Gocompare 0.41
Highland Spring 0.25 Moneysupermarket 0.22
Buxton 0.20 Confused 0.22
Nestle 0.10 Money Saving Expert 0.06
San Pellegrino 0.10 Admiral 0.04
Nikon 0.73 Walkers 0.82
Samsung 0.59 Doritos 0.47
Sony 0.49 MCCoys 0.29
Canon 0.35 Pringles 0.27
Fuji 0.20 Hula Hoops 0.20
Kodak 0.18 Sensations 0.18
Kelloggs 0.65 Red Bull 0.84
Coco Pops 0.47 Monster 0.47
Weetabix 0.39 Lucozade 0.43
Nestle 0.31 Boost 0.24
Cornflakes 0.22 Relentless 0.22
Rice crispies 0.20 Powerrate 0.10
Hertz 0.20 Nivea 0.59
Europcar 0.14 L'oreal 0.37
Rent a Car 0.12 Simple 0.31
Sixt 0.08 Garnier 0.25
Avis 0.08 Dove 0.22
Cadbury 0.61 Clinique 0.18
Galaxy 0.43 Topshop 0.71
Nestle 0.39 Primark 0.57
Kinder 0.29 H&M 0.55
Mars 0.25 River Island 0.49
Lindt 0.24 New Look 0.47
Strongbow 0.31 Zara 0.39
Bulmers 0.18 McDonalds 1.00
Magners 0.14 KFC 0.90
Stella Artois 0.10 Burger King 0.90
Koppaberg 0.08 Subway 0.49
Gaymers 0.04 Pizza Hut 0.41
Dominos 0.20
Fashion 
shop
Fast Food
Cider
Chocolate
Coffee shop
Comparison
website
Crisps
Energy
drink
Facial 
cream
Beer
Bottled water
Camera
Cereals
Car rental
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 Dominos 0.20
Brand 
Category
Brands
Recall 
Score
Brand 
Category
Brands
Recall 
Score
Coca Cola 0.96 Samsung 0.86
Fanta 0.75 Nokia 0.71
Pepsi 0.65 Sony 0.67
Sprite 0.45 Apple 0.61
7-up 0.39 Blackberry 0.47
Dr. Pepper 0.33 HTC 0.47
Nintendo Wii 0.96 Asos 0.51
Sony Playstation 0.84 Boohoo 0.39
Microsoft X-Box 0.75 Missguided 0.20
Sega 0.18 Very 0.14
Atari 0.04 Nasty Gal 0.04
Tesco 0.94 Alienware 0.06
Sainsburys 0.86 Tropicana 0.55
Asda 0.82 Innocent 0.33
Waitrose 0.69 SunnyD 0.16
Morrisons 0.59 Robinsons 0.10
Lidl 0.45 Capri Sun 0.10
Virgin 0.73 Copella 0.08
BT 0.73 Shell 0.57
Sky 0.63 BP 0.51
Talk Talk 0.51 Texaco 0.27
o2 0.24 Esso 0.24
Orange 0.18 Total 0.06
Apple 0.94 Jet 0.06
dell 0.80 Google 0.98
Asus 0.73 Yahoo 0.69
Samsung 0.55 Bing 0.61
Sony 0.51 Ask Jeeves 0.49
HP 0.29 Facebook 0.96
Easy Jet 0.76 Twitter 0.86
Ryanair 0.61 Instagram 0.61
Monarch 0.16 MySpace 0.41
Flybe 0.08 Tumblr 0.29
Wizzair 0.06 Linked In 0.22
BMI Baby 0.04 Nike 0.96
German Wings 0.04 Adidas 0.67
Ford 0.59 Puma 0.57
Toyota 0.47 Reebok 0.55
Volkswagen 0.39 Converse 0.20
BMW 0.37 Umbro 0.12
Vauxhall 0.33
Mercedes 0.31
Search 
engine
Social 
network
Sports 
clothing
Fizzy soft 
drink
Laptop
Lowcost
airline
Mid-range 
car
Mobile
Online 
shopping
Orange juice
Fast Food
Game
console
Grocery 
shop
Internet
provider Petrol
station
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Experiment 2: Table showing the brand rating data of Task 2 per category in 
alphabetical order of brand categories used 
 
 
Brand Category Brand Potency Evaluation Activity
Stella Artois 2.23 2.78 4.38
Carlsberg 2.55 3.25 4.03
Guinness 2.31 3.16 5.13
Carling 2.64 3.15 4.85
Corona 3.41 2.81 4.59
Becks 2.81 3.29 4.71
Foster's 2.57 3.50 4.79
Budweiser 3.10 3.67 4.86
Peroni 4.35 2.95 4.96
John Smith's 5.33 4.30 6.43
Tennent's 5.43 4.73 6.16
Evian 1.44 1.11 1.64
Volvic 1.97 2.22 2.27
Buxton 3.06 2.55 3.24
Highland Spring 3.03 2.83 3.06
Nestle Waters 4.26 3.28 4.41
San Pellegrino 4.58 3.88 5.42
Perrier 4.87 3.73 5.41
Iceni 5.83 5.13 6.00
Sony 1.61 1.92 2.57
Canon 1.97 2.03 2.69
Nikon 2.11 2.05 3.00
Kodak 2.76 2.56 3.33
Panasonic 2.54 2.85 3.43
Casio 3.24 3.09 3.72
Pentax 5.61 5.09 5.41
Leica 5.59 4.85 6.00
Coco Pops 1.50 2.59 2.92
Weetabix 2.22 2.26 2.89
Corn Flakes 1.51 2.68 3.47
Special K 2.30 2.60 3.73
Crunchy Nut 2.61 2.89 3.64
Cheerios 2.39 3.17 4.29
All Bran 3.54 3.13 4.68
Alpen 3.94 3.63 4.70
Hertz 3.18 2.55 3.73
Europcar 4.00 2.71 4.29
Sixt 4.06 2.81 4.65
Avis 4.22 4.00 5.54
National 5.39 4.25 5.83
Budget 5.78 4.56 5.54
Easyrent 6.48 5.50 6.21
Alamo 6.35 5.71 6.15
Cadbury 1.58 1.66 2.00
Galaxy 1.76 1.97 2.00
Lindt 2.29 1.89 2.68
Nestle 1.84 2.46 2.82
Toblerone 2.49 2.91 3.76
Milka 3.16 3.19 4.14
Green & Blacks 4.70 3.70 4.90
Ritter Sport 5.21 4.86 5.79
Car rental
Chocolate
Beer
Camera
Bottled water
Cereals
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Brand Category Brand Potency Evaluation Activity
Strongbow 2.73 3.84 4.96
Magners 3.11 3.81 5.00
Bulmers 3.92 3.47 4.83
Koppaberg 4.04 3.50 5.08
Olde English 4.96 3.73 5.65
Sommersby 5.00 4.10 5.59
Thatchers 4.86 4.38 5.65
Blackthorn 5.35 4.40 5.80
Costa Coffee 1.71 2.14 2.22
Starbucks 1.55 1.83 2.70
Caffee Nero 2.97 2.71 3.89
McCafe 4.43 4.00 5.33
Coffee Republic 5.19 4.06 5.94
Pumpkin Cafe Shop 5.48 4.38 5.86
Caffe Ritazza 5.48 5.36 6.30
ATM Coffee 5.78 5.67 6.20
Gocompare.com 1.94 2.42 4.13
Comparethemarket.com 2.41 2.29 3.87
Confused.com 2.29 2.50 4.03
Moneysupermarket.com 2.91 2.86 4.40
swiftcover.com 5.43 5.06 5.88
Walkers 1.19 1.92 2.00
Pringles 1.46 1.82 2.61
Doritos 1.63 2.00 2.35
Mc Coy's 2.38 2.54 2.94
Kettle 3.58 2.81 4.09
Golden Wonder 5.00 4.74 5.53
Seabrook 6.03 4.83 6.23
Real 6.20 5.27 6.27
Jones 6.30 5.58 6.40
Red Bull 1.51 2.05 3.36
Lucozade 1.94 2.13 3.86
Monster 3.13 3.24 4.58
Relentless 3.24 3.29 5.00
Rockstar 4.65 4.30 5.70
Emerge 5.15 4.80 6.00
Kick 5.54 4.72 6.04
No Fear 5.56 4.63 6.20
V 5.33 5.25 6.16
Ngine 5.10 5.54 6.50
Dove 1.61 1.92 2.17
Nivea 1.56 2.06 2.42
Vaseline 1.74 1.97 2.34
Loreal 1.95 2.44 3.57
Garnier 2.11 2.75 3.28
Johnson & Johnson 2.17 2.59 3.71
Simple 2.89 2.54 3.07
Olay 2.33 2.97 4.49
Nr7 2.81 3.04 4.40
Vichy 4.80 3.68 5.21
Eucerin 5.81 5.61 6.21
H&M 1.58 2.03 2.13
New Look 2.11 2.33 2.57
Topshop 1.63 2.25 3.18
River Island 2.16 2.31 2.78
Next 2.32 3.31 4.03
French Connection 2.97 2.84 4.67
Oasis 3.11 3.42 4.32
Gap 2.27 3.54 5.06
Bershka 3.67 3.35 4.18
Banana Republic 4.15 3.21 4.14
Facial 
cream
Fashion 
shop
Cider
Coffee shop
Comparison
 website
Crisps
Energy drink
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Brand Category Brand Potency Evaluation Activity
Subway 2.11 1.86 2.67
Nandos 1.97 2.07 3.16
McDonalds 1.37 2.86 3.08
Pret A Manger 2.59 2.24 3.68
KFC 1.81 3.14 3.81
Pizza Hut 2.08 2.68 4.24
Burger King 1.82 3.44 4.27
Dominos 2.59 3.00 4.37
Eat 4.42 2.91 5.19
Chicken Cottage 4.55 4.21 4.79
Coca Cola 1.03 1.70 2.26
Fanta 1.79 2.70 3.32
Sprite 2.19 2.81 3.26
7Up 2.37 2.67 3.51
Pepsi 1.66 2.97 4.24
Oasis 3.36 2.78 3.80
Dr Pepper 2.97 3.38 4.47
Tango 3.59 3.70 5.14
Orangina 5.09 4.74 5.68
Atari 5.48 5.26 6.40
Ouya 6.29 5.82 6.48
Playstation 1.24 1.59 2.46
Sega 3.47 3.37 4.73
Wii 1.66 1.70 2.69
XBox 1.39 1.80 3.20
Zeebo 6.52 6.00 6.76
Tesco 1.16 2.32 1.55
Sainsbury's 1.50 2.25 1.87
Asda 1.94 2.43 3.11
Waitrose 2.24 1.70 4.08
Marks & Spencer 2.26 2.08 3.74
Morrisons 2.72 3.20 4.48
The co-operative 3.31 3.19 4.32
Booths 6.45 4.71 6.46
Sky 1.51 1.97 2.59
Virgin 1.49 2.21 3.03
BT 1.81 2.31 2.79
O2 2.21 2.35 3.41
Orange 2.81 3.77 4.42
Three 2.75 3.88 4.46
Talk Talk 2.95 3.77 4.73
Plusnet 5.52 4.88 6.13
Apple 1.16 1.61 2.21
Asos 1.70 1.68 2.38
Samsung 1.66 2.16 2.75
Sony Vaio 2.00 2.06 2.84
Dell 1.87 2.45 2.64
HP 1.89 2.45 3.05
Acer 2.94 3.32 4.17
Toshiba 2.87 3.27 4.31
Compaq 5.09 4.85 5.48
Lenovo 5.26 4.76 5.61
Easyjet 1.34 3.08 2.92
Ryanair 2.38 4.15 3.89
Monarch 4.85 4.33 4.96
Flybe 5.12 4.31 5.42
Germanwings 5.86 5.23 5.85
Jet2 5.59 5.21 6.15
Wizz 6.07 5.50 6.12
Laptop
Low cost 
airline
Fast food
Fizzy soft 
drink
Game 
console
Grocery 
shop
Internet 
provider
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Brand Category Brand Potency Evaluation Activity
VW 1.86 1.97 2.43
Ford 1.61 2.40 2.70
Peugeot 2.50 3.06 3.47
Nissan 2.42 3.06 3.57
Renault 3.22 3.49 4.03
Volvo 2.92 3.39 4.53
Fiat 3.16 3.86 4.53
Skoda 4.53 4.72 5.33
Seat 5.03 5.10 5.12
Apple 1.11 1.67 1.84
Samsung 1.61 1.92 2.08
Sony 2.24 2.57 3.65
Nokia 2.00 3.03 3.97
Blackberry 2.14 3.38 4.17
HTC 3.30 3.34 4.15
LG 3.68 4.29 5.14
Motorola 3.95 4.91 5.59
Boohoo 2.77 3.67 4.29
Littlewoods 2.90 3.76 5.04
Very 3.14 3.58 5.00
Missguided 4.11 3.24 4.56
Fujitso Siemens 4.97 4.92 5.90
Just Fabulous 5.85 4.63 6.00
Zalando 5.92 4.63 6.33
Tropicana 1.81 2.09 2.47
Innocent 2.03 2.03 3.19
Capri-Sun 2.26 2.79 3.11
Robinsons 2.37 2.88 3.43
Sunny D 3.29 3.66 5.00
Copella 4.22 3.67 4.67
Don Simon 5.77 4.69 5.64
Coldpress 6.14 5.17 6.20
Shell 2.11 2.41 2.69
BP 1.77 2.70 2.91
Esso 2.74 2.63 3.52
Total 3.94 3.12 4.48
Texaco 3.74 4.28 4.88
Jet 4.30 4.10 5.28
Google 1.00 1.08 1.00
Yahoo 2.14 2.95 4.00
Bing 2.82 3.26 4.68
Volunia 6.71 6.39 6.80
Youtube 1.28 1.37 1.50
Facebook 1.08 2.03 1.74
Twitter 1.47 2.36 3.43
Instagram 1.91 2.17 3.32
Tumblr 3.57 3.26 5.45
Google+ 3.64 4.06 4.68
Myspace 3.40 4.56 6.26
LinkedIn 4.61 4.50 5.93
Flickr 4.97 4.64 6.37
Bebo 5.11 5.48 6.59
Adidas 1.26 1.62 2.03
Asics 4.97 4.36 5.58
Nike 1.11 1.34 1.62
Puma 2.45 2.67 3.70
Reebok 2.45 3.24 4.46
Slazenger 4.34 4.14 5.13
Umbro 3.86 4.22 5.00
Wilson 5.42 5.04 6.07
Search 
engine
Sports 
clothing
Social
 network
Mid-range 
car
Mobile
Online 
shopping
Orange juice
Petrol 
station
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Appendix H 
 
Experiment 3: Table showing brand categories and brands used in this study with 
mean proportions of yes-responses in the recognition test as a function of Item type 
and Condition.  
 
Original, misleading items, and foil items (latter collapsed over condition) 
Control 
item
Brand categories
Brand 
names
Original 
Item
Misleading 
Item
Original 
Item
Brand 
names
Foils
Total 0.69 0.69 0.67 Total 0.13
Carlsberg 0.67 0.67 0.50 Tennent's 0.00
Carling 0.67 0.86 0.71 John Smith's 0.26
Guinness 0.75 0.56 0.80
Total 0.43 0.57 0.69 Total 0.02
Buxton 0.57 0.67 0.78 Iceni 0.04
Volvic 0.40 0.50 0.50 San Pellegrino 0.00
Evian 0.33 0.56 0.78
Total 0.47 0.63 0.50 Total 0.28
Sky 0.50 0.38 0.50 Plusnet 0.25
BT 0.57 0.83 0.44 EE 0.32
Virgin 0.33 0.67 0.56
Total 0.65 0.62 0.62 Total 0.07
Avis 0.33 0.60 0.50 Alamo 0.00
Europcar 0.75 0.56 0.80 Budget 0.13
Hertz 0.86 0.71 0.57
Total 0.54 0.59 0.65 Total 0.00
Comparethemarket 0.40 0.38 0.50 Admiral 0.00
Confused 0.71 0.83 0.89 Swiftcover 0.00
Gocompare 0.50 0.56 0.56
Total 0.50 0.42 0.66 Total 0.06
Walkers 0.57 0.67 0.67 Seabrook 0.12
Doritos 0.60 0.25 0.75 Golden Wonder 0.00
McCoy's 0.33 0.33 0.56
Total 0.36 0.44 0.41 Total 0.04
Cadbury 0.11 0.60 0.17 Ritter Sport 0.00
Galaxy 0.22 0.29 0.57 Green & Black's 0.09
Nestle 0.75 0.44 0.50
Total 0.66 0.48 0.56 Total 0.11
Nestle Cheerios 0.88 0.67 0.60 Alpen 0.22
Weetabix 0.56 0.50 0.50 Quaker 0.00
Coco Pops 0.56 0.29 0.57
Total 0.55 0.61 0.55 Total 0.15
Koppaberg 0.57 0.67 0.56 Blackthorn 0.31
Bulmers 0.40 0.38 0.75 Olde English 0.00
Strongbow 0.67 0.78 0.33
Total 0.49 0.46 0.47 Total 0.12
H&M 0.63 0.80 0.33 Bershka 0.00
River Island 0.50 0.13 0.63 Banana Republic 0.23
Topshop 0.33 0.44 0.44
Total 0.69 0.76 0.89 Total 0.09
Starbucks 0.75 0.78 1.00 Coffee Republic 0.00
Costa 0.89 0.71 1.00 Pumkin CafÌe Shop 0.17
Caffé Nero 0.44 0.80 0.67
Total 0.58 0.45 0.57 Total 0.02
Red Bull 0.63 0.67 0.80 No Fear 0.00
Monster 0.67 0.29 0.57 Kick 0.04
Lucozade 0.44 0.40 0.33
Total 0.31 0.05 0.20 Total 0.04
Dove 0.22 0.00 0.17 Vichy 0.00
Nivea 0.25 0.00 0.30 Eucerin 0.09
Loreal 0.44 0.14 0.14
(Collapsed)
Compare website 
Chocolate 
Broadband 
Crisps
Condition/Item Type
Energy drink 
Coffee shop 
Misled
 item
Car rental
Facial Creme
Cider 
Beer 
Bottled Water 
Cereal 
Clothes shop 
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Control 
item
Brand categories
Brand 
names
Original 
Item
Misleading 
Item
Original 
Item
Brand 
names
Foils
Total 0.69 0.48 0.83 Total 0.13
KFC 0.63 0.33 0.50 Chicken Cottage 0.26
McDonalds 0.44 0.40 1.00 Eat 0.00
Burger King 1.00 0.71 1.00
Total 0.39 0.36 0.52 Total 0.07
Pepsi 0.33 0.30 0.50 Tango 0.13
Coca Cola 0.63 0.22 0.50 Orangina 0.00
Fanta 0.22 0.57 0.57
Total 0.54 0.46 0.47 Total 0.04
Wii 0.33 0.33 0.50 Atari 0.09
Playstation 0.50 0.33 0.20 Sega 0.00
X-Box 0.80 0.71 0.71
Total 0.29 0.54 0.50 Total 0.12
Apple 0.33 0.78 0.56 Lenovo 0.00
Asus 0.10 0.00 0.50 Compaq 0.23
Dell 0.43 0.83 0.44
Total 0.52 0.37 0.74 Total 0.06
Monarch 0.57 0.17 0.56 Flybe 0.12
Easyjet 0.50 0.50 1.00 Jet2 0.00
Ryanair 0.50 0.44 0.67
Total 0.34 0.36 0.34 Total 0.12
Toyota 0.40 0.25 0.25 Seat 0.23
Volkswagen 0.33 0.33 0.44 Skoda 0.00
Ford 0.29 0.50 0.33
Total 0.48 0.46 0.65 Total 0.10
Innocent 0.63 0.60 0.67 Don Simon 0.00
Tropicana 0.50 0.67 0.67 Coldpress 0.19
SunnyD 0.30 0.13 0.63
Total 0.28 0.40 0.54 Total 0.02
Google 0.43 0.50 0.67 Ask Jeeves 0.04
Yahoo 0.40 0.38 0.50
Bing 0.00 0.33 0.44
Total 0.51 0.22 0.61 Total 0.09
Esso 0.67 0.33 0.56 Texaco 0.00
Shell 0.57 0.33 0.89 Jet 0.17
Total 0.30 0.00 0.38
Total 0.35 0.55 0.38 Total 0.02
Reebok 0.11 0.60 0.17 Asics 0.00
Nike 0.50 0.33 0.70 Slazenger 0.04
Adidas 0.44 0.71 0.29
Total 0.48 0.46 0.65 Total 0.11
Innocent 0.63 0.60 0.67 The co-operative 0.22
Tropicana 0.50 0.67 0.67 Iceland 0.00
SunnyD 0.30 0.13 0.63
Supermarket 
Orange juice 
Sports clothing
Fastfood 
Service station 
Search engine 
Misled
 item
Mid-range car
Game console 
Low cost airline
Fizzy soft drink
Laptop
(Collapsed)
Condition/Item Type
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Appendix I 
Experiment 3: Example photo versions ‘Breakfast’  
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Appendix J 
Experiment 3: Full list of semantic associates used in the DRM paradigm 
Critical targets with list items and foils (last three words per list) from the Stadler, 
Roediger, and McDermott (1999) norms 
 
DOCTOR: nurse, sick, lawyer, medicine, health, hospital, dentist, physician, ill, 
patient, office, stethoscope, surgeon, clinic, cure 
SMELL: nose, breathe, sniff, aroma, hear, see, nostril, whiff, scent, reek, stench, 
fragrance, perfume, salts, rose 
SLEEP: bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, 
nap, peace, yawn, drowsy 
ROUGH: smooth, bumpy, road, tough, sandpaper, jagged, ready, coarse, uneven, 
riders, rugged, sand, boards, ground, gravel 
CHAIR: table, sit, legs, seat, couch, desk, recliner, sofa, wood, cushion, swivel, stool, 
sitting, rocking, bench 
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Appendix K 
 
Experiment 4: Table showing brand categories and brands used in this study with 
mean proportions of yes-responses in the recognition test as a function of Item type, 
Condition and Age group. 
 
Overall Younger Older Overall Younger Older Overall Younger Older
Walkers 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.82 0.93 0.75 1.00
Doritos 0.70 0.60 0.80 0.62 0.78 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00
Galaxy 0.69 0.67 0.75 0.62 0.50 0.73 0.86 1.00 0.80
Cadbury 0.57 0.50 0.64 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.92 0.80 1.00
Evian 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.79 1.00 0.70
Volvic 0.38 0.30 0.45 0.62 0.67 0.50 0.85 0.60 1.00
Innocent 0.62 0.56 0.75 0.52 0.60 0.45 0.71 0.75 0.70
Tropicana 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.62 0.67 0.50 0.92 1.00 0.88
Coca Cola 0.29 0.40 0.22 0.54 0.75 0.44 0.94 0.89 1.00
Pepsi 0.31 0.25 0.33 0.64 0.60 0.67 0.81 0.90 0.67
Costa Coffee  0.64 0.80 0.56 0.46 0.50 0.44 1.00 1.00 1.00
Starbucks 0.38 0.25 0.44 0.50 0.60 0.44 0.81 1.00 0.50
Heineken 0.50 0.20 0.67 0.62 0.75 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00
Carling 0.38 0.50 0.33 0.57 0.60 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00
Strongbow 0.64 0.80 0.56 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.72 0.56 0.89
Bulmers 0.54 0.50 0.56 0.57 0.40 0.67 0.81 0.70 1.00
Overall Younger Older Overall Younger Older
Golden Wonder 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.16
Seabrook 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Green & /  Black's 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.13
Ritter Sport 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.08
San Pellegrino 0.33 0.20 0.50 0.14 0.40 0.17
Iceni 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Don Simon 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00
Coldpress 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tango 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.14 0.00
Orangina 0.00 0.25 0.08 0.33 0.04 0.29
Pumpkin Cafe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Coffee Republic 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00
John Smith's 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00
Tennent's 0.10 0.25 0.21 0.00 0.17 0.20
Olde English 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.00
Blackthorn 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.00
Foil items
Crisp
Chocolate
Cider
Misled item Control item
Original items Misleading items Original items
Beer
Cider
Fizzy soft
drink
Coffeee
shop
Bottled
water
Orange
juice
Fizzy soft
drink
Coffeee
shop
Beer
Foil items
Condition/Item Type/Age group
Crisp
Chocolate
Bottled
water
Orange
juice
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Appendix L 
Experiment 5: Tables showing the mean ratings (SE) for liking and likelihood of 
buying of all item types as a function of Condition, Endorsement, and Time 
 
 
Liking scale   
 
 
 
 
Likelihood of buying scale 
 
Endorsement/
Time
Endorsed
Time 1 8.47 (.28) 6.13 (.22) 7.62 (.20) 6.87 (.49)
Time 2 8.54 (.27) 6.75 (.24) 7.80 (.20) 6.67 (.53)
Non-Endorsed
Time 1 8.09 (.19) 5.89 (.37) 5.85 (.84) 5.16 (.17)
Time 2 7.76 (.22) 5.67 (.38) 6.67 (.75) 5.09 (.18)
Original 
items 
Misleading 
items 
Original 
item 
Foil 
items
Item type/Condition
Misled item Control item (Collapsed)
 
 
Notes. It should be noted that the means for the misleading items do occasionally not 
match these reported in-text. The reason is missing data points that slightly change 
the means when more complex analysis (e.g. two-way repeated measures ANOVA 
including Misinformation endorsement (endorsed vs. non-endorsed) and Time (time 1 
vs. 2) is used. 
Endorsement/
Time
Endorsed
Time 1 8.38 (.26) 6.26 (.21) 7.63 (.20) 6.93 (.45)
Time 2 8.33 (.30) 6.87 (.22) 7.89 (.18) 6.62 (.45)
Non-Endorsed
Time 1 8.08 (.18) 5.99 (.31) 5.85 (.76) 5.37 (.16)
Time 2 7.93 (.19) 6.06 (.30) 6.45 (.77) 5.34 (.18)
Item type/Condition
Original 
items 
Misleading 
items 
Original 
item 
Foil 
items
Misled item Control item (Collapsed)
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